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FOREWORD
In January 1990 thirty-two experts from twelve countries convened
for a five-day working Seminar on the Berkeley Campus of the
University of California to discuss electrici,y supply and demand.
The participants brought with them deep and c,.verse backgrounds ill
energy issues. They chose the name "The First 1990 Group on
Electricity".
At that time, the Berlin Wall had just come down; Eastern European
nations were holding elections; China had closed itself off, but the
Soviet Union was opening its news media and its economy to the
Western world. Americans were talking about how to utilize the
"peace dividend", but at the same time, thoughtful persons were
warning against too much euphoria.
Less than half a year later, Iraq's actions marked another "lifetime"
event that has thoroughly tempered this optimism. Once again there
is a widespread wariness about the future. Once again, energy is a key
factor. As actual war drew near, world oil prices jumped. Americans
had vivid memories of the oil embargoes and gas lines of the !970's.
But almost as suddenly, oil prices dropped again, even as it became
obvious that neither Iraq nor Kuwait would be back up to its pre-war
production for many months or even years.
Less dramatic, less publicized, and less imminent are the risks that
may turn into real dangers because of electricity shortages in the
coming decade.
A major concern of The First 1990 Group on Electricity was the
potential impact of electricity shortages on the environment, just at a
time of growing awareness of environmental deterioration. These
concerns extend from local problems to nations, regions and global
impacts. Indeed, because of the importance of electricity in our lives,
potential electric power shortages already foreseeable in this decade
could overwhelm public concern for the environment, unless critical,
]ong-leadtime measures are taken very soon.
The First 1990 Group on Electricity's Findings and Conclusions, the
thinking that led to them, and the impact of events in the intervening
year form the content of this book.
All the prepared papers and statements from the Seminar appear in
full-page width. Conversations, arguments, comments and responses
are indented, beginning with the speaker's name as a hanging indent.
In spots, we pulled interrupted comments together where challenges
and cross-discussion became spirited.
As events unfolded during the ensuing year, we were struck by
messages in points that were made by various participants. Things
changed, but many of the key points were to remain the same. Over
the past year, we discussed these developments together, and some-
times with various Seminar participants.
When we occasionally introduce our observations after the benefit of
hindsight, we keep them clearly identified by indenting them and
putting them in brackets.
As for the body of the text, we have edited for clarity and sometimes
tbr readability in English especially, but we have not changed the
substance of the taped transcript or working papers we used. How-
ever, the narrow bracketed paragraphs are ours, and we, rather than
any of the participants, take full responsibility for them.
- A. David Rossin
- T. Kenneth Fowler
July 1991
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Though different from country to country, the symptoms of electricity
shortages are worldwide. Shortages, once they impact the public, are likely
to force emergency responses which are bad for the environment and bad for
any economy.
Everyone at the Seminar agreed that the time was right. Brownouts had
begun to show up in the U.S. (Florida and the Northeast). The U.S. Dept. of
Energy had embarked upon the preparation of (and since published) a
National Energy Strategy. Some experts were talking of a "window of
opportunity" to develop new sources of energy.
W. Kenneth Davis chaired the opening round table. "There seems to be an
almost complete lack of leadership on energy-related matters in industry and
government", he said, "both nationally and internationally. I don't know
how to correct it. But I don't know how some of the problems can be solved
unless we get some real leadership."
In January, 1990, it was a time for hope. Dr. Melvin Gottlieb commented,
"The most important event of our lifetime is that the danger of a nuclear
holocaust is retreating. Problems are very different in different parts of the
world; this is true. Nevertheless, we know very well how important electric
energy has been in improving the way of life in this country and other
countries can attest to similar experiences. We do have a common need and
we have much common information that we can use to the betterment of life
ali over the world."
As the decade opened, there was indeed a feeling of hope. Despite warnings
about the problems facing nations of the East Bloc as they emerged from
several decades of a rigid, closed economic system, speeches rang with
excitement for the future. There was a real easing of international tensions.
To people concerned about the environment, these developments appeared
to offer an opportunity to address problems on a global scale, through trade,
through international agencies and through shared scientific research of
benefit to ali of mankind.
[Less than half a year later. Iraq's actions have already tempered this
optimism into a wariness about lhc future. Once again, energy is al the
core of the crisis. The Middle East war was largely about oil. lt had
many and complex causes, but oil, the money it brings in, and the
potential political power that control of huge oil supplies brings is at
the heart of it all.
When the word "energy" is used, oil dominates. Oil provides the power
to make things move, and also to make chemicals, plastics, and
medicines. The concern of this book is electricity. In the U.S. and
Western Europe, burning of oil for generation of electricity has been
substantially reduced us nuclear power, coal and natural gas replaced
oil. But in many nations, oil is the dominant fuel for making electricity,
or at least it is the fuel at the margin: if electricity demand is to grow,
the additional supply will not come from new nuclear or coal plants,
or even natural gas in nations thai have ii or can afford to import it, but
from burning more oil.]
We live in a world in which the economically advanced nations are
becoming more concerned about environmental quality, not just within their
borders, but about global concerns which might affect ali humanity in the
future. As huge numbers of people around the globe strive for a better life,
they see that they will need to be able to use energy at a rate approaching
today's global average. And they will soon recognize that those nations
where people have a better life use a larger fraction of their energy in the
toml of electricity.
As economic leaders of the world, the industrialized nations play a special
role. To sustain world economic growth and improve environmental quality,
it is imperative that these countries begin now to assure their own electric
energy supply in the coming decades, make the best use of existing
technologies, and reinvigorate research and development on improved
energy technologies for the future.
This is vital because the developing nations must find ways to increase their
electric generating capacity many-fold over the next hailcentury, lt is these
nations, rather than the United States and Europe, that will control most of
what enters the atmosphere. Through commerce and international agree-
ments, positive achievements by the industrialized nations can directly
benefit these nations and the global environment.
Positive strides are being made in industrialized nations to conserve energy
through innovation, efficiency improvements and incentives, which should
lead to the growth of a conservation ethic on tile part of people tile world
over.
However. after reducing projected demand by taking full credit for success
of conservation efforts, new electric power plants will still be needed. Old
plants must be replaced. A mix of options and enough lead time to make
sound choices on both demand and supply sides is far safer than short-term
decisions and catch-up policies. Choices need to reflect local, regional and
giobal environmental priorities, as well as the economics and reliabiliiy of
the entire electric supply a_d delivery system.
WHAT GIVES US CREDIBILITY?
Participants in Tlle First 1990 Seminar on Electricity were invited because
of their knowledge anti actual experience in positions of responsibility in
eneroy_,supply, use and resea, ch.
We looked for outstanding scholars and managers, government ministers
and scientists. The Group that finally met at the Bechtel Engineering Center
on the Berkeley Campus included 21 from the U.S., 1I from other nations
and four invited speakers. These are people who have had responsibilities
for supplying electricity, or whose studies are recognized in this area. We
spoke frankly. Although there were many disagreements on s_ecil'ic details,
there was no disagreement with the overall Findings.
Our discussions divided into global concerns, the experience of and the
problems facing industrialized nalions, and issues of critical importance in
the developing world.
In developing the Findings. we set a limit of two pages. That meant reaching
consensus on what issues were essential, recognizing thai some issues of
strong interest to certain individuals could not be expressed con:.isely
enough to be included. Nevertheless, before the Seminar week ended, every
partkipant signed off. either in person or by FAX. on the Findings and
Conclusions, and oq tile Recommenc ations.
[In addition to approval by the Participants, copies of the Statement,
consisting of a one-page introduction, the Findings and Conclusions,
and the Recommendations. were sent to 165 persons who had been
contacted about the Seminar (some who had e>:pressed an imerest in
attending but could not schedule it/, and others from govemmenl,
university, research and industry organizations. Eighty of these people
were asked to respond by mail or FAX, and a signature form was
,_ included ii'the individual wished to join in approval of the Statement.
There were 61 positive responses and only two declined to approve.
Both stated that although they agreed with much of it, they had certain
concerns and, since they had not taken part in the :liscussions, they felt
it would not be appropriate to sign the statement. Many offered to assist
in further dissemination of the Statement.]
WHAT KINDS OF ACTIONS?
Our goal is to piace the Findir, gs of the Seminar in the hands of leaders
and policymakers in countries around the world.
[The Findings and Conclusions and the Recommendations were
delivered to the White House and the Department of Energy, and were
carried back home by each of the int,.mational participants for dis-
semination.]
The U.S. is taken as a special case, in part because of its size, resources,
economy, and patterns of energy generation and use. This was reflected by
m_:ny of the foreign participants, who pointed out that what the U.S. does
will certainly affect political positions and policy decisions in other nations.
They expressed disappointment in the failure of the U.S. to emerge with any
clear energy policy after so many years of talking about it. They feared that
with a lack of leadership from the U.S., their own political decisions could
tend toward the expedient and short-terne, rather than being long-reina,
sound and environmentally responsible.
CONSENSUS ON THE NEED FOR ELECTRIC SUPPLY
[In reviewing the Seminar transcripts in order to prepare this manu-
script we, as editors, were again struck by the unanimity among so
diverse a group of experts, on the key points underlying our Findings.
In the end, this diversity served mainly to bring out new points of
consensus, rather than to find irreconcilable differences, lt enabled us
to understand differences, which sometimes arose from misunder-
standing oi another's positions, but occasionally revealed basic dis-
agreements in personal or nationalistic philosophy.
This consensus was particularly evident when it came to the basic
linkage between electricity and well-being, and the certainty that, even
with broad success of the best efforts at energy conservation, more
electric generating capacity will still be needed.
There was also general agreement that the risks associated with ali of
the different ways of generating electricity are rather well understood.
In addition, and offeven more importance, there was consensus on the
evidence that societies with adequate energy had better health, more
hope [foreconomic growth, and better environmental quality. And, as
the actual discussions reveal, participants [felt strongly that the down-
side risks or"inadequate electricity supply can be much more serious
than the risks [from any mix of generating capacity.
Large, fuel-efficient power plants, either coal with environmental
control technology or nuclear plants, will take about six years for
actual construction. Permits, licensing and site preparation can add
,wo or more years to the lead time. This means that power plant
decisions made in 1991 will, at least in the United States. result in
actual power to the grid no sooner _tmn the turn of the century.
Long lead-time adds urgency to our Findings. This lead time is typical
of most oi" the industrialized world, where public policies have
discouraged new power plant construction [for two decades. (Japan,
France and Korea are notable exceptions.)
But long lead times are also inevitable in developing countries because
of the di[fficulty in obtaining international financing and the lack of"
hard currency for high technology imports. And as we heard repeat-
edly at the Seminar, this dilemma is particularly acute, because
shortages of electricity stand in the way offeconomic growth.]
SECTION 2
FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS
THE TEST OF TIME
The First 1990 Group on Electricity Findings and Conclusions are listed
below. In this book, we will explain why we arrived at them, share the
discussions that formed the basis for our reasoning,, and show their urgent
importance for the future.
[We continue to be struck by the timeliness of these Findings and
Conclusions, despite the momentous and unforeseen events of 1990
and 1991. In fact, these events and the changes they portend only
heighten our concerns about electricity supply in the decade ahead. ]
ELECTRICITY IS ESSENTIAL
Electricity is the key energy fore1 for ever}, modem economy. People
depend on it. As electricity has become widely available, societies have
improved their health, well-being, and quality of life, but also their environ-
ment and the global environment as weil.
ELECTRICITY AND THE DEVELOPING WORLD
Eighty percent of the world population lives in developing countries. Ever-
increasing amounts of energy and electricity are required for any substantial
improvement in their living conditions. China, tor example, projects the
need Io triple its coal burning, ii"it can find ways to haul it. To different
deorees_,.. developing countries lack sufficient electricity,, and this means
constraints on their urgent needs for food, clothing, housing, health and
education. Many of the developing countries face severe constraints in
mobilizing their own resources and raising capital to finance the power
sector, let alone to introduce advanced technologies and efficiency improve-
ments.
SHORTAGES ARE COMING
People depend on electricity for services that are critical to their jobs, life-
st}'le, health and well-being. The U.S. faces foreseeable shortfalls in electric
supply before the end of this decade, based on expected demand and supply.
Certain regions have already experienced transmission problems, curtail-
merits, brownouts or even rolling blackouts.
THE "D()WNSIDE RISKS" ()F EI,ECTRICITY SH()RTA(_,ES
The safety, and environmental risks of electricity, generatmn,," have received
much detailed revie\v and ;til o1 the public at!ention. But the downside risks
of inadequate electricity, are not as well recognized even though they are real.
more immediate, and potentially, much more serious. Downside risks e"o
beyond brownouts or blackouts during severe weather or emergencies. They
mean short-tenn, hi_,h-c{o_st. environmentally, unsound stop-cap,_ measures
like turning to natural '2"--asand oil aeain,_ for electricity" the imposition by
government of enforced conservation, rationing and even allocation of
electricity supply' between competing uses: t_otentially severe impacts on
tecimological competitiveness: and limitations on economic growth be-
cause of doubts about future electricity' supply. Examoles of these downside
risks are evident today' in many pans of the developing world.
DIVERSITY
Diversity nmans havino a variety of demaml reducing,, options amt ._Ul_plv
imreasinv options to meet new requirements. Different options offer
advantages for different load requirements (base load, peakin_z, seasonal).
Considering uncertainty of future fuel prices and regulatory requirements,
diversity increases stability in future electricity costs and contributes to the
security of energy supply. The cost of electricity is the cost of operating the
integrated system, so each addition must fit in well to minimize prices to
consumers.
On the demand side. electricity, is being substituted for bumin,,_, of fuels by
the industrial end-user. Process control is more precise, the workplace is
cleaner and safer, and energy is used more efficiently. This inter-fuel
substitution is driving an increasing demand for electricity'.
!, IE(,RATED PLANNIN(;
To escape the stagnation of the past decade requires planning now for action
that would produce sound environmental and economic benefits. Integrated
plans are recommended which _.,,ivebalanced consideration to environmen-
tal protection, public health and sat2"ty, reliable service for ali customers.
cost of electricity', and flexibility to respond to unexpected changes and
world events.
The 1989 Ontario Hydro 25-year demand/supply plan is an example of an
inte,_ratedplan. This proposed plan meets future Ontario electricity needs
as follows:
Total New Requirements 21,600 MWe
Demand-Reducing Options 5,900 MWe
Renewable and High-Efficiency 4,200 MWe
Supply Options
New Base-Load Supply (Nuclear) 7,100 MWe
New Peak-Load Supply (Gas-fired) 4,300 MWe
CONSERVATION
lt is important to achieve improved end use electric energy efficiency. The
focus is to meet people's needs while reducing the amount of energy
required and reducing the associated environmental impact. The national
measures undertaken should be decided after considering all advantages and
disadvantages, including costs and impacts on the economy.
NEW CAPACITY STILL URGENTLY NEEDED
Even with outstanding success in conservation initiatives and efficiency
improvements, substantial amounts of new generating capacity will still be
needed, and decisions are urgent because of the long lead-time (6-10 years
or longer) to license and build major power plants. Many options need to be
available so that responsible choices can be made: no narrow strategy is
realistic.
Nuclear power is the most contentious issue, but if industry and investor
confidence in the U.S. can be regained through licensing reform and
reviving predictable State regulatory treatment, sound long-term market
decisions can be made. After reducing demand projections to account for
conservation and efficiency improvements, and introducing alternative
energy sources where practical, the remaining possibilities for future base-
load electric capacity are between nuclear plants, hydroelectric dams where
environmentally acceptable, "'clean" coal, and burning more gas and oil.
RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT
A renewed emphasis on energy research and development, with inter-
national cooperation and coordination, is essential. The program should
include innovative technologies to conserve energy and a diverse menu of
new and improved energy supply technologies including advanced nuclear
designs, geothermal, solar and other renewable sources, as well as cleaner
and more efficient coal, oil and gas combustion. For the long term, fusion
could mean the opportunity to phase out the least attractive of today's
options.
EDUCATION
Programs to meet the world's energy needs will require more scientists and
engineers in energy fields, and consequently, more science and engineering
teachers and teaching facilities. Programs are needed to stimulate young
people, beginning at pre-college levels, to see the energy field as a challeng-
ing and rewarding career which can help their fellow man and sustain the
global environment.
SECTION 3
ENERGY SHORTAGES: THE DOWNSIDE RISKS
Tile 1970's were a period of new-found concern tbr the environment and an
awakening to the fact that thai natural resources are not unlimited. In many
nations this public concern was soon translated into laws. In the United
States, these laws have in turn led [o a vast array of regulations. The n.tost far-
reachin,,+ piece of legislation in the U.S. turned out to be the National
Environmental Policy Act (NEPA). NEPA requires that environmental
impacts and risks must be evaluated, reported, and in some cases, debated
in public hearings. Alternatives rnust be considered before a project can
begin.
In the 19g0"s environmental regulations became a lever for delaying, and in
sonle cases, cancelling projects. Regulations and their applications were
tested in court, and then tested again in higher courts.
Meanwhile, the Fuel Use Act, econonlic pressures, and concern about future
supply, led U.S. utilities to do anything they could to reduce their depen-
dence on oil for electric power generation. By 1989, oil produced less than
5c/c of ali U.S. electricity, down from 20c/+ in 1073. The major masons for
the decline in oil burning were conversions of oil-fired plants to natural gas,
a few fornler coal-burners that were converted back to coal, and the more
than 65 nuclear power plants that came on line during tile intervening years.
Throughout these two decades, the most controversial issue seemed to be
nuclear power. First tile United Kingdom, then France and Japan, made
major commitn-lents to nuclear power in order to move away from their
heavy dependence on oil for generation of electricity. Other nations fol-
lowed, but by the end of the 1970"s, and after the Three Mile lsland accident,
nuclear power ,,+,';_sbeconling a political issue in country after country.
Initiatives stopped plants in Austria and Switzerland, and later at the national
level in Sweden and Italy. Violence erupted in Spain, stopping construction.
In the U.S., numerous construction permits and operating licepse hearin,_+s
became lengthy battles that have led to huge cost overruns. Two plants
(Shoreham and Rancho Seco)have been shut down as a result of concerted
political actions. Various activist and special interest groups raise questions
and make charges about radiation, waste, safety and weapons prolife;ation.
1()
Industry and government experts document flmir answers with thick reports.
People wonder wlmm they can trust.
Nuclear risks are weighed against risks associated with coal (pollution, acid
rain, the buildup of carbon dioxide); with oil (spills, fires, tanker accidents,
platform collapses, and dependence on the Middle East): with natural gas
(rising prices and limited resources ), and with new alternatives (unknown
economics and unproven technologies). Assessment of health and environ-
mental risks l-ms become ama, ior industry. We have developed the capability
to quantify the risks rather weil.
But the benefits have to be weighed against the risks. Rarely do people hear
about the downside risks: the risks thai come with not having enough
electricity to meet the legitimate needs of the communities the utility serves.
No one claims thal nuclear power is the answer to ali our energy problems.
But nuclear power's contribution is vital. Without it the problem of supply-
ing enough electricity, to meet the legitimate demand of a growing economy
becomes more difficult.
The First 1990 Group are familiar with the environmental risks of energy
production and use. But they agreed that ii is time that people start to look
at the downside risks of not having enough electric power plants.
in most industrialized nations, young people have grown up with depend-
able and relatively economical electricity. Utilities, where they are the
providers of electricity, have (by law in the U.S.) served all. But with too [ew
base-load power plants being built today (coal and nuclear) and the eight to
ten years thai it lakes to gel one built, the odds of an electric generation
shortage before the end of the nineties are mounting. Even with zero growlh
in electric demand, by 1995 in the U.S. alone ii would lake bi,()()()megawatts
each year (the equivalent of seven new large nuclear plants),just to replace
the old plants that become obsolete. That is with no replacement of oil-
burning plants and no growth in demand. Only 6,0(10 megawatts were
ordered in 1999. So the stage is being set today, not just for one of the
downside risks, but for any or ali of them, perhaps even at the same linac.
DOWNSIDE RISK ONE: THE SELF-FULFiI,I_iN(; PR()PHECY
Privately-owned utilities used to be accused (sometimes correctly)of
building a new power plant, then advertising to promote demand for the
power to justify its decision. Some called thal a "'self-fulfilling prophecy".
In the days of 3 per cent interest rates, the new plant would produce power
al less cost than what it replaced, lt would br more efficient, and cleaner as
weil. Now there is no financial incentive for any utility to build anything.
Today there is a new, real and serious "self-fulfillipg prophecy." ( _nstruc-
tion plans are not keeping up with projections of future load. _eserve
margins are dropping each year. But it will be ahnost a decade before the real
impact will be felt in most regions of the U.S.
Utility executives continue to study the history of activist opposition and
denials of rates by their state commissions to covet" return on investments.
The U.S. Seminar participants described these difficult decision analyses,
and some of their experiences were matched by those from other nations. In
the last decade, the prudent financial decision has generally been to put off
any new construction projects.
But if a utility company cannot promise reliable electric service, the next
factory or office complex will go somewhere else. With it go the jobs. Next,
other local companies cancel plans for expansion. It could even lead to
closing of companies that had been pillars of the community for years. That,
again, becomes a self-fulfilling prophecy.
DOWNSIDE RISK TWO: PRIORITIES AND ALLOCATION
The theory of some who oppose new power plants is that growth is
unnecessary, that if government provides appropriate encouragement ev-
eryone will conserve, the right amount of energy waste will be skimmed
away, and that more energy supply and use, with ali its environmental
impacts, will be avoided.
However, on the downside, there is a risk if there is not enough electricity
to supply all users. When there are only so many generating plants, and the
various new demands turn out to be greater than the supply, priorities will
have to be set.
What new use should have p lority tor a limited remaining amount of
electric supply'? A factory with its jobs'? A new energy-efficient office
building'? A hospital'? Apartments'? One hundred four-bedroom houses'?
Should each residence have a limit'? Should certain appliances be banned'?
Just who should set these priorities'? Not the utility company; that is not its
role under U.S. regulatory law, since a utility has no right to discriminate
among users. Should the state order the utility to raise rates or should it tax
energy use to depress demand, even though that would increase welfare
payments? If not, that leaves allocation. The priorities would be set and
enforced, not by the utility, but by government. But not one public official
has called for hearings on how to set prioriiies for electricity when there is
not enough to go around.
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DOWNSIDE RISK THREE: WAR
The third downside risk sounded so frightening tit the time of The F;rst 1990
Group's seminar thai ii was hard to talk about ii: war over energy. But before
the end of 1990, war in the Middle East became ;l bloody reality. Thai war
was notjust about oil: ii was about power, and the control of oil lind the riches
thai oil exports could bring in thai could be used to build more military and
political power.
So the downside risk of war over energy is no longer only a risk, but a reality.
Its implications are tilt from clear. Daniel Yc rgin, in "'The Prize", documents
the lengths nations have gone to protect and control the world's oil supply.
The question now is whether or not the industrialized nations will lake this
warning seriously for the future.
WHAT IT IS ALL ABOUT
Competing views come into conflict when a new power plant, or even a new
energy technology, is proposed. Permits and licenses are required. Some
kind of governmental action is required in every nation. There are opportu-
nities for those who oppose a project to be heard, and in some cases, for them
to take an active role in opposition, to lk)rce delays, or to make their case for
rejecting the proposal. Financing must be obtained, and the climate for
raising investment capital or allocating government funds must be favorable
enough to attract capital.
In the industrialized countries there is broad political support for energy
conservation programs. There are also opportunities for investment in
improvements that will save energy through improved efficiency. These
efforts can reduce the rate of growth in electricity demand. At issue is, by
how much? Does this mean that no additional generation facilities are
needed? Does ii defer the need for the next plant, and if so, by how many
years'? Does it mean a different mix of base-load and peaking capacity, or
suggest a di fferent mixof fuels lhr better energy efficiency and conservation
of resources'?
And if more capacity is needed, how much can be delivered by alternative
or renewable energy sources? During the late 1970"s, it was politically
popular to call ti_r "'soft" and decentralized energy technologies, which
could free the user from dependence of large utility suppliers. The U.S.
Congress passed laws thai would encourage independent power producers,
and these have resulted in numerous invesin:ents in solar and wind power
generating facilities. However, most of the independent power projects burn
natural gas.
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Some of the most eutspoken political activists in tile U.S., Canada, Sweden
and in COnlinentai Europe, demand a commitment now to stop nuclear
power. Their argument is thai investment in a nuclear plant would both
alleviate the need and sap the resom'ces lk_r investmenls in conservation oc
alternative energy. What is nol yet clear is just ho;v much du:nand will exist
ii their rcconmmndations arc accepted. Decisions to defer ali new baseload
capacity without assurance of the exten! to which demand-side investments
will work also creale downside risks.
No one can predict with certainty just how much capacity will be required
for decades to come. But the risks of having too many power plants need lo
he compared wilh the downside risks of not having enough, This has not
been done when the environmental risks of building a power plant at a
specific site are analyzed.
A commercial airline considers downside risk. When a London to New York
flight takes off, it is carrying a specific measure of fuel over and above what
it takes to make the flight. This means higher inventory costs and more
weight on takeoff and landing because experience says there may be weather
delays or other unexpected developments. Cutting fuel loads close to the line
is tempting, but the downside risks of running short are well known, not only
lo pilots and executives, but to passengers and politicians.
If the debate about energy is to deal with risks, the downside risks of electric
energy shortage deserve to be a feature of it. If a free society is to arrive at





The ultimate downside risk is to be unprepared when events force society to
abandon a fuel source orenergy technology upon which ii has relied heavily.
The risk becomes a reality if lead times for development and substitution of
new technologies are long (and they generally are) but societies fail to act
when there is still time to do something about it. The task becolnes ali the
more difficult when there is a lack of scientists and engineers to create and
implement new technologies.
These issues are the domain of research and education, which are always
struggling for priority against near-term needs. Yet, they are essential l'orthe
long tern1.
Since the 1950"s, resource experts have warned that the fossil fuels that
created the industrial revolution are not renewable, not infinite, arm must
escalate in cost as more accessible supplies dwindle. Finding and extracting
them will get more costly. Others decried the pollution from burning fossil
fuels, and in recent ycars, the longer-term concerns about global warming.
In the 1960's and '970's, these issues first gave impetus to the growth of
nuclear power, and then to research and development of long-term options
including breeder rea¢:tors, fusion and solar power. By the 1980's, it was
clear thai this forward-looking program was in trouble. Energy research
funding waned. The breeder reactor became the target of concerns about
diversion of plutonium and proliferation of nuclear weapons. Fission
reactors faced teclmical, economic and political problems, and they turned
into a target thai mobilized political opposition to nuclear power.
Thus today, as concerns about long-term supplies of fossil fuels and
environmental deterioration become ali the more pressing, we find our-
selves unprepared for the very uncertain energy future ahead of us. The
Seminar participants felt strongly that reversing this trend, including a
revival of lluclear power, is of critical importance. There was a solid
consensus that the time i:_ripe for action, both at the national and interna-
tional level.
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FUSION - AN INTERNATIONAL EFFORT
Nuclear fusion has emerged as the paradigm for international cooperation
in government-sponsored energy research. Research on fusion dates to the
195()'s when it was realized that the deuterium in the oceans represents an
essentially infinite energy source with relatively benign environmental
consequences. The first major milestone is to demonstrate that tlm difficult
process works in the laboratory. After three decades of research on ever
larger and more expensive experimental devices, scientists believe thai they
have proved the feasibility of the process. More challenging scientific work
remains, and that must be followed by extensive engineering development,
demonstration of practicality, and ultimate deployment on a commercial
scale. Fusion reactors could then be integrated into large electric grids of
industrialized regions.
Recognizing the long-ternl costly nature of fusion research and develop-
ment, leaders in the field, including those _n the Soviet Union, began
preparing the way to collaborate on an engineering test reactor at the first
opportunity. That opportunity came in 1985, at the first summit meeting of
President Reagan and Secretary Gorbachev. By 1988, this had led to the joint
effort by the U.S., U.S.S.R., Japan and the European Communities to design
and construct the world's first experimental fusion reactor, the International
Thermonuclear Experimental Reactor (ITER).
[The conceptual design phase, completed in 1990, was an outstanding
example of international teamwork that can become a model for other
large science projects. By February, 1991, ali parties including the
U.S. had declared their intention to continue to the engineering design
phase at a cost of about $1 billion spread over five years, shared equally
among the partners, at about $50 million per year each. If eventually
constructed, the device is estimated to cost about $6 billion, again to
be shared equally.]
A BALANCED RESEARCH PROGRAM
As fusion has led the way in internationalizing hmg-term energy research,
new international industrial consortia, sometimes partially government-
funded, are contributing to the development of a new generation of fission
reactors and other energy technologies. Moreover, spurred in part by the
global warming issue land the Mideast War], some governmental leaders in
the U.S. and elsewhere are advocating a broad menu of energy research
activities. These include innovative technologies to conserve energy a:_well
as new and improved energy supply technologies: advanced nuclear reac-
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tors, fusio _, geothermal, solar and other renewables, and cleaner, more
efficient energy from combustion of coal, oil and natural gas.
A broad-based program for long-term research and development, including
demand-side management, supported by the private sector as well as by
governments, would give the greatest assurance that adequate generating
capacity will be r-_intained, despite the many uncertainties ahead in the
future. The promise of technology improvements to come should help to
allay public fears, because they provide the opportunity to phase ouc the least
attractive of today's energy options.
Yet there is a danger if p:_mises become a substitute for action. This is
especially true now on the para of those who demand a commitment to stop
nuclear power with no clear a_ternatives in sight. Such a decision could make
the likelihood of future electric generating shortages very high indeed.
EDUCATION
After the Second World War, a good many veterans found their service
experience led to productive careers in the energy sector. Following the
removal of classification barriers from nuclear science and technology,
man 5, universities opened departments to respond to the demand for educa-
tion in _his new field. The environmental awakening of the early 1970's and
the energy crises that followed attracted many bright young minds into
applied science and engineering. But during the 1980's, the decline in
support tor energy research has contributed to a decrease in student enroll-
ments in science and engineering thai has already reached alarming propor-
tions in some countries. In the U.S. the problem has penetrated even *o the
c"_mentary school level, serving notice that a long recovery period may lie
ahead.
At the college level the health of education is closely tied to job availability,
, and at the graduate level, to support for research. These correlations are
easily measured. Thus, it is not accidental that, in the U.S., following a
period of strong support for fusion research in the 1970's four out of five
DOE Assistant Secreta_les for Research have been fusion scientists. The
field offered challenges that attracted top students.
THE UNIQUE NATURE OF THE GLOBAL WARMING ISSUE
Students and stalesmen alike are auracted to meeting challenges that help
lheir fellow man. In this respect, nothing in recent years has caught the public
imagination as vividly as the perceived threat to the world environment by
the Greenhouse Effect and global warnling. Accordingly, The First 1990
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Group on electricity paid special attention to this issue, both to become
better itlfornled, and to try to sort out the intk+mmtiot_ and misinfl+mmtion
that impacts policy decisions in energy. For that reason, the chapter thal
includes Dr. Michael McCracken's update on global wamling is a valuable
part of this book.
Global warming is closely linked to electricity supply, since CO-2 emitted
when fossil fuels are burned to produce electricity is a maior contributor to
the inventory of man-made Greenhouse gases. The issue is truly global,
since worldwide atmospheric conditions disperse CO-2 around the globe
arm between the northern and southern hemispheres. There is ilo escaping
the consequences of your neighbor's actions.
Moreover, the issue is globally geopolitical! The industrialized nations are
now the maior generators of CO-2. But ii is the developing nations, notably
China with its huge population, vast coal resources and little investment
capital, and India with its huge population and rising aspirations, that will
dominate global emissions twenty years from now and beyond.
The First 1990 Group on Electricity did not discover any magic fommla to
alleviate global vvannir_g, nor could we contribute to reducing the uncer-
tainty' in predicting the magnitude or titnetable for its effects. We did agree
that the global wan-ning issue exacerbates the urgency to develop new
alternatives to fossil fuels and to preserve existing options, including nuclear





Borg: Right at the outset, we need to clarify time scales. What is the time
scale we are considering'. ) Are we talking about 2100'? About the next
fifty years?
Rossin: I would say 20-50 years. We don't need to be totally restrictive. But
we're looking for decisions to be made now that will affect the period 20
to 50 years from now. I think that's broad enough that we can probably
operate within it.
Stauffer: In looking at the agenda, it seems focussed on technical questions
or longer-term forecasts, whereas it strikes me that the problems are
financial, economic or perceptual. Insofar as we want to address deci-
sions that might make a difference, we really have to look at decisions
that might have to be made in the next year or two. So if we use words
that imply long horizons, we would be diluting whatever impact we
might have. We really have to locus on something people might listen to
because they have to make a decision on it in the next couple of years.
Fowler: Sometimes decisions are required almost immediately that also
have long-tem1 impact.
Kaprielian: About 3 years ago. some of us met on this campus and discussed
some of these same matters, mostly in terms of how you deal with crises.
lt sounds to me like we will be discussing here what I would call the very
near term, which is 20 to 50 years. Thal's the near term in the long range
scheme of things. I would hope that whatever our recommendations for
the very near term are, they would not be inconflict with what are the best
interests in the much longer term.
Shapar: lt is important that we clarify the time frame, whatever it is, so that
our action plan will be comprehensible. I think it is unlikely that we will
achieve unanimity or a broad consensus, so 1would not take too much
time trying to do that. To the eatent we apl_,:oachcontroversial issues !ike
nuclear power. I would not be diverted from saying that nuclear power
should be part of the energy mix simply becauge in some countries public
acceptance is not sufficient to endorse that kind of an approach. If we
think it is the right way to go, we should say so.
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Li: Your aim is to issue an Action Statement. I think that is very good, and
your initial draft is very proper. We must emphasize in the introductory
paragraph the importance of adequate electric supply Ibr future develop-
ment. lt is a matter of life, of economic prosperity, and this should be
repeatedly emphasized. What do you mean by the future? Now in the
place I come from, I will be very. frank about it, we don't plan beyond 15
years. We don't! If other countries want to plan for 50 years or the next
century, that is a different story. I think we must settle on some sort of
definition about the future. Dr. Starr's paper goes to 2060.
Davis: With respect to time frame, we need to talk about decisions that ought
to be made essentially now, that is, during the next one, two or three
years. We should locus on the things people ought to decide to do now
in terms of what's important for electricity in the future. We ought to
focus on who ought to do it and what they ought to do. The impact of
those decisions depends on what those decisions are and will extend over
periods of a decade, two decades or perhaps 50 years. The important
thing in coming up with our Action Statement is to try to determine what
are the high-priority important things that people ought to do now. That
is the time frame from my point of view.
IS NOW A UNIQUE OPPORTUNITY FOR ACTION?
Dr. Melvin Gottlieb, now a consultant at Grumman Corp., was a
leading fusion scientist at Princeton and Director of the Princeton
Plasma Physics Laboratory. He caught the feeling of many thai at the
beginning of the decade there was a spirit of hope that we could really
cut back on war expenditures because of the changes in the Soviet
Union. The Berlin Wall had just come down,the East Bloc was opening
up. the newly-elected President of Czechoslovakia was coming to the
U.S. for a visit, and prospects lhr a "peace dividend" that might make
it possible to invest in long-term environmental improvements and
building rational energy infrastructure were on political agendas.
Experts talked eagerly of new prospects for the industrialized world
helping the developing countries with their financial needs for energy
investments.
This is what Dr. Gottlieb said:
"'At the present time, it seems to me, the most important and dramatic event
of our lifetime is that the danger of a nuclear holocaust is retreating. That is
an extremely important element in the lives of evew one of us. It's
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something that people ali over the world are acutely interested in, because
it could affect every one of them.
If this is retreating, we now have the luxury to say, let us address the
opportunity of improving the lives of people ali over the world. A very
important element in this would be electric ener,,v_,. We know very well how
important electric energy has been in improving the way of life in this
country and other countries can attest to similar experiences.
Therefore, we have an opportunity to look at this in a global sense, in sharing
of data on how energy is used, on the environmental aspects, on the
economics, on the research and development. We should make use of this
opportunity to take a global approach, and organize effectively to help one
another in solving these problems. They are very different in different parts
of the world: this is true. Nevertheless, we do have a common need and we
have much common information that we can use to the betterment of life ali
over the world.
I think it is on this very positive element that we should proceed, rather than
making a declara__ion that we think nuclear energy is important. Fhat, as a
headline, will get you on the last page of the newspaper under Birttls and
Deaths. However, that may be, and perhaps will, be an important conse-
quence of the statements we make."
[The world was hopeful at the beginning of the decade. Scarcely a year
elapsed before war devastated the Middle East, but in the same breath
it also became clear that the tear of nuclear attack from the Soviet
Union that had dominated U.S. defense policy for three decades was
changing. The wor!d also learned that utter devastation can be swift
without resort to nuclear anns. The window of opportunity for apply-
ing major internalional resources toward solving global energy and
environmental problems closed before the year was out. Unfortu-
nately, the most immediale needs now' are tk_r rebuilding. ]
"(;,I,,OBAL"' - TWO DEF_(NITI()NS
[As the discussion evolved ii became evident that the word "global"
was being used in tw() contexts. One is with regard to global warming.
Carbon dioxide in the atmosphere has worldwide (i. e. global) impact,
which would be manifested in regional and local changes in climates
and geography. The word is also used with reference to problems,
policies, initiatives and solutions that apply to ali countries, to most
countries, or to ali countries to some extent. ]
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Dr. C. Y. Li, Science Advisor to tile President of Taiwan, wisely suggested
that we had belier reach an understanding of what we were talking about:
Li: When I came to this meeting and saw the list of participants-- most from
the U.S. -- I felt that this Seminar will be directed more toward what the
U.S. is facing.
1 worry about two things: You talk about "global". That is very big. Of
course there are problems which are "global". But there are a lot of
problems which are not global. So I want lo _,,elclear how we are ,_e,oing
to deal with global problems and how we are going to deal with regional
problems. 1 think that may be different.
Second: In your draft action statement, you put emphasis on "'developing
countries". But there are countries which are really neither developed
nor developing countries. There ;ire countries in-between. And there are
countries thai are not even in :he developing stage.
So ali of this makes me worried. When you issue the action statement,
to whom is it aimed? To the U.S. or to ali countries'?
Sanchez-Sierra: 1 would like to add to Prof. Li's comment. This is a very
important and valid point. Our objective has to be on a global basis. This
kind of action has to be oriented to a global perspective, not just L;.'¢. -
oriented. I think thai the problems we have in the power sector, even
though they are different by region, are global problems. Most of the
problems are totally interrelated, not just from the economic point of
view, or from the developmenl point of view, but from the environmental
point of view. So that kind of global perspective is crucial for any kind
of action statement that we can produce here.
Li: But I still feel that we should subdivide global problems into regional or
sub-regional groups, because countries are very different. I come from
Asia, a_ld I've worked in Asia fora long time. I always consider thai Asia
is not one continent. I divide Asia into tl_ree: Pacific Asia and facing the
Pacific Ocean. that's one. From Burma onward, including India, Paki-
stan and Bangladesh, that's another one. Then l'rom Iran onward, that's
the Middle East. These three Asias are very, different. Culturally they are
dilTerent, their problems are different. Now the reason I said I am worried
about the word "'global" is that in the old days we tried to compile
stalistics for ali these countries, grouping them together, and the statislics
were most misleading. This is because Pacific Asia progressed very fast.
But ii wm cornbine those data with India and Pakistan. the whole picture
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is distorted. That is wily I anl concerned when you talk about global
statistics.
Blue: I'm CEO of General Atomics, the company that has designed the
Modular High-Tenlperature Gas-cooled Nuclear Reactor, which is in-
tended to be a second-generation solution to the issue of political
acceptance of fission power, through providing inherent or meltdown-
proof safety. Our company has also been involved lhr many years i,,
fusion research, and under DOE and Government of Japan sponsorship,
we operate one of the two most important magnetic confinement fusion
devices in this country.
There is only, one valid perspective, and that is a global or worldwide
energy perspective. Thai reality is mandated by the fact thai global
environmental degradation does not respect national boundaries. But
more importantly, as Ken Davis has suggested, from an economic point
of view in terms of economic growth and world electric power genera-
tion requirements, the action is out there in the rest of the world, where
the U.S. will play a relatively minor role in terms of percentage of
requirements. There's no question, therefore, what perspective is indi-
cated when we attempt to develop an Action Statement and attempt to
develop some useful conclusions from this session.
I might specifically suggest when describing this conference some
alternative language.I would suggest calling this the "Berkeley Seminar
on Global Electric Power Requirements". The suggestion of using
Berkeley is not only thai this is 'he site oflhe Seminar, but also it imparts
some measure of identity and :ecognition. The word global imparts the
significance of a globe _ perspective and focus on the purpose of the
conference.
Rossin: In drafting material it became obvious that some kind of shorthand
to identify regions or groups of countries was very difl'icult to find a
satisfactory word for. I used the word "'developing" as contrasted to
"'industrialized". Prof. Li's point is right on target, lt is not a good term
to use. li is not very accurate, and yet I do not have a better way to do it.
Sudarsono: lt is difficult to categorize ali the developing countries into one,
because of the variety of the states :)fdevelopment. But we are ali in one
boat, so we have to deal with certain global problems. We here are
looking at 10-20 years. The problem is how societies deal with long-term
energy supplies and choices. In most developing countries, energy is
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being dealt with by government enterprises. Indeed, tile problems are
very different, but the financial problems cited in Latin America are also
severe in the Pacific.
The problem should be relatively simple; a technical one ot"design,
planning and financing. But is has become complex since the 1960's and
70's because of the incorporation of environmental considerations and
public acceptance. Now the media, which of course should not have a
decisive role in any country, does have the key role of detennining the
public perceptions and public points of view, and this impacts the
positions of the politicians who participate in the decisionmaking
process. Because of ali these complexities, making decisions is becom-
ing very difficult in advanced countries. So this is the problem that
societies are facing: how to be democratic and at the same time how to
resolve the issues in an acceptable manner, and to make decisions which
would be acceptable to everybody for the long feral. The problem is how
do we educate the public in general, going into ali the issues, even nuclear
energy and global warming. The problem is essentially non-technical, so
we should be looking for solutions that are non-technical in nature.
Borg: We haven't even mentioned it yet, but ali of the problems we are here
to address are really driven by a population problem which varies in its
severity from one end of the world to the other, lt is something that can't
be forgotten. It's basically going to drive the demand in various parts of




GLOBAL PROJECTIONS OF ENERGY
DEMAND AND SUPPLY
Projections of global electricity demand and how it may be supplied
provide an envelope of conditions that could occur over the coming
decades. No one claims that projections will come true. They serve as
a framework for discussion.
Over the ,ast two years Dr. Chauncey Starr has been carrying out
studies of global energy use and impact. Dr. Start explains what his
ground rules were, the results that he and his co-author Milt Searl
reached, and how he utilizes the research that he's done. The discus-
sion that follows digs into specific findings, assumptions and philoso-
phies about energy and environment.
Dr. Chauncey Starr:
No matter what I've written, I always have to add some new thoughts. I tried
to figure out what the real problem is. With an audience like this, which is
very sophisticated, each one of us knows fully the answers to part of the
questions and generally knows the answers to most of the questions.
What I'm really talking about is a market analysis ['or global electricity
supply: Who wants it'?When do they want it'?And what will they buy? And
what will be the impact oi'these decisions on a particular global environmen-
tal variable: carbon dioxide emissions.
The issue of the timescale doesn't bother me at all. The decisions are made
in the short term. The implementation takes another decade or two, and the
integration into the energy system takes two. three, four decades after that.
You're talking about the whole spectrum of times.
Looking back in time, in the U.S. there once was free competition between
electricity generators and coal suppliers and oil suppliers and gas suppliers.
Gradually, regulation became a basic [actor in energy supply. One can have
regulated industries in what is basically a free-market economy. But a
society that is based on and believes in free-market competition has a
cornpletely different approach than the society that believes in political
goal-setting. We have the latter now in this country.
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What's political goal-setting? Political goal-setting is where institutions at
the top say that the institutions of the country are going to do certain things.
For example, use our natural resources efficiently. That's a political goal. If
you left it up to the free market, market competition would determine how
the natural resources get used. But if you say a political goal is resource
efficiency, and then you start putting in subsidies and taxes and legal
constraints, that is political goal-setting. The rules that we are setting up with
our new Clean Air Act are clearly political goal-setting.
Free market competitiorl isn't going to take care of that one. If we want to
enhance the standard of living globally, by various international agree-
ments, like, for instance, the agreement on chlorofluorocarbons, that's
political goal-setting. Now, that one has particular significance, because to
have global political goal-setting+ you have to have global institutions with
the authority to override national sovereignty. I want to make this point,
because the internationalizing, the globalizing, of environmental issues
implies globalization of government in a subtle and hidden way.
But the essence of what I'm going to show you is that the underdeveloped
part of the world is going to be detemlining the environmental future 50
years from now.
The following report was prepared by Dr. Chauncey Start and Milton
Searl. and was presented to the Seminar as a major address:
(;L()BAL ENERGY, ELECTRICITY FUTURES
AND CLIMATE CHANGE
At present. 3/4 of the world's annual energy production is used by the
industrially developed nations (OECD, U.S.S.R., Eastern Europe), and the
United States consumes about 1/3 of this, or 1/4 of the global total( 1). The
projection described in this stud;>, shows that by the middle of the next
century today's underdeveloped nations will be using about 1/2 of the
world's energy., and the U.S. portion will be rou,,hly+ 1/6 of the world's total.
Thus, improving U.S. energy use may have only modest influence on global
energy den+mhd and global climate. Nevertheless, U.S. policy and perfof
mane,+ will be important as a guide to other nations and to the underdevel-
oped world on the economic feasibility oi irnproved energy systems with
minimal global environmental effect. The future eriE+ct of U.S. energy
choices on global climate must therefore be viewed in the context of a
projected global energy mix.
Enen,y_. systems,, both supply and consumer end-use, lake a long time to
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change. The effect on energy demand of a change in consumer life-style
shows up in a decade or so. Improved end-use system replacenmnt takes two
decades or more to be effective. And it takes anywhere from 30 to 50 years
for the capital equipment in energy, supply systems to be replaced. Thus a
half-century perspective is a useful framework in which to consider current
options and decisions in the energy field.
We have also observed thai during a half-century many societal goals shift,
particularly with respect to economic growth and the quality of life. As an
example of new social goals for our energy systems, the recent concern with
a global climate change arising from the Greenhouse Effect has stimulated
a reexamination of fossil fuels and their enlission of carbon dioxide, and
climate change now competes with economics for national attention.
Further, while new and improved energy options may be forthcoming in the
next halt century, because of the long time lag for producing substantial
changes, we will be depending chiefly on today's known energy options
during the coming half-century to meet these future goals.
Regardless of whether the global climate threat is eventually determined to
be serious or not, some current technological trends should be encouraged.
Certainly, improved efficiency in our conversion of primary energy sources
into end-uses is desirable. Efficiency improvements have generally been
driven by cosl factors and are continuing. Certainly the wasteful end-uses of
energy should be discouraged. And R&D on improved technologies should
be encouraged to l:,rovide a range of options.
What is uncertain is whether governments should interfere with the com-
petitive developmen', of technologies and their economic use in order to
favor those options whose emission of CO, is likely to be less, such as the
group of non-fossil eaergy sources called "'renewables." Non-hydro
renewables Isolar, geothennal, wind. biomass)have many decades of sinai l-
scale experience, and have made some commercial entry into specialized
niches where their economics tire suitable. (They now contribute about
(}.(14%of U.S. electricity,. I The open question is the degree lo which this
group should be subsidized in view of the anlicipated consequences of a
future e,,lobal climate change. A parallel issue is whether the use of conven-
lional fossil fuels should be discouraged by constraints placed on the total
amount of regional CO,. Fossil fuels are the principal support of economic
growth worldwide. Stopping pollution by' stopping economic growth is not
a popular solution, particularly in the underdeveloped regions of the world
where poverty is the greatest social pollutant. In order to provide a rough
framew()rk for considering these questions, and gl()bal climate change in
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particular, this study presents a rough projection of the likely range of global
energy and electricity futures (demand and supply) through the middle of the
21 st century.
(;lA)BAl, DEMAND
The factors that will have the largest influence on global demand are:
(11 populalion growth,
(2 ) economic growth,
(3) improvement in efficiency of energy use, and
(4) advent of improved technologies.
In view of the uncertainties associated with long-term trends for each of
these factors, a half-century projection must be perceived as a framework for
thought, rather than a prediction, However, energy history shows that the
continuation of present trends provides a plausible base case Rtr considering
future scenarios.
The historical impact of new technology is clearly illustrated in Figure 6.1,
which shows how the move to electrification in 1910-1920 altered the
energy/GNP growth rate in the United States(2). Prior to this, the wood and
coal-fired steam engine provided the muscle for the economy. The 19th
century growth of U.S. heavy industry based on these fuels gave rise to the
rapid increase of the energy/GNP ratio prior to 191 (I. After 1910, electricity
and the electric motor radically altered ali systems of production and
improved the efficient use of ali resources, as shown by the subsequent
decrease in the energy/GNP ratio(3). Electrification continues to reduce this
ratio. Electrification is clearly an imperative for the future industrial growth
ali nations.
In the complex of economic output, a rough encompassing paraineter is the
gross national product (GNPI of a society. Figures 6.2 and 6.3 show the U.S.
historical relation of total energy versus GNP, and electricity versus GNP.
The patterns are not the same. A close look at the energy data in Figure 6.2
for tile past decade shows that large discontinuities developed in this
relationship in 1973 and 1979 in response to the two oil-price shocks.
Energy consumers reacted to higher-priced energy by either reducing
consumption or using energy sources more efficiently. This was very
evident in industrial energy use, and in the heating and cooling of buildings.
The history of energy-using devices (e.g., stoves) shows a cost-effective
balance between the cost of fuel and the capital investment in improving
efficiency of use. As fuel cost increases, more is spent on efficiency
improvemenl. Based on the use of best available technologies, the likely
Fi_zure 6.1
U.S. ENERGY/GNP RATIO AND ELECTRICITY FRACTION
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potential for such future conservation by improved efficiency is shown by
the trapezoid area(4) of Figure 6.2. Llnlike U.S. primary energy use,
electricity use, and thus the electricity fraction, continued to increase during
ali this oil-shock period, as evident froin Figure 6.3. The likely potential for
improved efficiency in electricity use is also illustrated by the trapezoid in
Figure 6.3.
The strong connection between GNP and electricity use has been found in
every industrial country where data have been available(5). The aggregate
worldwide electricity-GNP data are shown in Figure 6.4. The slope in some
countries has been altered by a major shift in national energy patterns:
positively by the French stimulus to electrification t'rom low-cost nuclear
power, or negatively by the U.K. development of low-cost North Sea gas.
The net slope has always been positive.
The world's future population is very uncertain because of constantly
changing demographic factors. Figure 6.5 illustrates the range of projections
by the kJnited Nations(6), the Worldwatch Institute, and present trends. The
base case assumed lhr this study is shown in Figure 6.6 in more detail, lt is
evident that the less developed countries will be the chief source of global
population growth. This is a crucial parameter worthy of much policy
consideration.
With these historical relationships as a guide, a synthesis of these individual
projections provides the base case global energy and electricity projections
to the middle of the 2 !st century. The base case assumed the continuation
of the present trends for the per capita growth rate in energy and electricity.
The period 1983-1986 was used to establish the energy growth trend of 1.1 c_,
per year for energy per capita, and the period 1973-1986 was used to
establish a growth of !.75q per year for electricity per capita. Multiplying
by the population projection, total energy and electricity demand can be
estimated to provide a base trend case.
Three cases were considered:
( 1) continuation of the present growth rates,
(the base case as given above);
(2) a "'full conservation" case, described below: and
(3) a zero growth in energy and electricity per capita.
We believe these provide tipper- and lower-bound perspectives. The "'full
conservation" case assumes that direct energy use is reduced to I/2 of the
present trend value and electricity use reduced to 2/3 of the present trend
value, both of which already incorporate post- 1973 conservation achieve-
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ments of about 25c)_for total energy and 1()c7_for electricity,, Direct energy
use is that portion of primary energy applied to end uses that does not involve
an electrification intermediate. These assumptions are based on the previous
estimates of a reasonable maximum for total conservation (Figures 6.2 and
6.3).
The range of global total energy projections for 2060 are shown in Figure
6.7. For purposes of comparison, the energy-GNP trend from 1960-1973
provides the highest projection: the 1983-1986 per capita energy trend
projection is consistent with a 25% embedded conservation from this earlier
trend, and is equivalent to a 1.1% per capita growth rate. The 1.1% per capita
growth rate is our estimate of the present trend, and is our base case. Then
follows, inFigure 6.7, the full conservation estimate for 2060, and finally the
zero per capita growth estimate. The latter three cases are shown in Figure
6.8 for both the Developed Countries (DCs) and the Less Developed
Countries (LDCs).
The results are startling for year 2060 energy demand: an increase of 4.4
times 1986 levels with present trend: 2.5 tin'ms with full conservation: and
1,5 times with zero per capita growth. The less developed regions show the
largest total growth+ mostly because of their greater population increase.
The implications for the future and the growth of global fossil fuel emissions
are obvious.
The electricity projections are even more startling. Because of the higher per
capita growth rate of electrification worldwide, the total increase is greater
than for energy, as shown in Figure 6.9. For the year 2060, present trends
result in a 7 times increase in electricity demand: with full conservation this
is reduced to a 4.7 times increase: and with zero per capita growth, it is
reduced to 1.6 times the 1986 global demand. As shown in Figure 6.10, the
implied annual electricity growth rates for each case are higher for the LDCs
than for the DCs, primarily because of their higher population growth rate.
The LDCs now use 20% of the world's electricity, and in the year 2060 are
projected to use 46_. As shown in Figure 6.11, the global fraction of
primary energy being used for electricity generation increases from a
present 33% to 52c_ in the year 2060 for the full conservation case.
GLOBAL ELECTRICITY SUPPLY
Where can ali this electricity, come from? We have speculated on the
maximum contribution from the non-hydro renewables, and the results are
shown in Figure 6.12 for solar and Figure 6.13 for biomass. Solar is a
surrogate which also includes geothennal and wind. as they are likely to be
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relatively small. As explained in Figure 6.12, a reasonable upper limit for the
solar electricity contribution is the peak portion of the daily load, roughly
about one-third the operationally available capacity. Such a massive solar
component is unlikely to be approached for many practical reasons in the
foreseeable future. The biomass estimate in Figure 6.13 is also an upper limit
estimate, achievable only if land and water availability, can accommodate to
global food supply needs, lt appears that, with full conservation, these non-
hydro renewables might be able to contribute about one-third of the world's
needs as a practical maximum, as discussed below. The remainder will come
from fossil fuels, hydro, and nuclear.
Figure 6.14 presents the full conservation electricity projection with two
arbitrarily chosen illustrative cases for the year 2060. The first case assumes
that fossil fuel and hydro are fixed at about present levels, and that solar and
biomass are developed to their maximum. Nuclear power expansion pro-
vides the remainder. In the second case, fossil and hydro sources grow to
share equally with nuclear the demand not supplied by solar and biomass.
This second case is probably more representative of the direction that the
global energy mix will take. The pragmatic and economic difficulties of
expanding solar, biomass and nuclear sources to the massive quantities
shown in Figure 6.14 will be so great tha, a major expansion of the fossil fuel
component beyond that shown appears unavoidable.
SIGNIFICANCE FOR CO, EMISSIONS
The pragmatic significance of these projections for the issue of global
climate change is that for the next halt century annual CO, emissions are
likely to increase, even with an intensive global program on conservation
and non-fossil sources. This is primarily a consequence of the foreseeable
global population growth and the common desire for an improved scale-of-
living. The economic issue is illustrated in Figure 6.15 which shows our base
case projections of the per capita energy use in the United States (a
developed region), and South Asia (an underdeveloped region). The dispar-
ity between an industrial country like the United States and the underdevel-
oped regions such as South Asia is now more than thirty-fold in per capita
use of energy. This emphasizes the motivation that the underdeveloped
countries have to increase energy intensive productivity so as to approach
the present scale-of-living of the major industrial nations.
Thus, the combination of their high population growth and probable
economic growth will make the LDCs substantial contributors to global CO,-
by the year 2060. This is evidenced by the past growth rate of their CO_-
36
Figure 6.11
YEAR 2060 ENERGY & ELECTRICITY SUPPLY
Trend & Full Conservation Cases
(primary energy input in quads)
No_Electric EiectrK: Total Percent Electric
1986 Base 216 105 321 33%
Trend Case
2060 773 635 1408 45%
Full Conservation Case
2060 387 423 810 52%
Figure 6.12
Maximum Solar Electricity in 2060
• Typical electrical load patterns consists of
base, intermediate, and peak loads.
• .A,ssume solar supplies peak with roughly
1/3 of available capacity.
• Assume a high diurnal availability
of 29%
Then: Solar electricity, output is 12.7% of the total.
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Figure 6.14
YEAR 2060 WORLD ELECTRICITY SUPPLY
Full conservation case:
• Lim_te(_ 'ossfl aria nyaro
• Maximum solar ana biomass
(!000 TWhr)
Total Foes# Maxtmum
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emissions since 1973, as shown in Figure 6.16. The industrial world,
represented by the OECD nations, had no growth in CO, emissions since
1973 due to price-induced conservation and nuclear-generated electricity.
The U.S.S.R. and Eastern Europe have had a 2_ per year increase in
emissions, and the rest of the world had a 4e/c per year growth rale. Because
the OECD nations represent about 75c/_of current energy consumption, the
world's average increase is about 1% per year, lt is evident lhc LDCs will
be an increasing factor in future greenhouse emission sources.
Projecting the CO_ emissions lo the year 2060 involves so many uncertain-
lies thai ii is useful to present the spectrum of outcomes provided by our
various energy estimates. These are shown in Figure 6.17 for three illustra-
tive cases:
(1) a fossil fuel base trend case with nuclear fixed at present level,
maximunl hydro, and no other renewables:
(2) full conservation case with maximum renewables and with a low
nuclear component, and
(3) full conservation with a high nuclear component and a smaller fossil
share.
The projections are given for the world, the DCs, and the t, DCs. In ali three
cases, the hydro component was taken as an estimated global maximum of
four times the 1986 level. For the year 2060 the hydro was arbitrarily divided
equally between the DCs and the LDCs. The non-hydro renewables were
assumed to be at a maximum level for the two full conservation cases and
divided in proportion to their electricity use. lt was also arbitrarily assumed
(as a limiting case) that none of the LDCs would have new nuclear sources
because of their foreseeably limited capital. The resulting fossil fuel use was
converted to carbon equivalent and compared with 5.5 gigatons of carbon
emitted in 1986. The ratio is shown for each case, and for the DCs and the
LDCs. The conversion ratio of 0.2 gigatons of carbon per quad of fossil
energy assumes the current mix of coal, oil, and gas.
These estimates show the benefit and limitations of pursuing the target of
full conservation and the development of non-fossil sources. In none of the
cases was the imnual global CO, emission less than the 1986 value. Even the
most extreme target of full conservation, maximum renewables, and a high
nuclear componem (13 times present levels), projects an annual carbon
emission 160c7cof present values, lt is interesting that this extreme case does
show the Developed Countries" contribution at 8()c/_of their present emis-
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Developed Countries. While lhcse example pro jccii_ms are clearly not
predictions, they do provide a perception of lhc relative importance i)l IIlc
taclois thai will determine future global CO, emissions.
Although this study has focussed on the feasibility of carbon emission
redi.lc'lJon, _,lSdelerinined by growth in both population and econonly relaled
energy cise, ii also provides some insight li) the effect ol"a drastic curlailnleni
of energy use. li can be shown fronl iko lahulalion in Figure 6.114,thai with
zero energy per cap)la growth globally, by the year 2()60 global energy use
would he about 36<_ of lhc projected trend case. The average pcr capJi;.i GNP
lk)r the LDCs would be reduced about 10% and the DCs reduced 6</<from
their 1986 levels: lhc weighted global average would be down about 27cJ.
In such an impoverished world, ii is unlikely thai substantial investments in
energy efficiency would be made, so we have not speculated on furlher
reduction of carbon emissions by this means. II"the energy mix of lhc base
trend case remains, the year 2060 carbon emission would be 1.8 iinles lhc
1986 level even for the case of zero energy increase per capita.
As the LDC's appear to be the principal source of carbon emission increases,
such a projected economic plight would have serious consequences both
environmentally ;.lnd sociologically. A more likely future for the LDC's is
a combirlation of sonic economic growth and some energy conservation.
Assuming lh;.lt there would be strong resistance to reducing the present
scale-of-living in both the LDC's and DC's, the application oi'conservation
measures and associated investments is likely to be dependent on some
economic growth. ]'here does not appear to be feasible intermediate mix
which would prevent carbon emissions from increasing. Even our high
economic growth case (2.3% per year) with full conservation showed a
substantial increase in annual carbon emissions.
The sequestering of CO, from the atmosphere by capture in new forest
growth is frequently suggested as a means of reducing the greenhouse effect.
The projected year 2060 maximum biomass potential of 99 quads (Figure
6.17) is about a third i)ithe total present fossil fuel usage of about 3()() quads.
Thus, ii new f_)iests ;.ire grown primarily for capturing CO> (instead of for
fuel), the amount sequestered would be about a third of present CO,
emissions--and about a fifth c_l the projected fossil fuel use in 206()in lhc
full conservation case. This is cerlainly a significant annual reduclion in CO,
emissions, but ii requires thai the annual production of bioma:_s is stored
long-term (century) in wood construction, paper, etc. The energy deficit
would then need t() be filled Oy the other non-fossil alternatives (probably
nuclear) ii emission reduction is sought. Such a bil)mass _equestering
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Figure 6.17
ENERG't CASES FOR "t EAR "Ct_O CO2 .-k.NAL't SIS
-knnual er.ergy !n qua_s per year
_ase case ,nuclear at ',986 ',ever. maximum hydro, no other renewa01es)
Fossli" [365 753 ,-912
Hydro °° 25 14 14
Nuciear '5 I5 ,)
Solar ,) ,} ,)
Biota as s _2 '2 '2
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_-3o;ar an,a e:omass a;'.ocateo ':,etween t:'.e DCs ano :._.e LDCs m _'2rovort:on to
:heir e:ectr:c:tv vroctuct:on_
L_)3v nuqlgar _ower ,'er_zon
Fossii" 494 2!4 280
lqvdro'" 28 "4 "4
\laxtmum solar 54 32 22
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H_h nu;iear ;,ower ,.er_ton:
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Figure 6.18
COMPARISON OF 'YEAR 2060 VALLES FOR ',' -kRIOL5 CASES
• ear 2_60
-kctual Full Zero _'er
_ C,.'nserv,_IIc'n Capita Cro,,'tr
,'oputatlon _bdhonsJ:
World 4 967 4 086 -__86 _ 086
Less developed counmes ._793 _.0l 2 _ 012 _ 012
Developea countries 1 174 i.074 1.074 1o74
Population_percent J:
World 100.-(30 100.00 100.00 _30.00
Lessdeveiolx=dcounmes "6.36 ,3-_,.,-'-,= ,a-_.,.,"_, _-_,.....,_
Deveiopeacountries 23.64 t Y.2S :,".2S : ,".2S
Per capita energy, tmdhon Btu):
World ,-M.7 145.3 33.6 .:2.7
Less developed counmes 20.3 78.1 44.5 20.3
Develo.l:_a counmes ",.28.0 4o7.3 270,9 208.0
Total energy, _quad_:
World 321.3 ; .407.8 309 7 510.8
Less developedcounmes ,-',.1 -_25.5 356.1 162.6
Developed counmes 244.2 732.3 453.6 348.2
Electricity i kWh/capttaJ:
World 2.005.6 7240.9 4 ,826.8 1,602.4
Less developed counmes 505.0 3,587.1 2.391.8 505.9
Developed counmes 0,850.1 24,731. i 16,481.5 6,850.1
Total kWh _tnllions_:
World 096 70.14 46.75 15.52
Less developed counmes 192 28.74 19 16 4 05
Developed counmes _J.04 41.40 2739 l 1.47
Heat rate (ktloBtu/kWh) 10,500 '_.054 0,054 10.500
Elecmc input_quads):
World 104.6 635.0 423.3 163.0
Less developedcountnes 20.2 260.2 173.5 42.6
Developed counmes _4.4 374.8 249.8 120.4
Elecmc_rv I% or total energy_:
World 32.55 45. I 1 ._2.28 31.90
Less develot:a.=d counmes 26.13 41.60 48.71 26.17
Developed counmes 34.58 47.91 55.08 34.58
Crosa world m'oduct
bdhon L,5 $1987)
',rorid 16,600 -.Y).595 00.595 23,484
Less deveio.tx.=d counme_ 2,438 28,962 28,962 4,603
Deveiooecl counmes 14.162 _1.633 ,_1,633 : 8.881
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program would be a valuable, even ii partial contribution to C(), reduction.
Extreme hYl,othetical technical solutions are not practical oplions. For
example, willie a theoretical combination ot"solar t,onversion with massive
storage facilities coukt speculatively supply global needs, it is not economi-
cally feasible, as the foreseeable cost barrier is so enormous: about 20 or
more times alternative options. This would consume the bulk of the worlds'
capila] resources.
Expanding the nuclear option is also theoretically unlimited, technically
feasible, and now marginally economic, but this requires a global expansion
of about 30 times present nuclear generation for ali electricity supply, and
it would need to start soon. This would contemplate roughly 15,000 nuclear
stations (1,000 MW each) worldwide, and a massive global fuel cycle
infrastructure servicing such stations. Such an expansion appears pragmati-
cally and politically unrealistic in the foreseeable time scale, particularly for
the Less Developed Countries.
In view of ali the uncertainties, it is obviously wise to seek improved
efficiency and conservation worldwide, and encourage the development of
solar, biomass, hydro, and nuclear. Such steps may buy us a few more years
to learn more about the potential global climate change and to accommodate
effectively to it. In the meanwhile, we should recognize that the economic
and population growth of the underdeveloped and less developed regions
will be the chief determining factors in future energy demand growth and its
consequences. The industrial world's role may be most important as a model
for efficient energy use.
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DISCUSSION
Question: What was your assumption about population?
Starr: The bottom line is that the energy input into any population (it could
be the global population) depends on population growth, the change of
the standard of living of that population, and the change of the energy
intensity.
Now this is very important, because if I have to bring in a principle
character, and I'm not trying to make any religious implications, but if
I had to bring in a principle character to be involved in world energy
planning, I would bring in the Pope. I'm serious about that. He should
have been invited. Incidentally, some decades or so ago, I atte_lded a
Papal Academy Issue on Energy, and the Pope isn't uninformed in terms
of the literature. I don't know whether he read the report, but the fact is
that population is one of the biggest driving forces on energy and
environmental impact. Because regardless of economic level, it's been
very difficult to manage family planning. You and I, and my wife and
children, see on TV ali these starving babies in Ethiopia and other
nations. It's heart-rending.
You keep wondering why they keep having more children in the numbers
they do under those circumstances. Whatever the driving force is that
keeps the population going, it certainly is a serious issue. In fact, family
planning is, I think, a bigger issue than global warming, energy supply
or anything else. The fact that the issue of family planning gets so little
coverage is, to me, one of the great tragedies of public communication,
because that's the driving force.
For our analysis we have taken the accepted compromise between the
World Energy Council and the UN projections on population out to the
year 2060. We picked the year 2060 because that's as far as they had
numbers.
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The difficulty is that even with a slowdown in the less developed
countries, the population of the world is pretty well dominated by them.
In fact, if this continues to be so, we're going to end up, der_ending on
what you want to believe, with somewhere between 8 and 9 billion
people in the year 2060. That's not quite double where we are, but the less
developed countries will certainly be the biggest population group.
The developed country problem is fairly easy. We have a situation, for
example, in a country like France, where the population has changed
only very slowly. So, the developed countries are not the issue. Family
size control in the United States is an inevitable social development. Our
population growth has already been primarily by immigration. I think
that's going to be true in all the industrial countries. The issue is the le'is
developed countries, and the reason is that their economic future is the
one that's going to determine what happens to global fuel use and
emissions.
Borg: You've made a pretty strong assumption about the relationship
between energy and standard of living. Do you believe it will remain so?
Starr: This is a political problem. There isn't an economy anywhere in the
world that doesn't want to improve the standard of living. Ii"you listen
to economists talk about the U.S., they're grumbling about the fact that
the GNP is going to go up only 1 or 2 percent in the next year and it will
hardly keep up with population growth, and so on. The politk al drive, the
cultural drive, in almost every country in the world is to improve the
standard of living.
There's a good reason for this. The standard of living includes a lot of
things. If you don't produce excess wealth, you can't improve health,
you can't improve sewage disposal, you can't improve cleaning the
streets, keeping the whole infrastructure of roads, and of course, educa-
tion. These ali require continuous investment. And you have to have
excess wealth production to do that. This controls the standard of living.
This is a driving force.
Energy intensity is where the technology comes in. It's only in this pan
that technocrats, like myself, play a real role. Because it's in this part that,
in fact, we can do something about improving energy systems, improv-
ing the way they function, improving their use of resources, and reducing
their environmental impact. We tend to forget there are two kinds of
customers. There's the industry that produces goods and services and
there's the end-user: the guy who turns on his TV set or his toaster at his
house, lt is the industrial technology part of it, the productive system, its
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design and management, which is one of the great potential areas tbr
energy improvement.
You can make an enormous difference in the amount of energy you need
in industrial processes if you have a very good system for production,
design and management, l'm not talking about the basic technology, but
the way materials and work hours are used. Inefficiency is a big factor,
a big place for improvement.
The end-use operation is what you hear ali about in the literature from the
environmental movement. The environmental movement rarely talks
about this industrial part, which is one of the big energy users. They'll
talk about how we ought to have refrigerators that have better insulation
or a different cycle, or that our home heating system ought to be different
and more efficient and so forth. These are ali the end-use examples.
What this says is that as far as economic analysis can show, the economic
output of a country follows electricity use closely. Or to put it the other
way, electricity use follows economic growth closely. We found this to
be true all the way through the period of the big gasoline crises, where
the U.S. total energy dropped but electricity use did not drop. lt tracked
with almost no perturbation the economic output of the U.S. This has
happened in every industrial country, and even in the underdeveloped
parts of the world.
The other thing is that. assuming this is correct, simple mathematics says
that the change in standard of living in any country or any social group
will really be dependent on the change of electricity per capita. That's
just an assumption, but it is based on the observation that those two lines
roughly track each other. This is important, because we assume that this
will be the electricity per capita growth, and it is based upon economic
growth projections for different parts of the world.
Fulkerson: But won't an effective conservation program change that rela-
tionship?
Starr: When you plot energy versus economic output, one sees a sharp
upward slope up to 1973, then the first oil shock, and then the second in
1979. The energy curve flattened out, and that's when ali the environ-
mental groups said we had broken the tie between energy and economic
growth, lt started up again in the last few years.
In 1977 we finished a study at EPRI on ali the things that could be done
using modem technology without regard to cost to reduce energy
consumption and to reduce electricity consumption, lt was published in
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a book which is now available in libraries. It's called "'Efficient Energy
Use", put out by Pergammon Press. Nobody was particularly interested
in it. But now it's still the only compendium that shows a cross-section
of ali the things you can do to conserve energy in a technical sense.
Forty percent was the must savings that they could come up with in total
energy consumption. That includes ali the building improvements that
the enthusiasts are talking about, and a lot of improvements in industry.
Twenty percent was the upper-bound guess that the authors made that
could be done with reasonable economic investments. If you apply
energy conservation without regard to cost but with reasonable expecta-
tions of the capital required, you ought to find yourself somewhere in the
feasibility range, below the 20% bound.
We have assumed that on a global basis by the year 2060 (which is now
70 years away), 50% of all the direct energy use could be saved, just to
set an arbitrary upper bound for discussion purposes. That is substan-
tially higher than either the economic feasibility iange or the "techno-
logical feasibility at any cost range".
But when you look at the same relationship for electricity vs. GNP, it
never dropped, even in the U.S. in 1973. lt actually went up! Starting
from the projection of the old 1947-73 trend, a projected saving of 34%
for electricity was about the most that they could see, using the same type
of analysis. One of the key reasons is that much of the end-use equipment
is already reasonably efficient. There are improvements, but we are
starting from a relatively efficient base.
At the World Energy Conference in 1990, Amory Lovins stated
that the U.S. could save 75% of ali the energy it uses and also 75%
of all the electricity it uses with no sacrifice in standard of living
("End-Use/Least-Cost Investment Strategies", A. Lovins, 14rh
Congress of the World Energy Conference, Montreal, Canada,
Sept. 18, 1989). Fickett and Gellings of EPRI performed a critical
analysis of Lovins' paper, and then the three coauthored an article
("The Potential for Energy Conservation", A. Fickett, C. Gel]ings
and A. Lovins, Scientific American, April, 1990) discussing their
areas of agreement and disagreement. The EPRI calculations
indicated a theoretical upper limit of about 30% for conservation
investments that could break even or better. The required changes
in energy use patterns and efficiency would require massive capital
investments up front and total penetration of the potential market
to achieve the calculated savings. The time required to achieve
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projected degrees of penetration irl specific areas is not something
that can be predicted at this time.
Starr: lt turns out the best you can do with ali the varieties of conservation,
lighting and efficiency improvements and everything else for total
energy use is about a third. So, we've assumed Ii)r the year 2060 that one-
third of ali electrical growth by the ),ear 2060 would be saved. We call
that the "'full conservation case."
The full conservation case assumes that half of the primary energy fuel
that would be used, just based on the trends alone, would be saved. That
would be a cut of half in fuel burned and a saving of a third of the
electricity.
What this means is that the average world energy use would go up close
to two and a half times the world energy use per person that we have
today. Now, you can see why that's frightening: If we're talking about
being worried about the Greenhouse gases, we're up against a terrific
problem. If we're going to allow the population of the world to grow, and
some economic growth to occur, the resulting economic growth is very
small: between one and two percent in the per capita energy growth per
year.
We also calculated an extreme case (Case 3 above) in which we assumed
continued population growth but zero economic growth throughout the
world, specifically no energy growth per capita from now to 2060. The
less-developed countries will end up just a little higher. The world goes
down slightly because the total amount of energy used by the less
developed countries per capita is less. They're the dominant population.
But I don't believe the world can accept zero economic g_owth (or zero
per capita energy growth) and the zero electricity growth that goes with
it. To me, the most infornlative case is our full conservation case (Case
2 above ).
Prof. Lu mentioned the enormous increase in energy demand expected
in China. It's a factor of eight over today by 2060 based on the present
trend, With our full conservation case assumptions, the total energy
increase is still a factor of four.
Blue: What about the possibility that today's LDC's catch up with the
industrialized countries?
Start: I think anyone who studies these issues knows that within the next 50
or 60 years that's not likely to occur. But as long as lhe developed pan
of the world continues with its irnproved life-styles, improved health and
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services, it will form a target for the less developed part oi'the world. The
wealthy countries can't go back and tell the less wealthy countries: you
can't do this or that because of the global environment, when those very
actions opened the way to economic growth.
We've been told in a half-joking way by some of the people we visited
in some of the less-developed countries" if environmental pollution is the
price we have to pay, you paid it, you got the benefits, now we'll pay it
and then gel the benefits ourselves. They're not very keen about doing
much in the way of sacrifice to reduce environmental pollution.
As a technologist, I think we can achieve much by pushing the conser-
vation issue. Actual figures for 1986 show 500 kW-hr per capita in the
less-developed countries: and over 10 times as much in the developed
countries. You can see why the developed countries always dominate tile
world energy use picture. Per capita there's no question about it. We
would end up, with the full conservation case, about a five times
improvement in the less developed countries. In the developed countries
there would be about two times improvement. And for the world as a
whole, about a two times improvement.
I said in my paper that we would need ali of our options to provide the
energy and electricity people will need. even after successful conserva-
tion.
Two trillion kW-hr are now being produced in less developed countries,
eight in the developed countries. The total |'or the world is 10. Now ii we
take the present trend, in other words, we don't invest in massive
efficiency improvement, and there is no breakthrough in population
control, and hold average per capita energy use constant (Case 3 )by 2060
seven times as many kW-hr of electricity will be needed globally.
Developed countries will need five times as much, but in the less
developed countries the increase would have to be about 15 times as
much, simply because of the population growth.
Ifl take what is to me a more reasonable case (the full conservation case I,
because I think the economic pressures will be there to do it, I get about
t0 times as much electricity in the less developed countries, and about
3-1/2 times in the developed countries. But ali together I get about 4-1/
2 times more electricity being made in the world than is being made
toda,v, and that's with the maximum efficiency that we can gel into the
systems.
To win acceptance of this analysis. I had to slay two dragons. Dragon
number one is, "'We're going to do ii ali with solar." Dragon number two
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is "We're going to do it ali with biomass." Weil, we have a big section f
at EPRI that works on solar energy, a group of professionals that work
closely with the Solar Energy Research Institute. And with biomass, we
have a cooperative program, mostly with Oak Ridge, but there are people
working on biomass ali over. We're enthused about both. They are good
adjuncts: we need them: there are places for them; they should be
developed. That's not the argument. The argument is how much can they
carry'?
Here's the problem: The typical load pattern in any electrical system, if
you look at a classic example, can be divided into base, intermediate and
peak load. Let's arbitrarily make this assumption for the year 2060: that
solar is one-third of the installed capacity to provide the peak load. But
ali of the variable load is not going to be supplied by solar. No solar
enthusiast has ever proposed as much as this; so this is an extreme upper
limit. Let's just say it can be done. (And frankly, I think ii could be done,
except for economic realities.)
A high diurnal availability factor is 29%. To convert this to kW-hr I have
to average what fraction of the time the solar installations are going to be
working, and it is at best 29%. So I have to multiply my capacity by 29c/_.
availability factor. The answer: solar electricity can supply a maximum
of 12-1/2 percent of the total kW-hr required, or six trillion kW-hr.
So in theory, it could provide one-eighth. Now that is not a trivial
number! But it's the upper limit.
Biomass is an absolute delight because we have great opportunities, on
an economic basis, for biomass to be used today in terms of the wastes
from the forest products industry. It's being done ali over now, wherever
you can get the forest products producers to sit down and listen. If they
take the stuff that they leave behind when they collect the forest materials
if the 3' take the sawdust, the mill filings, and ali the waste products,
and really make the capital investment for developing their own steam
and electricity', it "s in their economic interest to do this. And we're seeing
it begin gradually throughout the world. It's a good thing and it's going
on. But how far can ii go'?
Biomass energy, includes growing forests, or growing agricultural prod-
ucts like sugar cane, specifically for energy purposes. The forest prod-
ucts people are very interested in this because it gives them a second
market for forest products. So they've looked at this very carefully. And
there's experimental work going on. This is a live field. The figure of
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merit is the dry mass yield in tons per managed acre. Mana ved: That is
very important. Unmanaged collection is but a fraction of this. Managed
acreage can provide 6 tons per }'ear. Agricultural scientists think that by
the }'ear 2060, the genetic selection of trees and perhaps some chemicals,
will double it.
The biomass electricity optimists who have looked al this say they can
take an additional 5- l/2q of the land area in the United States and build
in forests which don't now exist. So based on that, they end up with 1.2
trillion kW-hr. This requires putting it into a combustion process with
35c,_ efficiency. And so we go next to the global number. We've assumed
the same number: 5-1/2'7_ globally. Frankly. this is ave W soft guess:
about 5.5 trillion kW-ht/year now and about 11 by the 3'ear 20(_().
The total electric energy that we calculate we "re going to try and produce
with the full conservation case is 47 trillion kW-hr (Figure 14 above ). We
chose two cases:
1) Fossil and hydro are kept at a fixed level. Here we maintain and
replace, but do not expand total coal. oil and gas, and expect no
significant new hydroelectric power expansion.
2t In this case. we allow this combination to double.
We made optimistic assumptions about hoa' much could come from the
combination of solar and biomass. The remainder, if enough electricity
is to be available to match the assumptions of the case. has to come from
nuclear power.
For the first case nuclear ,aould be 14 times what it is now. And for the
second case. it is about ten times as much. That case lets fossil and hydro
carry rou,,hlv an equal load with nuclear. This is a way of actually
bounding the problem. If the electricity we project is to be there, nuclear
will have to pick up a large amount. This would necessitate a very
different political atmosphere than we have today.
What it says is: we need ali the technical virtues that ali the people of good
spirit are selling. We need to improve the efficiency we use energy with.
we certainly shouldn't have wasteful life-styles. We certainly should, in
fact. v,e must. successfully develop solar and biomass. But we're going
to need fossil, x_e're going to need hydro, and we're going to need
nuclear.
And finally. _e cannot say to the less developed pans of the ,aorld that
the,, are not allo_ed to produce wealth to take care of ali their s(_cial
needs. _<hich _,,e somehow< or other seem to take care of ourselves. And
that's ,ahere I'm going to leaxe it.
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Wilson: Goldemberg of Brazil and Williams of Princeton had an article in
Annual Reviews of Energy about three years ago, and their projections
of what the world was going to need in electricity were about just about
your full conservation measure, and their methods were about the same
in trying to figure out what was reasonable in trying to reduce electricity
demand.
Zebroski: We can't really talk about projecting or predicting the future, but
it seems to me that anything we project even for next year is more robust
if ii is consistent with a vision for the future which is in the range of
feasibility. I think the fact that a number of different people coming from
different directions have similar visions for the future makes the visions
more robust and strengthens the credibility of what we may project.
Borg: I have problems with using the U.S. as an example of uncoupling the
G.N.P. with energy use. The reason is that at just the point when you say
they became decoupled was about time when the nature of the G.N.P.
began to change dramatically in the U.S. Thai was when services became
far more important than goods in the G.N.P. This has a serious ilnplica-
tion when ii comes to energy use, because while our standard of living
continued to increase, we are beginning to import energy embodied in
products. For example, our aluminum is smelted in Canada and our
automobiles are made inJapan. The heavy energy intensive industries in
the U.S. took a real nosedive in thai period. The whole industrial sector
was hit very hard by the increase in fuel prices. So I don't see how you
can justify that decoupling into a global picture.
Starr: We did not use the U.S. numbers; we used the world numbers. I gave
the energy picture in the U.S. to show that there was a big difference
between the energy relationship in the U.S. and the electricity relation-
ship. lt was the electricity relationship that was a tie. We have curves for
both energy and electricity. In the UK, when they discovered gas, the
energy relationship dropped, but the electricity relationship did not
chan,,e_. In France. as w'ell. You don't extrapolate energy use, you
extrapolate electricity use.
Borg: But in the U.S., that energy drop is related to a whole number of things
which have nothing to do with conservation.
Rossin: II we cannot use G.N.P. any more, what is the alternative?
Starr: When you look for large indicators, we have no substitute for G.N.P.
You can get a whole lecture on why G.N.P. doesn't even measure
G.N.P.! I've been given lectures by nay colleague Sam Schurr on why
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G.N.P. doesn't really measure true economic output. But you start
looking for solnothing else, and you have to spend your Iifetinle as an
economist to find something.
Davis: We're talking about G.N.P. and not G.D.P.G.N.P. fails to take into
account the energy we import, so they are not identical measures.
Second, what does the economic activity that either index measures
actually mean'? You include in each a lot of things which are non-
productive arid do not contribute lo the standard of living unless you
broaden your definition a whole lot. A great amount of the G.N.P. in the
U.S. in recent years has been military activity. Now, we can say thai our
standard of living is improved because we have a very strong military
eslablishnaent, but 1 dorl't think that's what most people mearl by
standard of living. So the problem is more complex than it appears, i
recently wrote a letter to Murray Weidenbaurn and asked him if he could
explain ali this to me, but he said he couldn't. The confusion between
standard of living and G,N.P. is really enormous.
Slam What this paper does is scope world demand, taking the industrial
growth of the developed world and the developing world as two separate
parameters. In that sense it doesn't make any difference if cars come out
of Japan or the U.S., they are still going to require an energy input.
And again, I have to emphasize, we are not predicting: we are scoping.
There is a subtle dit'ference. This is a framework for discussion, a
framework that says this is the nature of the problem we have lo deal
with; these are the rough magnitudes of what we face, and these are the
parameters we have to recognize are the ones we can affect. For us to say
lhal we have the answers to what the future is going to be would be
ridiculous. I have in nay paper pointed out all the things I can do to destroy
rny projections!
Take an obvious example: the electric automobile. We have been
pushing the electric automobile for over a decade at EPRI; it's now a
marginal demonstration device. You've heard General Motors come out
with a flashy display _ they have a little sports car that can go 100 miles
between charges. 1 think that is around the corner. But if the urban
communities of the world start using electric automobiles to gel rid of
their smog problem _ and I don't think they have any choice; I think
they're going to be doing ii _ you'll see electricity demand go way up,
but you'll see some other demand go down.
These are the kind of things which will change the whole nature of the
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energy use pattern. But it's pretty clear that electricity isa basic input to
economic growth and the production oi'electricity is absolutely essential
to the productivity o1"these countries. That is the point which the public
really has not accepted. The fact thai electricity production has by-
products which involve environmental issues: we know that too.
But it is scoping the nature of the problem, l'm trying to say some very
simple things: Giving to the environmental movement ali the concerns
they feel are justified about future environmental impacts, we are not
going to be able to reduce fossil fuel consumption in the foreseeable
future, meaning the next 50 years. We might be able to reduce the rate
at which their use increases. But to do tllat, we would need everything:
solar, biomass, and nuclear, and we also need more improved use of
fossil fuels.
But to go around and promise to the world that they are going to reduce the
carbon dioxide content of the biosphere by imposing on the world ali
kinds of energy restrictions is either totally dictatorial or dreaming.
Sanchez-Sierra: I would like to give two conclusions from OLADE's energy
studies which reinforce Dr. Starr's projections. I) Even in countries
where the G.N.P. has been negative, electricity growth has increased,
sometimes by 5-6% per year. The explanation is the"informal economy"
which is not in the national data, and 2) in Latin America during the last
ten years we are consuming more energy per unit G,N.P. When we put
this together, I would call Dr. Starr's projections conservative.
Fulkerson: Do you accept as a foregone conclusion that you can't increase
productivily of energy use more than you have to date? China has had a
very intensive energy conservation program over the last decade or so.
They have found the opposite. Energy use per dollar of G.N.P. has gone
down.
Sanchez-Sierra: I don't know about China. But for Latin America, this has
been the "'lost decade". With very low economic growth, with our
energy-intensive industries working at 2()c/cof their capacity, we are now




The public debate continues about the impacts on the environment of
increased generation and use of electricity. Participants brought differ-
ent views to the Seminar based on their experience, as well as their
impressions of views of others with whom they interact. The "statement"
occasionally mentioned by Participants became the Findings and Con-
clusions in Section 2.
Wilson: I think our statement should address the views of a number of other
people who want to reduce the amount of electricity use. They wish, in
fact, to stop any future electricity expansion. They hope to use reduced
capacity as a way of caressing people into using less.
Hubbard: I'm the almost retired Executive Director of the Solar Energy
Research Institute. About what people can adjust to: Saturday night I was
on a railroad platform in Agra, India, and ali the lights went out. My
Indian friend said, "No matter. Five, ten minutes, it will ali be back on."
Ali the vendors gol OUt their candles, lighted up, and went on cooking
Indian bread. It's astounding how resilienl society is. ! think when we
categorize things in terms of imperatives: "We must have this..." or "We
must have thai .... " we have to be careful about that language.
When ! first came to the Solar Energy Institute, 1use to start out every
talk I gave to the public by saying, "'Look, the world is not divided into
solar freaks and nuclear nuts." 1 JUSt do not see those technologies in
conflict one with the other. There has been a tendency for those of us who
are interested in energy technology to be embattled about it, to be
advocates or be defensive about it.
I was at that Sundance meeting. (A recent conference at Sundance, Utah,
brought together persons with a broad spectrum of views on energy,
including leaders of groups dedicated to stopping energy growth. A
summary was distributed to the Seminar participants.) It's true that the
Sundance meeting concluded in general that nuclear power was a terribly
desirable option, and that we ought to have it _ not that we must, but that
we needed it in lemls of an optimal energy system. But in the final
statement, there was a codicil added which simply said that until the
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public and until the environmental community are convinced that
nuclear power technologies are safe and acceptable, ii will be futile to
advocate that they be re-utilized in this country.
Now I don't think it's quite that bad, but I think we have to be careful
about that advocacy. Somebody already said that it is less a technical
problem than it is a perceptual, social and political one. I would hope in
our statement we can get out of that somewhat antagonistic posture of
conflict between efficiency and environment and the need for energy
development.
Going back to the meeting in India, which was the Association of Energy
Economists, it was pretty clear that what we were talking about was the
quality of life. If there is to be adequate quality of life that's generally
acceptable in a global context, you've gol to have some equitable
distribution of resources and an equitable approach to economic issues.
You need economic vitality, you do have to have a living environment
that people are satisfied with, and you've got to have some political and
social stability. I think that the issue of equity and the issue of balance are
particularly important. We just cannot afford to get back into the
situation where it is the technocrats against the Rousseaunian idealists.
Fulkerson: My responsibilities at ORNL include efficiency technologies,
fusion, renewables and fossil energy sources, which is an interesting
combination. The dilemma I would propose to the group is: If it turns out
that someone must do something aggressive about moving away from
fossil fuels, that we are technologically not very well prepared to do it,
because the non-fossil sources are not very good, either singly or in
combination, lt is in that circumstance that efficiency and non-fossil
sources are basically partners. You cannot get there without both. Both
must be pursued very aggressively. The dilemma is decision-making
under great uncertainty.
Furthermore, the decisions that are made by the developing nations in the
world will be crucial in regard to this problem. The industrial world is
going to have to provide a great deal of help and better technology that
will be compatible with economic growth in the developing nations
given their particular circumstances and situations. We are ali in this
together.
Starr: The word "conservation" is going to reappear over and over again, no
matter ho,,v hard we try. I think it should be clarified so we ali have the
same idea of what it means. May I suggest my usagc: both efficiency and
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cur'_ailment. Ijudge from the notes you supplied to us, thai you are using
the word irl the latter sense, almost throughout, lt should include
efficiency. Now within the curtaihnent category, you have both volun-
tary and involuntary, the latter being the result of regulatory action. But
I think we should have a consensus; it would be very helpful. With regard
to the term "conservation", we must separate conservation from etTi-
ciency.
Borg: Weil, they're very difficult to sort apart: the curtailment aspect -
voluntary or involuntary or price-driven - from actual improvements in
efficiency.
Erdmann: I just finished a study last month of the electricity demand in the
service industry at the Swiss Institute of Technology in Zurich, and last
year I did a similar study on the newspaper industry. The key point seems
to rne to be whether there will be another nuclear power plant started. (I
personally believe that technically it will be different from what it was
before.) Even if this decision is made only in the US, it will have a big
global impact. In Switzerland you now find no young engineers who will
study nuclear technology, so very soon we will reach the point of no
return.
Of course, if the US stimulates a new nuclear power plant, that will have
an influence in ali the European countries, especially in those where
public opinion is strongly against nuclear power. That would have a very
big impact. I know it from Switzerland, from Germany, Italy, Sweden,
and so on. In other countries in Europe, in France for example, they do
not have this problem in which public opinion is against nuclear power.
Nevertheless, the US will have a big effect. A decision made in industrial
countries to return to nuclear power will have a big global impact in ali
countries, even those which do not actually use nuclear power or will not
use it in the near future. So I think that whether a new nuclear plant or a
new generation of nucicar plants can be installed in the future is a global
question.
Larrson: Within the Federation of Swedish industries, 1tried lo work very
hard on environmental issues. The environment is very high on the list
of the public and also the politicians. We've tried to take a pro-active
attitude rather than the reactive one. If we want to have a pro-active
industry on the environment, we need to have electricity. We need to
have growth in industry and we need to have an electric supply that in
reliable.
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My objectives in coming here were twoIbld: First, to try to explain to you
what the Swedish situation is. To be quite honest with you, I sometirnes
have big problems understanding it myself, but I try. Secondly, to try to
bring back to the Swedish debate what is happening here. My bottom line
is that the environmental issue has brought us to, as you say, "a complete
new ball game".
Li: Energy conservation -- or the increasing productivity of energy use
is a very important issue in my country. We are not allowed to build any
new power stations. What else can we do? We try to save energy. We talk
about cogeneration, ice storage, whatever. But we must emphasize,and
you have emphasized in one of the papers, that some people have the
notion that by saving energy you do not have to build new power stations.
And this is completely wrong. We should emphasize this in our action
statement, because it is so misleading.
Now, about the environment. I've been thinking that our discussions
have not put much emphasis on oil, gas and coal. We cannot avoid them
for many years to come. Among fossil fuels some are better than others.
For the environment, coal is bad. Why not gas? lt is very much in my
mind... In my country we are importing very large amounts of coal. And
then I start to think, instead of coal, why don't we import large amounts
of gas? We are importing anyway. We rely on foreign supply and gas is
rnuch cleaner than coal.
I have not made a proposal to my government. But I may suggest to
change the coal stations to gas. If not, at least the new plants to be built
should burn gas, not coal. I have not made this a proposal; it is very much
on my mind, so 1 will be listening to your comments.
Lu: I agree with Mr. Li that there are great differences between developed
and developing countries. However, we have many things in common.
For instance, the importance of electricity, and the high rate of electricity
growth compared with the rate of energy growth, and also the develop-
ment of future technologies in power gene'ation.
My impression is that environmental issues are becoming more impact-
ing, But for the developing countries, the first priority is not the
environment. Of course environment is an important problem. But our
first priority is shortages: the shortage in power, the shortage in energy
and the shortage in investment.
For instance, we are now involved in a study to the year 2050 for our state
planning commission. From our preliminary results, our electricity
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demand will increase at least ten times between now and 2050. How can
we develop so many power stations in the next 60 years? Of course, 50
or 60 seems so long, but it is not so long compared with the time scale
for energy development. If we turn to new technology for all of these
power plants, the lead time for commercialization for any new technol-
ogy will take at least 50 years.
So we must rely on existing technology. Now that means either fossil
fuel-burning power plants or nuclear power plants. We have enormous
resources of coal. But coal already causes us problems, not for the CO2
in the far future, but for the transportation and the local air pollution. So
we try to turn from coal to nuclear power, not only for power generation
but also for district heating. We just completed a heating reactor at my
institute. It is a 5 MW heating reactor following the Russian design, and
it has operated very well for the last few months. So we try to turn to
nuclear not for the far distant future but for the near-term demand. But
unfortunately we find it is very capital-intensive, and we are short of
capital. So for a big developing country like ours, the near-term priority
problem is the shortage.
Haslip: I think there is a fundamental difference in the challenges of
environmentalism that we see in this country today and what we saw in
the late 1960's and early 70's. Then, in fact, it was a media-driven issue,
and driven by a reasonably small segment of the popu!ation that were, at
that time, very sensitive to issues like environmenta!ism. That segment
of the population is now senior staff people in regulatory agencies,junior
legislators and Congressmen, and in some case they are even executives
of utility companies. So it is a much more fundamental issue that is
deeper in our social fabric here, and a more substantive movement than
it was during that earlier era. And I think that implies a different response
from policymakers.
I would also like to comment on the issue of diversity that I think is
presented in the draft statement, completely appropriately so. There is a
corollary issue to diversity: the implementation of conservation and
efficiency may be appropriate for a utility. I am intrigued by those people
from developing countries regarding the problem of not having enough
electricity. We should find ways to export from industrialized countries
our experience about energy use. I think we've learned a lot about how
to use electricity and how not to use it. I think it is appropriate to export
those lessons learned to avoid mistakes that we've made in industrialized
countries.
6O
Cicognani: ENEA is the governmental body of Italy responsible for research
and development in the energy field. Generally, ENEA gave a strong
contribution to the new energy plan that was adopted by the government
and debated by the Parliament in 1989. Environmental protection is
supposed to play a major role and our energy plan was established with
a specific concern about pollution of the environment, and aiming to
limit as far as we can the emissions of chemicals.
We have discussed electrical energy supply with great concern. It is
crucial for the country because in the last three years we had an increase
in consumption of electric power of the order of 5% per year, and the
tendency is even stronger for the next few years. All of our nuclear power
stations are now closed. Now only the fossil stations contribute. Of
course the hydro power is near to the limit in Italy. Hydro contributes
about 25%, and the rest has to be made by fossil fuels. Also we face a lack
of installed capacity. Our imports from the North, mostly from France,
reached 15c,_. This is a very weak position for the country, and it is a
matter of strong preoccupation for us.
Diversification of primary fuels and minimizing the emissions of chemi-
cals, and also our effort to make nuclear energy acceptable again, are our
key problems. We are working on simpler reactors with passive features
and strong containments, aiming to avoid evacuating the population after
a severe accident. We feel this will be a "must" if we want to gain public
acceptance of nuclear energy in Italy.
McConnell: During my 30 years at Ontario Hydro I have had the opportunity
to send staff to work with electric utilities in a number of countries
throughout the world, including Nigeria, Ghana, Iran and Korea, India,
Pakistan, Rumania and Argentina. I have participated in technical
exchanges and served as Chairman of the North American Electric
Reliability Council. lt seems to me that insofar as electricity is con-
cerned, there are many issues that are common to countries throughout
the world, but every country has its unique problems as weil.
Turning to a narrower front, electricity supply for one province in
Canada, we have been engaged in an integrated demand and supply
strategy for the electrical supply in Ontario. This was a very intense
process that involved massive interaction with the public at large, our
customers, politicians, etc. We started offwith the idea of doing it in two
years but it look us from 1984 to 1988, a full five years to develop a
strategy that represented a position for the province having to do with
electric efficiency, and the role that it would play, as well as the supply
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options. We did get it completed. We did reach a consensus among the
various interests in the province.
In 1989, after ten years of paralysis in which we had never made a major
supply decision, we've just launched a 25-year plan that we've an-
nounced, lt is just about to go through a public review, lt represents a very
ambitious plan in terms of demand management. Our plan calls for a
5000 MW program of several billion dollars having to do with electrical
efficiency, load shifting and the like. But on the other hand, we don't
regard electrical efficiency as the sole solution. And the real discipline
in this process was moving away from the generalities, and quantifying
ali of the options and taking a posture on what the contributions would
be from each of the demand options and each of the supply options.
[Of all the specific actions brought to the attention of the Seminar,
none won such wide acceptance as integrated resource planning.
Hydro's integrated planning process is discussed in Section 9. The
achievement of Ontario Hydro in developing this plan was agreed
to set an excellent example. But within less than a year, new
parliamentary elections brought a new Prime Minister to power in
Ontario. He campaigned against the power company, and his firsl
act was to order it to put all supply parts of the plan on hold and to
call for a new examination of the issues. Once again, the public
skepticism about nuclear power, and also about ali big power
proiects, seemed to make opposition an attractive political posture.]
Zebroski: Most technical problems have their roots in management prob-
lems. It is not the technology that is bad; it is the way you use it and how
you manage it. We should put what we talk about in light of an enormous
historical movement, the reduction in the threat of nuclear holocaust.
Another monumental historical trend here is Peristroika. Peristroika is
not just in the Eastern Bloc. lt is a by-product of electricity, lt is the global
community of television and radio that has made the aspirations of
people worldwide have a voice and have a sense of world community
that was not possible in the past.
We face a global risk in the energy area. Unfortunately, the risks are
getting more serious, because we are. in effect, making decisions by not
making decisions. The public in any country can demand that when
decisions are made about the future that they be robust decisions:
decisions which five and ten years later you dc) not regret because you
could have made a much better decision given what you knew at that
time. (But you didn't know how soon or for sure!).
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Our present political process does not make robust decisions. If you
listen to our media today, the words "'corrupt" and "pervasively contrary
to the public interest" are becoming common perceptions of the way the
political process works.
As an example, we should no! underestimate the implications of one
important polling result. If you poll people on a NIMBY (not in my
backyard) question, it is 90_, plus: ! don't want it in my backyard. On the
other hand, when people are asked do you think nuclear energy is
important in our energy future, you get upwards of 70_ saying that it
important. I think that is the constituency that this effort needs to reach.
The basic fact is that many energy decisions, if they are to be beneficial
to society and the environment, cannot be made on a political basis -- on
a near-term, one-issue constituency basis. They have to be robust. That
means they need to withstand unexpected turns of events. They have to
reflect some sort of intelligent, rational integration of global environ-
mental, resource, economic and public factors.
In thinking back over the conversations with our colleagues, we find a
trap into which ali of us fall: we say that things "'have to be done", that
actions "must be taken", that we "'can't afford to delay". But the reality
is that these things which seem so obvious and so vital to scientists and
technologists, who in fact do understand pretty well the problems facing
societies, may not be done at all.
Experience has taught us that just because something is right and
necessary does not mean that people will do it. In some cases there are
other groups to whom these very actions are just what they do not want
to see happen. And in others, even if understanding is there and the need
is perceived, the resources to make them happen are simply not available.
Things that we say "must" happen, simply do not. This increases the
chances that one or more of the "downside risks" will turn into realities.
FINANCIAL MATTERS DO COUNT
Shackelford: I retired as President of PG&E in 1985, and am now on the
Boards of a geothermal energy company and a gas pipeline company.
My feeling is that we have to agree on what our audience is. If what we
say comes out like energy experts talking in energy expert language, it's
not going to be very effective. Somehow, we've got to cast our statement




I agree that we ought to try to take a global approach. We have an
opportunity to have people who are our guests from other countries help
us to inform the U.S. as to some of the questions, particularly about what
happens if you don't have an energy supply with adequate margins. We
don't have much experience in the U.S. about what happens if you don't
have enough electricity. But there are places in the world that could
inform us on this.
Coming from the utility background, I can tell you that at some point the
question of financial risk and perceived financial risk to utilities oi"
embarking on large energy projects in the current environment in the
U.S. has to be considered. In the current financial and regulatory climate,
this is not happening.
Sanchez-Sierra: During our last OLADE Ministers Meeting we tried to
discuss the most important issue of the energy sector in Latin America
and the Caribbean: It is the financial situation of the electric power
sector. It is not in petroleum or coal, it is the electric power sector. Here,
I would like to stress the following: we have a lot of experience to share.
You don't know what it means when we say shortage. You don't know
what rationing means.
A year ago Argentina just passed a critical situation in the power sector.
They had problems with the Atucha nuclear plant, problems with the
hydraulic system and at the same time with ali the thermal equipment. It
was a time when "willingness to pay" was demonstrated, lt was five to
six times the traditional rate, which they were "willing to pay!" For the
financial district in Buenos Aires they had to run diesel engines and they
had to pay at least six times the tariff they were paying before. And they
paid! In Haiti, the tariff is very, very high. A kilowatt-hour costs three
times what it costs in the U.S. But they pay it!
The issues can be different. Here, in the industrialized countries, CO,
could be the most important one. But I can assure you that in the
developing countries, the people don't know anything about the CO2
issue. Here, -- and I'll be very frank -- you don't know how it is to run
a utility company when the most important constraint is the national
financial constraint. You haven't experienced anything like it. You have
a media issue which is important, and you have a CO_ issue.
I strongly recommend that we agree that we are not here for a short-term
analysis. If we take a short view, we would assume that for the U.S.
Congress right now it is not important what the situation is to the South.
For the industrialized countries the most important political develop-
64
ment is in East-West relations. But here we have a big responsibility to
take a visionary approach, 20, 30 or 50 years, and recognize that ali of
the problems at the global level are important. Our recommendations are
not for the next 5 or 10 years.
When it comes to important decisions, if you tell us that we have to lake
care of the environmental issues without any commitments from the
industrialized world in order to solve the problem together, you are not
going to get a positive response. The world is changing too much, we ali
know that. But when we are talking about 30 to 50 years from now, we
cannot be short-term oriented.
Davis: In my view, the basic problems we are facing, and must deal with in
any kind of an action statement, are really institutional problems and not
technical problems. I think this is extremely important. The technology
has to be right; it has to support the decisions. But the institutions are the
ones that are going to make the decisions and carry, them out.
I think ii is vital that we recognize the importance of economics. We tend
to talk a lot about the environment and about the technology, but I think
the one thing that is missing from the discussions is some real under-
standing of what the economic impacts are of many of the decisions that
might be made. Some of the ones we are discussing would have
absolutely enormous impacts on a global basis. And of course the
principal one of these, which is the most confusing issue in terms of
intelligent decisions on energy policy and particularly electricity policy,
is the perception of the imminence of the Greenhouse Effect. This
completely confuses today the whole issue of making intelligent deci-
sions. I think that is one of the principal issues we have to struggle with.
I have been concerned over the last several years over the almost
complete lack of any real leadership in energy or electricity-related
matters among industry or government, nationally or internationally.
We have suffered from a great lack of real leadership. I don't know how
to correct it, but I don't know how to solve some of the problems unless
we get some leadership with the courage to make tough decisions.
[Ken' Davis served as Director of Reactor Development in the
Atomic Energy Commission and Deputy Secretary of energy at the
Department of Energy. In 1990, Sec. Watkins had just assumed his
duties at DOE, and his National Energy Strategy document was in
preparation. Issued in 1991, the NES has not yet resulted in any
implementing legislation, although a number of important bills
based on it (or contrary to it) have been submitted in the Congress. ]
65
RELIABLE ELECTRICITY: IS rl" A PREREQUISITE?
Rossin: How would you respond to this question: Is reliable electricity a
prerequisite tbr economic growth and environmental quality'?
Is there a possible consensus on this statement'? Are there any who would
have problems associating themselves with such a statement'?
Wilson: I helped start the Energy and Environmental Policy Center at
Harvard University. I feel very strongly that energy and the environment
do belong together. In this particular question of electricity, 1 am
constantly overwhelmed by the importance that electricity has in one's
life, and also by the fact that younger people tend to forget that. They
think that itjust comes out of a plug in the wall. But it takes a lot oi'trouble
actually to get il there.
Every time I've seen a study, the cost of electricity interruptions looms
extraordinarily large. We can do without electricity; I have done without
it. I don't like doing without ii. We must be aware that one reason that
people concerned about growth attack the electricity sector is because by
its nature it is regulated, and therefore vulnerable to attack.
Olds: As Executive Editor for Power Engineering Magazine for 20 years, I
dealt with the problem of communicating from the technical sector to the
public sector. One of the many problems is the use of words. For
example, the term "'crisis" or "'energy crisis" has been terribly over-
worked, and we've had one crisis after another. From the public
standpoint these have ali been solved. You remember 1973, 1979, high
gasoline prices... Now that's ali gone, so the public doesN't really see
anything wrong with the world's energy situation. That's the public in
the U.S.. because most of the people in the U.S. believe that everybody
in the world has electricity, when relatively few people actually do, and
certainly not ample electricity.
Another thing: People quickly forget events that have no lingering effect
on them. For example, on the East Coast there were brownouts and
blackouts in 1989. Hardly anybody remembers these. The big emphasis
in the papers now is that we have too much electricity in the Midwest, and
we are paying dearly for the excess idle capacity.
Another problem is that we in the U.S. are called the energy hog of the
world and the only nation of significance that does not have a national
energy policy. We used to have one. I remember when the AEC and the
utilities set national energy policy. We had a fairly well-understood
energy policy that was based on Keynesian economics, and said thai to
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make the economic system run we must have abundant low-cost energy.
So the utilities and the AEC provided for it. Since 1973 we have had a
totally fragmented set of institutions talking about energy policy. In
Congress you have a myriad of committees and sub-committees ali
exercising responsibility or oversight on the energy policy of the U.S.
Everybody has a cut: the NRC, the DOE, and the Members of Congress
and their staffs who try to perceive through the media what their
constituents seem to want today.
Each year I speak to high school science teachers and students in
Georgia. They work with a textbook that has one chapter on energy, and
the teachers say they seldom get to that chapter. So their understanding
about what energy is and the relationship between energy and standards
of living around the world just does not exist. They are thunderstruck
when I show slides of how much energy is where, who has it, and so on.
So we have a big problem getting information to our young people today.
I'd like to comment on something that happened back in about 1975: the
advent in this country of participatory democracy. At that time, the NRC
decided to hold hearings on nuclear waste disposal. The reasoning was
that there are social, environmental and economic implications and the
public must have a right to vote on these matters. Now they never
addressed the fact that the public needs facts in order to vote. I'll never
forget a statement by Prof. Harold Green of George Washington Univ.
on this subject. He said, "It is more important in this country now for
decisions to be reached on a participatory basis than that the decisions be
correct." In other words, decisions are to be based on the voice of the
people and whether they are educated enough to make an intelligent vote
is less important than they had the opportunity to vote. So this is a gloomy
assessment that I have of the U.S. as the energy leader of the world.
Borg: Electricity today is a constant related with economic growth. But is ii
a prerequisite? Regarding CO_, reliable electricity is not prerequisite to
environmental quality if CO_ is the factor by which you measure
environmental quality.
Starr and Wildavsky said that with a higher level of electrification and
industrialization, health and environmental quality are improved. So
they are intimately associated.
Wilson: I certainly would agree very strongly that going tbr more electricity
is a good idea in order to get environmental improvement. But you can
go for electricity without getting environmental improvement, and you
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can gel environmental improvement without going for electricity. If it is
written as a prerequisite, it can be counterproductive in the way it is read.
Davis: Prerequisite is a word that gives people some problems. The general
concept is accepted, but prerequisite may be a problem.
Start: Sam Schurr puts ii like this: "There is not any national infrastructure
that can exist without electricity supply." I think that is one you
could get everybody to agree on.
Davis: Unfortunately, I think that is a wonderful way to lose an audience.
Starr: That may be. But I'm not talking about a document for an audience.
I'm talking about the concept itself.
McConnell: Like others, I'd have trouble with the words here.
Borg: Instead of prerequisite, you can say historically, electricity has been
associated with economic growth.
GLOBAL ISSUES - INDUSTRIALIZED AND DEVELOPING
NATIONS
Davis: As we discuss the "industrialized nations" and the "developing
nations" we need to have a list of concepts in our minds as we proceed
with our discussions.
Start: Are you looking for a global issue or for the U.S.?
Davis: Everybody in this room knows the answer, but each would say ii
differently. For our purposes, we have to approach this on a global point
of view. lt may be necessary to say something specific about what the
U.S. or the industrialized countries or the developing countries may have
to do. I think we have to start with a global point of view.
Starr: If you want to look at this as a global question, if you want to ask what
the U.S. can do to assist global electrification problems, that is a question
that might be pertinent to the DOE or the State Dept. lt is one thing to talk
about the global electricity supply in which lhc role of the U.S. might be
very secondary, lt is another thing 1o ask what the U.S. can do about it.
Davis: That is not the only question. What can ali the industrialized nations
do'? What can international organizations do'?
Starr: You can make the global electricity supply the issue, and then ask what
the industrialized nations can do. The answer is slightly different
whether you talk about the problems of the globe and the electricity
supply, and the problems as to what the industrialized nations can do to
assist the global electricity supply.
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Davis: You seem to be saying too much in one sentence. ! would say: An
adequate supply of energy is necessary for economic growth. An
adequate supply ot"electricity is necessary tk)r economic growth in the
developed countries. A healthy economy is necessary to achieve envi-
ronmental quality. Those propositions should be the substance ot what
we are trying to say.
Starr: I agree!
Zebroski: As many of our friends have said, the U.S. has a very strong
influence on what other nations do. The U.S. today does have an energy
policy! lt is the same energy policy it has had since the late 1970"s. The
energy policy is to talk about everything and to burn more gas and oil.
Because of North Sea oil and gas and Russian gas, Etarope has done this
too. This is a policy that at least some of us feel is headed for serious
economic difficulties, at least by the mid-90's. The things that are
decided in 1990 can make a big difference on whether that turns into a
painful crisis or one that we robustly survive.
Now at least one of the priority things we must talk about is, can we make
some statement that would affect U.S. energy policy in a constructive
way'.) You can say pious things about global issues, but if you are not
taking care of your own kitchen, you are not helping the world very
much.
In fact, the U.S. is a model for a decaying infrastructure. We have a
rapidly decaying energy infrastructure, in which our average plant age
is going to be 30 years by 1992 or 1993. And we're going to solve that
problem by building cogenerators that basically burn natural gas, our
most expensive, our most environmentally precious fuel, and at the
highest cost!
Starr: That is one way to get attention. You start off with the fact that the U.S.
is a model for a decaying infrastructure.
Zebroski: As Wildavsky said, I think we have to air our fears!
POTENTIAL FOR CONSERVATION
Davis: How much can projected electricity demand growth be moderated by
conservation initiatives and improvements in efficiency? Perhaps
Chauncey's talk preempts that by saying "Fine, I'll give you a very
optimistic projection of what we can theoretically do, and we still have
a problem."
Starr: Other studies were mentioned to me right after my talk, and they reach
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the same conclusions.
Hubbard: Your numbers on biomass and solar energy potential are consis-
tent with ours at the Solar Institute. You may argue about how much you
can project, but we seem to agree thai no matter how much one can
reasonably do on energy efficiency and so on, it is not going to be enough
to satisfy the remaining dem,'md.
Gottlieb: That is a very important :;tatement. lt is not a long statement, but
people can understand it.
Hubbard: This is precisely where the battle is going to be joined with the
environmentalists. This is going to be attacked. This is what the issue
really is, and we need to state ii very strongly.
Fulkerson: I wouldn't latch onto just one analysis for the potential for
conservation, because those vary enormously depending on the eye of
the beholder. I don't think that Amory Lovins would agree with Chauncey
in ali details in regard to how far efficiency could help.
Wilson: If you look at Amory Lovins' projections, he suggests that India
reduce its per capita energy consumption by a factor of two, and I don't
think thai is a moral thing for anyone to request.
Hubbard: I don't think we could be in a position where we are going to satisfy
every extreme point of view.
Fulkerson: The point is we don't have to. What we need to say is that
improving the efficiency of electricity services is a net good, if it is done
economically.
Hubbard: Yes, if it is done economically. That is a very key provision.
Fulkerson: Absolutely, that's a key provision. I do not disagree with you at
all.
Hubbard: We should not water down the statement so much that we miss the
point we are trying to make.
Davis: The key to the statement is that with successful or even optimistic
achievements in improved efficiency and conservation, there will still be
the need for additional supply to meet the demand.
DEFINITIONS: CONSERVATION ANl) EFFICIENCY
Starr: We ought to settle on the word. Do you want to use conservation, or
efficiency improvement?
Fulkerson: 1 would use efficiency improvement.
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Borg: ! would usethem both in conjunction with each other, if you usethe
word conservation, ii could be qualified as Io whtlt you nlean. If you
meanefficiency, say ii. if you meanconservation as involuntary curtail-
ment, identify ii clearly.
Fulkerson: Do you meanthai standards,such asFederal standardsto require
thal cars achieve a certain average miles per gallon, thai would he
involuntary?
Borg: Anything regulatory is involuntary curtailment.
Davis: You have a problem here. You are going lo have to have some kind
of recommendation that will include energy efficiency and thai we will
accoml31ish ii by somebody doing something specific in order to bring ii
about. _'oa can say ii is a good thing, but in the end you are going to have
say how you arc going lo make ii happen, ts a requirement that ali
refrigerators have a certain efficiency an improvement, or is thai conser-
vation?
Start: What we are talking about are two basic approaches to reducing
energy t'or any given output. One is technological improvement and the
other is through life-style changes. Technology is driven by cost-benefit
analysis which shows what is worth improving. This is in the hands of
the manufacturers, the engineers, the technical professionals, lt also is
driven by imposition through regulation. Life-style changes are personal
matters, but they can also be regulated; take the 55-mile speed limit as
an example. So you have a choice of two parameters on conservation.
One is technological improvement of efficiency in use oi resources and
the other is by life-style changes.
But there tire also two ways of getting either one of these changes. One
set of changes is in the hands of the technocrats, and there is another set
that is part of the political process. One works on improving the
efficiency of the technical system, and the other puts impositions on how
the technical system is to perform or how you use ii.
Davis: But in the end, what we are trying tc)say is that even if we can be very
successful with these initiatives, ali of them, we will still need additional
supply.
Start: My numbers were based on technology limitations. I did not impose
lit'e-style changes. However, you can impose them. lt depends on how
autocratic the government wants to be. Ifl have an argument with Amory
Lovins, who has a lot of good points as well as a lot of nutty ones, it is
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thai he doesn't distinguish between the imposition of an autocratic
government on the people and on the technology. 1want to distinguish
between what the technology can do and what people are willing to
accept in the way of political domination.
Wilson: I think that is a tremendously important distinction. ! think that is
one of the reasons why ! would avoid using the word "'conservation",
which is so vague that you would have to define it almost every time. But
it is tremendously important, because a vast majority of the people who
might read the document we would produce would say they would like
improved fuel efficiency, even ii'it is not economically efficient, but very
few people want the imposition of somebody else's life-styles on
themselves.
[Here is the k{y point about Downside Risks: maybe people will
accept political domination on energy use. Maybe they will accept
restrictions enly if there is no other choice. But what if the crisis
comes and Lhey won't accept'? That would be called a political
crisis. With it, the downside risks begin to become realities.!
Oids: We've been focussing on the industrialized nations where conserva-
tion or improved efficiency may have meaning. But most of the people
in the world don't have anything to conserve, and these words don't
really mean anything to them.
Borg: Oh, I think they do!
Gottlieb: Efficiency and demand controls are what people are talking about.
We could make the additional point that in other areas in the world, it
means different things.
[Here is Wilson's last point vividly demonstrated: Unless conser-
vation is defined, it means different things to different people, even
those who are talking across the same table!]
Fulkerson: If you limit yourself to efficiency improvements, they can make
economic sense whether you are in Kenya or in the United States. There
is example after example where improved technology on the demand
side of the equation helps out the developing countries. China is a good
example, we know.
Zebroski: But they are extrenmly capital-intensive!
Fulkerson: That's what you mean by economic. Building power plants is
capital-intensive too. You've gol to figure out a way to finance both, and
you take the cheapest one. Isn't that right'?
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Zebroski: No! When you are in Poland, you build the coal plant that belches
out the particulates and the SO-2 and the NOX, because you can't afford
the scrubber and you can't afford the backups.
Fulkerson: OK, you are right about the externalities. They may be different
in a few cases. But if you haven't sorted out the externalities, you pick
the cheapest solution.
[This discussion swirled around definitions, but underlying it were
basic differences in views. Some of these hinge on what people
believe different things cost. What may be a good investment in an
ultimate economic sense may be impossible because there isn't
enough capital to do it, or to do enough of it. Or, in a particular
country at this particular time, it may be politically acceptable to
invest in supply but not in efficiency. In the U.S. today, it is just the
reverse!]
Shackelford: We spent some time with the PRC power planners, lt was
interesting, because what they wanted to talk about with us was not
supply-side planning, but because of their problem of being behind
4 already i_lterms of meeting load, they wanted to talk about methods of
load management: demand-side management. I think economic de-
mand-side management is something we ought to do in the U.S. also, and
it is being done,
IShackel ford was President of Pacific Gas and Electric Co., a utility
that has taken the lead with a number of major conservation
initiatives.]
Borg: In the case oi'the developing countries, I don't think we should forget
that improved efficiencies are already part of the developed world's
strategies as a normal course. So if you are going to say what conserva-
tion. specifically meaning efficiency, can do for them, you have to mean
over and above what they are going to do anyhow.
Erdmann: Conservation means that I reduce the temperature of my house.
Technical improvement means that I put in a new boiler, which produces
the heat. For developing countries_, reducing the temperature of the house
is not possible because such a large part of the population have no home
heating. The best way to do it is technical impre,,'ement, and that is the
only way. There is no other. But for industrial countries we also can say
conse_,ation, meaning that we do not travel so far, or we take a trains
instead of cars. or we reduce the temperature of the house, or switch off
- the refrigerator. I doubt whether it is feasible that people really will do
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this. People do not really act like this. But we could say it may be a
possible strategy+ but only in industrial countries, and technical improve-
ment can be a strategy in ali countries. I know that in East Germany, for
one ton of steel they use four times as much energy as they do in West
Germany. So you can improve a lot in technological efficiency in the
East Bloc.
Sanchez-Sierra: Even though there is a possibility to save a lot of energy
through energy conservation, or as we say in Spanish "rational use of
energy", that is the first part. The second part is that it is necessary to
expand the capacity. And this is true all around the world. From the
developing countries' point of view, we can agree on that type of
position. I think that we agree on the major topics: energy conservation
and the need to expand capacity.
EVOLUTION OF ELECTRICITY APPLICATIONS
Erdmann: Another point we did not talk about: Most technological innova-
tions that are foreseeable in the future are demanding electric energy. For
example, there is the possibility that in the near future there will be
electric cars. In Switzerland they are discussing the introduction of
electric cars as a secondary car, and that could be a very interesting
measure to improve environmental quality in cities. Then when you
travel downtown, you only use electric cars. So we should mention this
kind of thing, because it ma.> create such a lot of demand for electricity
that we must adjust the capacity. These new technical improvements and
shifts will ali be in the direction of more electricity and not less
elecu'icity. Wherever you look in industry, you see that where there will
be technological change in the future, and that the new technology will
use electricity. This is another reason why we will have more demand.
Wilson: Yes, ali environmental improvements, and ali technical improve-
ments, all of them go in the one direction of increasing electricity demand
over and above what was planned.
Erdmann: Right. Whether it is planned by the Government or not, it will
happen like this. I will give you an example: laser technology. Laser
technology for cutting steel has a maximum efficiency of 10%. lt can
replace torches that burn chemicals to cut steel. The energy needs for this
factcry using lasers will be less to produce a certain amount of products
because of using electricity instead of fossil fuels. And that will be the
future t
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Rossin: EPRI has extensive documentation on this. Ii is an extremely
important example, and one that is not widely recognized. The replace-
ment of fuels for processes with electricity is one that is happening
throughout industry all over. But what does it take lhr developments like
this to take piace in the developing world? We do know that it is
happening in the emerging industrialized nations, like Korea and Tai-
wan. But is it even practical to think that because something that has been
a successful innovation in our country, it will take piace in many
developing economies?
Starr: There are several things which the politicians will buy, and one is the
globalization of technology. Technology can be moved to any country
in the world, even the most sophisticated technology. Workers can be
trained everywhere to use ii. So if the people who have it want to move
it, they can move it. The second thing is the globalization of information,
which is creating the political revolution. And the third is the globalization
of the environment. That's why we are excited about the Greenhouse
Effect.
So the answer for the industrial world is to develop those technologies
which can then be made available to developing part of the world to use.
lt has to be done on a commercial basis, that's the function of the
industrial world, and that's what is actually happening.
The developing part of the world will not want to buy the second-rate
power plant: they want to buy the first-rate power plant. (We can't even
sell military equipment that's second rate.) I have been a consultant to the
Government of Taiwan, and I've seen it. The developing part of the
world wants to buy the most advanced technologies, and it is the function
of the industrial world to develop those technologies.
Zebro_,_:i: On a five or ten-year time scale the industrial/developing world
distinction is a valid one. But on a ten-to-twenty year time-frame, I
believe all countries are developing countries. I cannot see the U.S. ten
years from now proceeding on the path it is has been on for the past
twenty years. I can't see Eastern Europe progressing on the same path
they've been on. Major developments in infrastructure and technology
are absolutely required.
Starr: Are you talking about levels of maturity?
Zebroski: This is an example of the global village: transfer of information,
transfer of technology, and transfer of manufacturing capability. Barri-
ers are disappearing monumentally in Europe, possibly even in the
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Eastern Blot_. The USA has been in the international manufacturing
business for a long time, though it has not always been very visible. I
worked for GE for many years, and people didn't recognize that even 25
years ago, a great many of our products were, at least in part, manufac-
tured in other places. Now it is obvious to everybody that we have the
global village. So in reality efficiency and conservation should transfer
by example to ali countries. But building new capacity is a fundamental
necessity for much of the world. Our energy growth was subsidized by
cheap gas and oil, for which we were able to raise the capital. To follow
that pattern as a world model now would be terrible.
NEW CAPACITY: IS NUCLEAR POWER A VIABLE OPTION?
Davis: To meet remaining demand increases with adequate reserve, what
options are left? If those responsible feel that new nuclear power plants
are needed, will they be politically acceptable?
Sanchez-Sierra: What options are left? We need to discuss this at three
levels: political, economic, and environmental. Political: it's up to the
countries. If they have the uranium, if they have geothermal, if they have
hydro, and if they have the political will to do it, then they are going to
do what they can. From the economic point of view, each power
company will make its own analysis. But for the global environmental
decisions, we need to get something creative from _:hismeeting. If we ali
agree that the environmental issue is a global nr_e, we have to link
industrialized countries with the developing countries.
Consider China: It is not just up to China to improve the technology and
to reduce the environmental impact. I think that it is up to the whole
world. When I worked with the World Bank, I found out that ii is a matter
of political decision at the Board of Directors level what kind of loan they
are going to approve. Can we change the rules? Suppose there is pressure
from the major countries to the World Bank, or the InterAmerican Bank,
or the Asian Development Bank to lena m6_,ey, for example, to China to
build a 500 MW coal plant. Let's say that 80% of the money that is going
to be spent for the conventional part of the plant is going to be loaned at
the normal amortization period and rate, and the other 20% is needed for
environmental protection (but here 20% can mean over $100 million!).
Since we all agree there is a global problem, why don't we change the
rules'? Why don't we suggest a 40 year amortization period, a 3 or 4%
interest rate, and a grace period of 20 years for the environmental
protection components?
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That kind of issue is a critical one for the future. How are we going to
tackle energy development on a global basis? Three weeks ago in
Europe, at a very important meeting about CO+, the industrialized
countries started to talk about a CO_ tax to be invested in environmental
protection around the world. With a little imagination it is possible to find
ways to continue with rational energy development.
In Latin America, there are four countries with nuclear programs: Cuba,
Mexico, Argentina, and Brazil. From an internal political point of view
there is no problem in Cuba, Argentina and Brazil in order to continue
with the program. The problem is an economic and financial one. So if
there is interest in order to support the Brazilian nuclear power program,
there is a lot of room to do it. But where are you going to get the money?
Let me give you a real example: Brazil was discussing a $500 million
dollar loan for the national utility company (Electrobras) with the World
Bank, and it was postponed because the nuclear company, Nuclearbras,
is integrated with Electrobras. The issue at the Bank is that as long as the
Brazilians include nuclear, there is a problem for this kind of a loan.
The most important global issue is energy, and the environmental
problem, the global one, must be tackled properly. The others, like
energy conservation, are things you can do in industrialized and devel-
oped countries.
Rossin: So here's something that would be environmentally desirable, but
the World Bank's concern is that it might be a political liability if they
put their money there for that purpose?
Sanchez-Sierra: From the Bank's point of view, it was no problem to lend
money to Electrobras of Brazil as long as they did not include nuclear in
their program. Nuclearbras exists as part of Electrobras. The World Bank
will not lend money to it. But this is a very particular issue. In fact, I think
it is possible to develop coal. We have the technical capability to avoid
environmental impact if you are willing to spend the money you need to
spend.
Borg: Doesn't Brazil have the largest national debt in Latin America right
now? Does that in any way influence the decision of the World Bank not
to give them additional loans?
Sanchez-Sierra: Not at all t Because the debt of Brazil is around $110 billion
dollars, and a good part of that is coming from the energy sector, at least
$30 billion dollars. And a good part of that is from the nuclear program,
but that was not the major issue. At the end, the big part was that
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Nuclearbras was an integral part of Electrobras.
Davis: I think ali of you have thought about what we might say as a Finding
about the need for nuclear power in the future. I thought Chauncey
Starr's analysis made it perfectly clear that if you are going to "get there
from here", there are going to have to be substantial increases in electric
supply from nuclear power. Is that what we should say, or is there
something else v,e should say?
Fulkerson: Only if global warming is a constraint. If global warming is not
a constraint, what the hell, use coal. And by the way, we are spending half
a billion dollars a year figuring out how to burn it cleanly.
Rossin: But keep in mind that's the legacy of a policy that's been in place
Ibr quite a number years.
Wilson: lt is not necessarily incorrect unless one believes in global warming.
Fulkerson: That's right!
Starr: Clean coal gets rid of most of the pollutants and ends up with water
vapor and CO,, which is the perfect end point for a hydrocarbon. Clean
coal technology does not get rid of the CO,. The real issue of course, and
you've raised the right question, is how serious is global warming? That
hasn't been resolved, and we won't know for years down the road ii"it is
truly big or not.
If there is a restriction due to that fear, in anticipation of global warming,
then we're faced with the alternative of low or zero per-capita energy
growth, as my figures show, with its limitations on the global economy,
health, education and environmental protection.
Shapar: I found at the International Energy Agency that the whole world is
asking the same question. What's the answer'? Is it clean coal and
nuclear'? lt should be diversity. We recognize that China is going to
expand its use of coal two-fold before the year 2025, and India is going
to triple it. They've got to use coal for much of that. Looking at it
globally, the answer has to be clean coal and nuclear. Any additional
hydro sites worldwide will be used as weil. And of course, we need better
end-use efficiency, and as we tried to define it before, conservation and
change of life-style. We're talking about everything.
Rossin: Is it fair to say that whether the Greenhouse Effect turns out to be real
or not, that diversity of supply is important enough that we need to use
ali of these options'?
Fulkerson: No.
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Shapar: If you are looking at the globe, there is no way that China and India
are 1tot going to increase their use of coal. If you are talking about the
United States, you might come out with a ditTerent answer. Besides,
there are two billion people in Asia that are cooking their food over open
fires.
Davis: Ali of these clean coal technologies are less et'ficient than the present
methods, and they actually increase the amount of fuel that needs to be
burned, and thus increase the COt emissions. You ve gol to make a
fundamental decision about how serious the Greenhouse Effect is likely
to be.
Shapar: The environmentalists arc' attacking the Clean Coal Program of
DOE. They're saying it is an excuse to sell and burn more coal.
Rossin: Dr. Lu, forgetting about CO, for a moment, will the program for
increased burning of coal in China include pollution controls on coal-
burning plants'?
Lu: Presently we do not include plans for such investment. In the future, it
might be so. We anticipate by the year 2000, we will be burning 1 to 2
billion tons of coal a year, and by the middle of the next century, 2 to 3
billion tons of coal, compared to 0.8 billion tons a year now in the U.S.
At the same time, we have to keep in sight the costs. With such heavy
dependence on coal, we must face transportation problems and local
pollution problems.
Blue: If the CO, issue is debatable, one issue which is not is local air
degradation. _Fhose of us who have visited Eastern Europe have ample
evidence of particulate pollution. The level of that pollution is severe
enough to suggest that some substantial amount of cleanup will be
required and needs to be funded. To accomplish that will cost money, and
therefore coal will cost more to burn. But if you want to choke on coal
gases, you can just visit cities in developing nations around the world
today.
Other sources of energy supply may become more interesting, even
nuclear fission. We should not lose sight of the fact that uranium is just
another fuel. If you are looking at significant multiples of wh_,. we use
today, then it is obvious that the availability of another energy source
(uranium) as well as fossil fuels that we bum, will affect costs. So
ultimately, the issue is an economic one. The phenomenon we perceive
today is the increasing costs of fuels.
79
/
Stauffer: Si_icc we are focussing on economics, let me raise the question I
whether nuclear power in the (J.S. really is economic? Or do we have to
assume a variety of shadow pricing effects to try to justify it'?
Starr: I think we get in trouble if we don't face this honestly. New nuclear
power plants in the U.S. would be uneconomic under today's rules. The
cause of that uneconomic power is a different question, lt is not the
technology that is uneconomic.
Stauffer: Then can you go one step further? Take the French costs: Given
today's oi) prices, or given gas prices in the U.S., even at French
construction costs, is ii economic'?
Starr: Well, France is able to sell power more cheaply to England than the
English can generate themselves, to Switzerland, to Italy ...
Stauffer: That's not a proof that it is economic, that's a proofthat the pricing
is competitive.
Erdmann: Ot"course, the French nuclear plants are half as expensive as the
ones in Switzerland and Germany. That is clear. Also, in France, one
kilowatt-hour costs half as much as in Switzerland. The reason is you can
build them faster. This is the reason you have cheap nuclear power in
France. They are standardized, so you can build more bigger ones for
lower costs. When you build one it is more expensive than if you were
building ten. These are very simple reasons. Government subsidies are
also involved, but the subsidy is not so big that the subsidies determine
the economics.
Starr: This is ,_very complicated question. Every one of our energy sources
is subsidized. Who pays for the black lung disease for coal miners? It is
the U.S. government.
Fulkerson: You think that's a subsidy'? That's not a subsidy. It's an
internalization!
Starr: OK! The point is that if you look at the Electricite de France balance
sheet, it is in the black. They turn a good profit for the government, and
the real argument is how much they can raise rates and make more profit
for the government. It's true in Japan too. Nuclear power is cheaper. If
you talk about the U.S., nuclear power is out of whack and much more
expensive. And until something happens to bring its costs down compa-
rable to the best elsewhere, it's not going to make ii.
Rossin: We should be talking about building new nuclear power plants to
supply future capacity. That's different from saying that existing U.S.
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plants are not economical. Some nuclear plants in this country are
expensive. We know that. By and large, though, the ones that exist in
general are more economical than alternatives. The existing plants with
their sunk costs are economical, although it costs a lot to run them, and
these operating costs are rising. The French are finding this out too.
Wilson: Did we get the answer to the cost of nuclear power today? Is it
economic on a technical basis? I mean price, not cost. Is there acceptance
that nuclear power, when done the way France or Japan does it, or the
way we did it in the good old days, can be economic?
Stauffer: I think that what comes out of it today is that at present oil prices,
which set a cap for coal prices, the economics of nuclear power, even fbr
French reactors, built as cheaply as they can be built in the world is
questionable. If you do the full costing, even the French reactor barely
breaks even against imported oil. I'm talking about new ones, not the
existing ones.
Starr: The French don't agree with that!
McConnell: I spent two months last year with extensive discussions on
economic evaluations of the French situation. I just don't think oil in
France is even close to nuclear power costs. Nuclear is much less -
Fulkerson: Did you hear three times as much?
McConnell: Their numbers showed that electricity from oil is 200% of the
nuclear power costs.
[Electricite de France publishes operating and financial data in its
environmental reports, and this infornlation was gathered after the
Seminar. However, throughout 1991 the international organization
Greenpeace has been claiming that the French nuclear power program
has been an economic failure, and these claims have been echoed by
many other activist organizations. Citing 1989 data, Greenpeace cites
the record of unplanned shutdowns, production efficiency figures and
the large debt carried by EdF. In July, 1991, EdF issued a statement
responding to the Greenpeace charges.]
The following statements are excerpted from an EdF press release dated
July 1,1991:
Today EdF's nuclear power plants produce 3/4 of France's elec-
tricity needs and one-third of its primary energy. This electricity is
the cheapest in Europe, with the exception of hydroelectric power
in some Scandinavian countries. In 1990 France exported 12% of"
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its electric power production for 2.2 billion U.S. dollars.
With regard to debt: At the close of 1990, EdF's debt was $45.2
billion (226.1 billion French francs). This is $1.3 billion less than
in 1989. The debt is 1.4 times the annual revenues. This ratio is
common with electric utilities, regardless of whether they are using
nuclear power. Nuclear power is capital intensive, which is the
main reason for use of long-term final;,.ing and therefore, the
existence of this debt.
The reduction of EdF's debt in 1990 was achieved simultaneously
with a profit of $20 million (100 million French francs). EdF's
goal, in agreement with the French government, is a reduction of
electric rates of 1.5% per year in constant francs, which was
achieved in 1990.
Zebroski: I keep seeing that the industrialized world, at least parts of it, can
build both nuclear and clean coal plants which are environmentally
desirable and can be economic, and which have the great advantage that
they reduce the world pressure on oil prices and gas prices. As those
prices go up, the countries which will be most disadvantaged are the
Third World countries that do not have gas and oil.
I think that we should discuss the institutional obstacles that make a plant
that can take 120 months in some countries that can be built in 39 months
in other countries. This is the main element of cost overruns. And the
same thing is happening on clean coal. Clean coal is capital intensive, it
means big projects and it is a big environmental target, lt is a risky
proposition for many companies to tackle. They will put scrubbers on old
plants because that's ali they've got, but when someone says tackle this
billion or two-billion dollar plant, which you may not be allowed to run,
the default is to burn more oil and gas. That's the bad guy in the world
energy picture and we should address it. So the institutional obstacles
that can make the environmentally and economically desirable options
impractical in this country are a central policy issue for us.
Hubbard: Ed, you're saying that they are environmentally desirable, and a
lot of people wouldn't agree with that. So that's not an institutional issue,
it's a public perception issue.
Rossin: We do have one record on this. Every licensed nuclear plant in the
U.S. had an Environmental Impact Statement, and went through the
whole public hearing process. The conclusion in every one of these was
that it was preferable to the alternatives.
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Fulkerson: Most of the NEPA work was done al the time when one did not
consider Class 9 accidents.
Rossin: Class 9 accidents are scenarios that are beyond the design basis. Ii"
you are going to include such calculated scenarios you must include their
associated probabilities. And then, even if Class 9 accidents are in-
cluded, it doesn't make a bit of difference in the conclusions.
Fulkerson: Oh yes ii does! lt may not make a difference in probabilistic risk
calculations, but it makes a difference lo the public. We fundamentally
did the environmental impact statements wrong.
Shapar: lt survived legal attack on that very basis, and it has been upheld by
the courts.
Erdmann: I have studied costs for nuclear plants that are planned to start
construction in 1987 and be in operation in 1995. They are compared
with plants that would bum black coal inGermany. These designs are for
clean coal, because that is the only option for Germany. In any event, the
nuclear plant option is definitely cheaper than coal.
Starr: I don't think ii is wise tbr this group or this study to make economic
comparisons or say that one is beite_ ,.ban the other. I think that has to be
decided by each country or each utility system. What we are arguing
about is the options that have to be made available to the world, and about
seeing that these options should be developed as effectively as possible.
Davis: No one is going to order a plant based on the price of fuels today, but
rather on what one thipks the likely costs of fuels are going to be 5, 10,
15, 20 or 30 years from now. The current prices have nothing to do with
it: you have a series of options and other people are going to have to make
their own judgments. We really are talking about keeping options open.
Rossin: If we regard diversity of supply as important, and hope that
decisiu,_, can be made among options based on economics and weighing
enviromnental impacts, then it is ali the more reason to have a wider
range of options to choose from, and not anticipate that one will do it ali
somehow.
Slauffer: For the sake of argument, if you believe then, thai nuclear power
is economic, and I'na speaking of the U.S. wher( rate-making procedures
are different from anywhere else in the worl !, if you believe that a
nuclear plant undertaken today would be economic compared to oil,
which is the way they are often tested now de facto before utility
commissions, then the entire rate-making structure in this country is
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institutionally designed to make it look uneconomic. If one were to build
an economically effective and practical plant today, it would nonetheless
raise rates.
Rate shock is not only a function of the intrinsic capital cost in this
country, it is also an artifact of the rather bizarre way in which we design
rates. You can show that a plant which can generate at below the average
cost of power could nonetheless cause the rates to go up! Now that is a
very real institutional inefficiency, and one tor a variety of reasons the
utility industry has not been able to address. That is a basic obstacle.
Starr: I think it is real; the only thing one can say about those issues is that
if they persist, they will discourage the construction of high capital cost
of any kind. They can be changed by the political will of the people to
change it. lt can be done. If they were to allow CWIP (inclusion of
amounts representing investments in Construction Work In Progress in
the rate base before the plant goes into commercial service) there would
not be rate shock, the rates would go up slowly as the plant is completed,
and then the price would drop.
Rossin: And that's what happened in many states until adversaries discov-
ered that by eliminating CWIP they could discourage large, high-capital
cost plants.
Stauffer: It is not only CWIP, it is more fundamental than that. The problem
faced by the utilities is they have to deal with rate shock, even if they
come up with a plant that could generate more cheaply.
Shapar: In a study done by OECD, comparing nuclear and oil in 1987, in
most OECD countries except for the U.S. and parts of Canada, nuclear
was much cheaper than oil, and also cheaper than coal. The study is being
redone now with the drop in coal prices, but the prediction is that nuclear
will still enjoy a cost advantage over coal. That study assumes that the
plant will be built on a reasonable schedule.
Erdmann: I think the relation between international considerations and
national supply concern is this: we cannot expect that France or the
Soviet Union will abolish planning new nuclear power plants. In France
there are 15 being planned, and I don't know how many in the USSR. But
what happens in some countries like the U.S., or Switzerland or Germany
if the knowledge to build nuclear power plants will be gone? We have a
big problem now in Switzerland in that we have no one studying nuclear
technology at the Swiss Institute! This will continue. In a few years time
there will not be enough qualified people; we will have to start the whole
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industry from the scratch again. We in Switzerland can buy power. But
for other countries, this will he a big problem. Some countries of course
will continue with nuclear: France will, even if there is a second or third
Chernobyl !
IMPLIC'ATI()NS OF INADEQUATE GENERATING CAPACITY
Rossin: We spoke of inadequate capacity. What are the implications in
industrialized countries that already have an infrastructure thai depends
heavily on elec:ricity'?
Kaprielian: I can speak to the attitude of people in California. People in
California do not want to remember when their last interruption was. It"
there was an earthquake, or a very severe storm, the public is very
understanding, so long as you don't keep it off for too long. If, however,
the cause is inadequate capacity, lack of hydro because of a dry year, or
an inordinate number ot"large units being shut down by forced outages,
public tolerance as I know it approaches zero. And the public at large is
going to be climbing ali over everybody. The utility companies will be
faulted for inadequate planning, and as a nation, we're going to start
throwing money in any direction possible that will bring something on
the line last. What will be fast will be uneconomical. That's my
observation based on my personal knowledge and understanding of the
reaction of the public.
Starr: We had a historical case when the semiconductor industry in Califor-
nia made a study and tried to get reassurances on the reliability of
electricity, which is absolutely essential for the reliability of their
production processes. They decided that in view of the attitudes within
this state (the Public Utilities Commission, the California Energy Com-
mission) on electricity supply, they had better start looking at other states
for expansion, and that's what they've done. So one of the effects of an
anticipated shortage of reliability of electric supply has been to move
industry out to other areas.
Fulkerson: Is that good or bad'? There are people in Tennessee who would
like it.
Starr: Well, that depends on your point of view. If you like industrial growth
andjobs for people, it's bad to have good industry move out. You'vejust
heard a description of what happens if you get a sudden impact on the
public, but there's a gradual one where the industries anticipate an
unreliable situation and shift their industrial base. Now they can shift
their base anywhere in the world.
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Rossin: And they have. I was lit Commonwealth Edison for ten years, and
lhr ali sophisticated industries, fllose within the stale, or planning to
expand an considering doing it in Illinois, it didn't lake them long to
figure out what our phms were and whether we were going Io have
adequate capacity, lt was a straightfl_rward thing since ali power plant
plans are filed with the State.
Wilson: There are two aspects: Certainly 20 years ago, the demand for
reliable electricity dominated ali utility thinking. That went to pieces
about ten years ago when ali the environmental issues came up. Certainly
in the Northeast, those that I know were dropping reliability out of their
priorities, even though we had just had the NY blackout of 1977. The
CEO of New England Electric explicitly said it was no longer one ot"his
objectives. I think maybe we went too far on reliability in the 196()'s. But
we should address not only the impact of the public demand, for there are
actual costs which, every time we look at them, are extraordinarily high.
Since the NY blackout, the reason we no longer demand quite so high a
reliability is that the hospitals in the Boston area have doubled their
capabilities tbr emergency electricity. (They don't always work well in
thunderstorms; half of them don't switch on in fact, but they are there.)
The cost of unreliable electricity is well over a dollar per kilowatt-hour.
Fulkerson: Doesn't that depend on the use? Certain industrial processes are
critically dependent on reliable supply. On the other hand, for the
average consumer, a two-hour power failure is not catastrophic, and it is
not ver:y expensive to him either.
Rossin: And it is tolerated as long as he thinks there is a legitimate reason
for it, other than poor planning.
Wilson: I'm just asking myself how much would I be prepared to pay.
Actually'. l just came back from five weeks in China. I never saw a power
cutt Not until two hours before I landed in Boston, and it was out for two
days! 1would pay quite a lot to have had power during those two days.
I would pay a dollar a kilowatt-hour.
Erdmann: The government can impose economically designed taxes to slow
dernand, as is now being discussed in Switzerland. We should discuss
what arc the societal costs of high electricity prices.
Start: But it's even more fundamental. If you raise the costs of electricity,
you raise lhc costs of ali production in the total economy. You are in a
competitive world. ! don't know what percentage of Switzerland's
products arc exported, but 1 imagine it is a pretty big part. You are in
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export competition with countries whose electricity costs might be
lower, so you begin to lose market share, and to lose GNP for Switzer-
land. This is a slow-moving thing. It does not occur overnight. There is
a big difference between visibility of an issue that occurs quickly and one
that is slowly moving.
Rossin: What about countries in Eastern Europe and some developing
countries that have a limited supply of electricity today? Is that the
constraint? In some cases it may be a constraint on growth and on
investment.
Sanchez-Sierra: There is an important experience that you can learn from us:
the willingness to pay. When you don't have electricity, you know the
worth of it. In Argentina in January, 1989, Florida Avenue, which is the
most important avenue in Buenos Aires, was full of diesel engines
producing electricity for the banks, the shopping centers, etc. And at
what cost? Five or six times the cost of buying it from the electric
company! How long? Almost two months!
Kaprielian: About industry's reaction: We used to make available to large
industries (and we still do) interruptible rates which allowed a lower cost
per kilowatt-hour, with the expectation that when you came into a peak
demand situation, you could either have the customer go off automati-
cally by action of automatic relays, or anticipate for him, and tell him
there is going to be a problem tomorrow, so that he could shut down. This
was received very well for a number of years, so long as there were no
interruptions.
But the first time there were interruptions, our President got phone calls
from chief executive officers that said, "_Look, you've never done this
before! Why are you doing it now?" Immediately, they would want to get
on a firm rate! Right now!
Zebroski: You were too reliable! That was your problem! You weren't
unreliable enough to begin with!
Kaprielian: Well, I'll buy that! But I'm addressing the point about the
developed nations and the people who have gotten used to the conve-
niences and ali the good things that electric energy brings to us. To
suddenly not have it available by the flipping of a switch, or to be without
it for a period of time, is no longer an acceptable option.
Rossin: Then that is really the flip side of what New England is being told!
They are hearing that reliability is not important anymore!
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Wilson: That's right! New England is still saying that. I've twice been in the
business of negotiating electricity rates for my labs, at Harvard 20 years
ago and recently "atFermiLab. You are exactly right. We had complete
confidence we were unlikely to be switched off very much. We had
exactly a one-minute notice that we had to switch offfrom 70 megawatts
down to 10 megawatts stand-by! I think ii happened twice.
[People just don't believe it can happen. They have become accustomed
to reliable electricity. In fact, electricity at reasonable cost is regarded as
a "'right" in many states. "'Lifeline Rates" have been instituted tbr poor
and disadvantaged customers. Utilities cannot refuse service, and find it
very difficult to cut off service for non-payment of electric bills.]
Kaprielian: To draw on the experience of our Canadian friends to the east of
Ontario Hydro, they've had typically one outage, system-wide, per year
for years. And this has gotten the top political people in Quebec
demanding that something be done!
Rossin: I remember our planning criterion at Commonwealth Edison back
in 1972 was one outage in five years.
Sudarsono: We had that experience in the 1970's. We started an economic
development plan in 1969. The political situation was unstable. We tried
first for political stabilization, and then economic stabilization, because
in 1965-66 we had 500-600% inflation. Our power sector started at a very
low base, about 500 MW. But only 10% of the households were
connected to a grid. Our industrial base is still small now, but it was
smaller then: it was less than 15% of the total GDP.
We wanted to develop economically, so we invited foreign investment.
There was response from the private sector, both domestic and foreign,
and there was a high demand for power, from the early 1970's until now.
In fact, the average growth has been 15% per year experienced by the
utility, because we were starting from such a low base. The utility was
unable to meet all of this demand. And now, even though we don't have
exact data, 50% of the generation is captive, that is, it is done by the
industrial companies that use electricity. Our government decided in the
early 1970"s to allow them to do this because we had no alternative. We
had no capital: we had no means to install quickly the additional capacity
the utility needed. So we allowed them to install their own plants and
gave investment incentives. Now, of course, this is a negative, because
this capacity in separate units in ali these industrial plants means a waste
of capital resources. They are not connected with one another. They use
88
small plants. They are inefficient and they use oil; they cannot substitute
other fuels. So we are paying for that now.
Fortunately, Indonesia is an oil-producing country. We did have a
windfall in the 1970"s. When we made an assessment of the social
demand for power in the late 1970's (this was before the second oil price
rise) we decided we should keep away from oil-fired generation. We
decided to use coal and to make additional investments in hydro power.
These decisions were made on the basis of diversification. With these
investments through the Economic Development Bank and the World
Bank, until now the utility was able to supply the current demand,
because of the independent capacity. But with the 15% growth that has
been experienced since the early 1970's until today, the utility very soon
will be facing a great concern, because 15% per year means a doubling
of capacity every five years, and as you know, it takes longer than that
to build a power plant.
Rossin: Does the utility still have the obligation to supply any new cus-
tomer?
Sudarsono: Of course. They have to. The utility is State-owned, and the
Government is part of it, and if the utility cannot provide the power, it is
a reflection on the achievement and the performance of the Government.
[This discussion session, and the detailed discussions of electricity
demand and supply issues in the industrialized and the developing
nations, formed the basis for the Seminar's Findings and Conclu-




SCIENTIFIC UNDERSTANDING ON CO,
CONCENTRATIONS
Dr. Michael McCracken, Director,
Atmospheric and Physical Sciences Div., LLNL
One thing we know, that we really know and are certain of, is that the CO,
concentration has been increasing from when it was first measured in 1958,
from 315 ppm in Hawaii to about 350 ppm today. So the concentration has
gone up. There is a network of stations around the world that confirms this.
One of the interesting things is the seasonal variation that occurs as a result
of the northern hemisphere biosphere, from peak concentrations in the late
winter and early spring to minimum concentrations in the early fall. This
change in mass of carbon in the northern hemisphere is about 7 gigatons: 7
billion tons of carbon. You can compare that to what we are injecting as a
result of fossil fuel emissions, which is about 5.5 gigatons right now, and
biosphere deforestation another 1.5 gigatons. So the total of man's activities
are putting about the same amount of carbon into the atmosphere every year
as is being drawn out and put back in from biosphere over the whole northern
hemisphere. So if you want to capture man's input and store it somewhere,
ii is equivalent to an awful lot of twigs and grass.
Nov,, the reason that the concentration does not go up by 7 billion tons a year
is that half of it gets mixed with the Southern hemisphere, where concentra-
tions are also going up: and we believe that the ocean is taking up about half
the carbon that is emitted. I say "'believe", because there is a new paper that
suggests that it is actually growth of the mid-latitude biosphere that is
managing a way to store more carbon in the soils. We're not quite sure where
it is going: it is likely a lot of it is going in the ocean.
If you want to stabilize the composition of the atmosphere, have the CO_
concentration not go up _.llany more in the future, you would have to cut
this emission number by 80_)_or so. You have a system that consists of an
atmosphere and an ocean. The atmosphere and the upper ocean are in
9O
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equilibrium, bt,t what is not in equilibrium with them is the deep ocean. We
haven't cycled the carbon down to the deep ocean. Sediment removal is a
pretty slow process. The arnount you can add to the atmosphere without that
concentration going up is what you can store in the deep ocean. That number
is only one or two gigatons per year.
Fulkerson: I've heard numbers down to 50%, compared to the 80% you cite.
If that is the case, that means that the fossil fuel ratio is extremely small.
McCracken: That's right. If what you are going to do is stabilize the
composition of the atmosphere, and not use the atmosphere to store some
of your wastes, which is what you do for every other medium that exists,
you must cut emissions drastically.
Fulkerson: If you could remodel it and get 50%, I could sure use the extra
carbon emissions for energy production!
McCracken: And it also depends on the amount of net deforestation, lt is fine
to cut down trees to build buildings that lasl a long time and store carbon
in buildings, but when you destroy the forests by burning them and
putting the carbon into the atmosphere and don't allow that regrowth,
theta you have a net deforestation and more carbon is going into the
atmosphere. So if you want to stabilize the composition of the atmo-
sphere and don't do anything about detbrestation, you would have to go
ali the way, virtually to zero, on the fossil fuels. It is a coupled problem.
A lot of what is driving this is the rapid population growth that has gone on
since World War II. If we are going to stabilize things, we are going to have
to do something about population. If you recall Sen. Wirth's energy bill in
1988, a large fraction of the money was for population control. That is an
interesting role ['or an energy bill.
Where is the carbon coming from'? In 1950 we were emitting about 1.6
billion tons of carbon, mostly from the industrialized world. Not much from
the developing world. In the next 30 years, the total amount nearly tripled.
lt was the industrialized part that almost tripled. Meanwhile, the developing
world part increased by a huge fraction.
Consider a hypothetical case: If you take the year 2000 population, roughly
6 billion people, and you say that every person uses 5 kw per person, which
is more or less the amount of energy demand in Europe today (the United
States is about double that), and you assume that ali the developing world
is aspiring to that, and we've stabilized population, we would be putting out,
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keeping the same fuel mix, about 20 billion tons of carbon, four times what
we're putting out today. There's a real question, of course, if we could ever
get there because of availability of fuel and generating capacity, but if you
keep the energy mix the same, you're going to increase dramatically the
amount of CO 2going into the atmosphere.
The 20% reduction in CO_ emissions from the industrialized countries
talked about at all international conferences this year would reduce it by one
gigaton. Even if you reduced it to zero, but if the rest of the world develops
the way the industrialized world has developed, you are going to have
tremendous emissions, and what is done in the industrialized world will
make little difference. So the challenge is to find some way to provide clean
energy for the developing world. (Figure 8.1)
Depending on what you do, the CO_concentration could go up from its value
of 350 ppm today to double the pre- industrialized value, 600 pprr_,sometime
in the middle of the next century. It's now growing at about I to 2% per year,
so 600 ppm would be reached about 2060.
The atmosphere holds about 750 gigatons of carbon now; the living
biosphere above the ground about 560 gigatons. So if you were to totally
destroy ali trees and add this to the atmosphere (remember that half of it goes
into the ocean) you're not going to double the atmospheric CO,, concentra-
tion. (Figure 8.2) If you burn all the available oil and gas and add the carbon
to the atmosphere, and half goes into the ocean, you're not going to double
the CO_concentration in the atmosphere. The problem comes when you start
using coal and oil shale. Then you can easily double tb,_carbon concentra-
tion.
It is often pointed out that global warming is not entirely a CO 2problem. CO,
is about half the problem. There is a range of gases, methane, NO, and the
chlorofluorocarbons, that have quite small concentrations, of the order of
ppm and reasonable growth rates. Some of them have direct effects on the
radiative balance: that is, they directly trap radiation. Others have chemical
effects. They change the ozone concentration, and that increases the global
warming effect.
Olds" Do these gases reach an equilibrium distribution in the atmosphere'?
McCracken: Most of the important ones are distributed pretty unifomlly.
Methane has a lifetime in the atmosphere of about ten years, lt is pretty
uniform around the globe. One of the most interesting things is that it has
a 20 - 25% effect on enhancement of the Greenhouse Effect. With its ten


















methane emissions from rice or farm animals or leaking natural gas lines,
perhaps by 25%, the excess methane concentration will start going
down. That will tend to counterbalance the radiative effect of CO,
increasing. So you can think about trying to manage the composition of
the atmosphere. Methane concentration is now about double its pre-
industrial level.
The fluorocarbons have lifetimes of the order of 100 years. Now we are
trying to replace them with new compounds that have a lifetime of 10 to 15
years. In terms of their infrared capacity, the new compounds turn out to
have roughly comparable effects, but because they have shorter lifetimes,
they do not build up in the atmosphere. It is important to distinguish between
merely reducing mass and reducing numbers of molecules, as the newer
compounds are lighter. If you do it on an equal mass basis, you get a
Greenhouse Effect that is not too much lower than what you are expecting
from the longer lived ones, because the Greenhouse Effect is based on
molecules. I haven't seen a very good analysis of this on a molecular basis.
When you consider solvents, is it molecules or is it mass? Or foam
insulation: is it on a molecule basis or on a mass basis? I think it is really on
a molecule basis, but everybody is assuming in most of the calculations that
it is on a mass basis. That's something that needs to be cleared up!
In one of the most interesting efforts to understand CO_ in the last decade,
the Soviets drilled an ice core in the Antarctic, and measured the concentra-
tion of CO, in bubbles in the ice. We have some sense of the temperature in
the ice from isotopic data, going back about 160,000 years. The last ice age,
about 18 - 20,000 years ago was about 10degrees colder at this location, and
this glacial climate prevailed back to 110,000 years ago. The last time it was
as warm as now is a rather brief period about 125,000 years ago, and before
that there was another glacial cycle.
What's interesting is that the CO2curve has a very similar pattern: peaking
at about 280 ppm, which is sort of the pre-industrialized level. The data
points span 2000-years. There is a real question as to whether the CO 2caused
the ice age, or contributed to it, or there was a feedback process. The
resolution isn't really good enough to do leads and lags very weil. But it
seems to be related. The French feel that the two factors that contributed are
CO, and methane, and variations in the Earth's orbit, and that the two may
be about equal. So they would say that about half the temperature change is
due to CO 2and methane -- about the same as the models we are using.
Fulkerson: Do you think that gives us a clue as to how much natural
Greenhouse gas could occur due to temperature changes?
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McCracken: We wish we knew. lt was natural, not man-made. There are
possibilities that warming would lead to melting of the pemlafrost,
which would release methane, and that would be a large source of
methane.
Now if our models were ten times less sensitive, they would not match these
data, but our current best models do explain the data fairly weil, within a
degree or two. Actually, the climate hasn't changed as much as the models
indicate it should, and we don't know why. The ocean lag can be a factor of
two. That cuts the prediction down to 1to 1- 112degrees wanning, and that's
what the models suggest we should be seeing. Actually, we're seeing half
a degree, and we don't know why.
Fulkerson: We're not even sure we see half a degree, are we?
McCracken: Weil, there's a lot of argument about that. The consensus in the
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change is about a half a degree.
Erdmann: What created the recent rise in CO 2in the last 20,000 years?
McCracken: We don't know. lt is hard to explain such a long period. There
are plans to drill another hole, maybe on Greenland. With its higher
precipitation rates, you can get better resolution.
MODELS
We wish we didn't have to use models. We wish we could go into the
laboratory and do experiments or use past analogs. But the system just
doesn't work that way. We're ibrced to use climate models instead. They are
theoretical, so one does have to worry about confirming how they work. You
make a lot of assumptions, because we have to represent a lot of complex
processes, like cloud cover, which has received a lot of attention lately,
about surface hydrology, about oceans, and so forth. So you ought to be
skeptica! of GCM's (General Circulation Models) and you certainly should
be skeptical of the details of them. GCM is jargon for the most comprehen-
sive of the models that exist.
The models divide the world into grids and boxes. (Figure 8.3) I've shaded
in the center of a box on the finest resolution model used in the United States.
The Europeans and Canadians have some recent results with a slightly finer
grid. You can see that one grid point is about the size of the state of Colorado.
That means every place in Colorado: Denver, Grand Junction, Steamboat
Springs, Vail, has one value of temperature, one value of wind, one value of
precipitation.
So the first problem is to decide what the temperature of Colorado is. There's
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not much resolution. We will not get any local results. Here at Berkeley our
grid point extends from the Pacific Ocean, across the Bay, the Berkeley
Hills, the Central Valley, the Simwa and into Nevada. Again, the model has
one point of information for ali that. So these models are clearly approxima-
tions. You are not going to get regional detail out of the present version o!"
them, and that's a serious limitation, because people want to do impact
studies. For example, the Canadians want to know in one particular specific
piace how the snow changes. Very difficult!
Weil, we try to test these models to the best of our ability, against a lot of
things. We can test some individual processes: radiation in the laboratory,
advanced weather forecasting. You might say, "Well gee, that must mean
everything's terrible, given how bad weather is." But weather is the
instantaneous state, climate is the statistical state. The question is, can we get
the same sort of statistics. We test against the seasonal cycle. We test against
El Nino, when it comes. We test against some of the glacial data, if we can.
But there is a real sparsity of information that is precise enough over the past
100 years that you might use to look ahead 100 years.
Consider the four GCM's used in the United States. (Figure 8.4) I've
compared their predictions for wintertime temperatures across the country.
The models don't agree well on details amongst themselves. And they are
better at predicting winter temperatures than summer temperatures.
So what do models do weil, and what do they do poorly? We think they do
reasonably well on the global average temperature, on the north-south
temperature gradient, on the change from season to season, and on winter-
time temperature. They do relatively poorly on regional detail, or summer
temperatures, hydrology or extreme events. The problem is if you are doing
impact studies, this is the information one really wants. But if it gets a few
degrees warmer in the summer in the Midwest, that could be a real problem.
We use these models nonetheless. For example, we double the CO 2concen-
tration and niake a simulation. The modelers say that when you double the
CO 2and come to a new equilibrium, you get a temperature change of from
3 to 5 degrees tor these conditions for the global avm'age: larger at high
latitudes, less at low latitudes. If however, you examine a sequence of papers
over the years, you see that their predictions varied. The one that's gotten a
lot of attention over the past year, the study from the UK Meteorological
Office, took the very same model but changed how they treated clouds a
little, by changing the optical properties as they got wanner. This gave a
dramatic change in temperature for a doubling of the CO,.
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This is why the NAS and the others say +'Weil, we are not sure what it is, but
let's take a range from 1-1/2 to 4-1/2 degrees, because we think it's in that
band." You have to be very cautious. But it's a very important difference!
If you're a farmer in Nebraska, and it's only going to go up 1- 1/2 degrees in
the next 100 years, you're going to adapt your agriculture very slowly. If it's
going to go up 4 degrees, and there's an amplification in the continental
interior due to drying that makes it 6 to 8 degrees, so that it is 1-1/2 degrees
in the next twenty years, that's going to be much more important. Right now,
we can't tell you the difference.
Most of the differences between models seem to be related to how they
handled the clouds. There is a lot of uncertainty about what the models are
showing. But I would argue that the temperature response to a doubling of
CO+ is a few degrees. It is not tenths of a degree. If it is that low we would
have real trouble representing the past climate change and the seasonal
cycle. And it's not ten degrees. If it were ten degrees, the climate would be
changing ali over the place. But, as I've commented elsewhere, I didn't say
if it was Centigrade or Fahrenheit. It is certainly a factor of two, and "few"




Now these are equilibrium calculations. What's really happening is that we
are slowly increasing the CO+ concentration, and you want to know when
you'll get out of the band of natural fluctuations around the present climate
by a halfa degree or so, and start rising into the warmer state to come. There
have been a ver?,,few calculations of this. This is one from Jim Hansen that
has received a lot of publicity. He starts in the late 1950's and runs into the
future with three scenarios, A+ B, and C. (Figure 8.5) Each represents a
different amount of Greenhouse gases put into the atmosphere: correspond-
ing roughly to unrestricted growth, moderate growth, and lower growth. The
temperature starts rising maybe by about 1/2 to 1degree into the early part
of the next century. The shaded area is believed to be in the warm period
5000 to 6000 years ago that you remember from your high-school history
books, when the climate of the Middle East was quite different.
125,000 years ago the sea level was maybe 5 meters higher than it is now.
If we got equilibrium in this condition, we would expect the sea level to be
higher. He sees this slow, steady warming well into the next century. It isn't




saying that in a statistically significant way it would be different from the
19th century.
What do we think we know'? lt is reasonably well established that the globe's
going to warm. We argue a little bit about how much. We think we
understand the mechanisms, at least the amplification in the polar regions
because of snow cover and ice melt-back. Certainly if you get to wanner
conditions you are going to get increased evaporation and also increased
global precipitation. For a number of reasons, ultimately, we think we'll get
rising sea level out of it, although there are arguments about what happens
to the polar ice cap. and whether you'll initially put more snow or less, and
whether the melt water offofGreenland will initially reach the ocean or will
seep down into the glacier and make it more dense for a while. The warming
will be a little less at lower latitudes, because ii takes more energy to
evaporate moisture at higher temperatures. You are likely to get increased
summer drying of the continental interiors, mainly because you get increas-
ing evaporation rates. Although precipitation goes up, most of that's in the
winter, and as a result you will get more frequent hot summer days.
There are a number of things that are possible that we really don't under-
stand, mainly precipitation changes. They are likely to change, but we don't
know how.
Dr. Borg asked about our reconstruction of the temperature measurements
over the last hundred years. There's a lot of problems. You have to go back
to the days of sailing ships to get ocean temperatures. They threw canvas
buckets over the side and pulled them up on the ship, as they cooled in the
wind. to get ocean temperatures. You have to adjust tbr a lot of different
things. Those adjustments on individual measurements turn out to be as
large as the kind of change we are looking at. So. one does have a problem!
But one sees some reasonably steady warming on a global basis (Figure 8.6).
lt is a little bit steadier in the Southern hemisphere than in the Northern. The
cooling period around the beginning of the century isn't understood at all.
lt has been suggested recently that it could have been due to increased sulfur
oxide emissions in the Eastern United States and the industrialized coun-
tries, which create sulfate particles that become cloud condensation nucleii,
so that the number of droplets in clouds changes, and if you increase the
number of droplets it makes the clouds brighter, and that tends to reflect
away solar energy. So there are some suggestions that this can be due to man,
but these are only suggestions, and we have a lot more work to do to see if
that's true.
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GLOBAL ENVIRONMENT AND ENERGY
If you are going to do something about the environment thai affects energy.
you have to look for large effects. These are the kinds of categories where
you might look for large effects. If you have a big effect on human health.
eveR, body might want to do something. If you merely have more frequent
hot days, you decide how you want to deal with that. In the tropics ii is harder
than in the high latitudes. There are suggestions that pests and tropical
diseases will be more prevalent, but then you have to make a prediction
about how medicine evolves. Certainly. food and fiber resources are an
important issue. CO, enhances the growth of many plants, lt also enhances
the growth of many weeds. You'll have longer growing seasons, so farmers
will benefit and grog' more crops. You do have to worry about earlier
summer drvinm so you have to manage, .... ,"moisture more carefully. ,...- . ., .Jg.a, . .
One of the things you have to worr}, about is the fresh water resource. In
California. for example, if you raise the snow line, and keep precipitation the
same. the maximum runoff may be higher, because more of the precipitation
will be coming down as rain than snow. As a consequence, you have to lower
your reservoir levels to protect against the 100-year flood. But if that storm
does not come that you've protected against, then you have less snow in the
mountains to run off in the Spring to fill your reservoirs for the Summer, so
you will end up with less water available for agriculture. If you get increased
precipitation, vou have to lower your ;esen'oirs even further. So water
resources will be a serious issue.
The other issue is the potential for rising sea level. Estimates have been
coming down since EPA's rather outlandish estimate of 1 to 3 meters by
2100 a few years ago.
The other night I watched an NBC special on the Greenhouse Effect? Weil,
it was very interesting. Steve Schneider said you have to be very careful: the
press always takes extreme views, and he kept warning about caution. And
the rest of the show was ali extreme! The whole world is going to die! The},
had a picture of Washington. DC, awash in v,,ater! And they talked about not
going to extremes!
In the last l l00 }'ears sea level has gone up maybe l0 to 15 centimeters.
probably from thermal expansion and melting of some mountain glaciers.
The rising component comes from the flow of ice into the ocean, which
man}' think won't happen for a few centuries, if at all. The negative
component comes from more snow on the Antarctic as it gets warmer, but
still below freezing. So the "'central guesstimate" is still 50 to 150 centime-
ters by the },ear 21(X).but I think people are leaning toward the lower number
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in recent years. Even so, in coastal states, like California, rising ocean water
would mean more salt water pushing up into river deltas, which could mean
even more water problems.
POLICY
Cutting back Greenhouse emissions is going to be difficult, because it
affects energy, it affects food and it affects health. My view is that the CFC
problem is a 1% problem: you adjust costs over some scale by about 1% to
deal with it. Acid rain, if you spread the cost around, is a 10% problem.
Greenhouse gases are more like a 100% problem. You have to think about
changing technologies. If you hope to scrub CO_ yot_have to have another
power plant al_d that takes twice the amount of energy. EPA has put out a
chart on where these gases come from. About 20% comes from the United
States, with 6% of the world's population. We take a lot of criticism for
producing Greenhouse gases. My sense is that you have to be careful in
saying that, because there are a lot of developing countries that would love
to have the standard of living that we have, and that means they aspire to have
the emission rate that we have.
You have to be careful about land area too. The California Energy Commis-
sion estimated how much CO_ is produced per person in California by taking
the total combustion in California and dividing by the number of people. The
average number in the United States is five tons of CO: per person per year.
Anybody want to take a guess on whether California is higher or lower?
(Guesses: "'Higher!")
Higher'? Actually, it's only three! The reason is the way they do their
accounting. The power we get from Arizona which is generated by burning
coal counts against Arizona. The energy used to make the cars we drive that
come in from Japan is counted against Japan, not California. We do,
however, count the energy to grow the food in California that we export. One
way to help correct the United States' problem is to stop growing food and
exporting carbon! That hurts the nutrition of the world, but ii would reduce
our carbon emissions, because we wouldn't have to use ali that diesel
energy.
-_ There certainly are limitations in the models, in space, in time, and in
observations. In fact, we don't have a very good baseline climate model to
compare with to understand natural variability. We have problems reconcil-
ing models and observations. The models seem to be maybe two or three
times more sensitive than the observations are indicating. We don't know
why. And the regional changes in the observations aren't matching the
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models weil, so we have work to do there. There are other factors that can
affect climate: solar variability, volcanoes, and on longer time scales, orbital
drift and continental drift. There is also the question: Is the climate
predictable at all?
Well, I guess I would say it is more predictable than a lot of people might
think. Certainly winter-to-summer changes are not chaos. That's very
regular. A lot of the variability occurs from natural oscillations: sloshing
modes, diurnal tides that are results of natural oscillations that are excited by
forces in the system. These are important for our ultimate understanding, but
they are qot on the scale of change we are talking about.
What do ali these unce_ainties mean as Jar as presenting the scientific
results? Scientists have a hard time putting the uncertainties up front. What
does that mean for policy making?
I would summarize by saying that we are going to see potentially large
climate changes, and they are going to keep happening, lt is a cumulative
effect. We need to understand better the vulnerabilities and sensitivities.
And it is going to take ali of us working together to figure out what to do
about it.
QUESTIONS
Zebroski: Is the gain in arable land hkely to offset the loss of coastline? Say
you gain arable land in Siberia but you lose coastline.
McCracken: I think any change is a problem. You can postulate that the
world we are moving toward will be better, if we can adapt to it. If change
occurs rapidly it will be hard to adapt, and it will be a negative impact.
If we can make the change occur slowly enough so that we're technologi-
cally adapting to it, that will be a lot easier. The issue is probably not
stabilizing the composition of the atmosphere, which is very difficult,
but slowing the rate of change as much as you can, and bringing some
balance between the impacts of these changes and the costs of getting to
those new energy technologies.
Starr: 3he big concern is the time. What would you guess for the doubling'?
20 years? 50 years'? 100 years'?
McCracken: We've seen of the order of half a degree over the past 100 - 150
years, about half-way to a CO, doubling. What we're going to s_,eover
the next 30 - 40 years, maybe because of ali of the trace gases, is that we
go up to the full equivalent of a doubling due to the methane and
fluorocarbons. So you might see the same temperature change over the
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next 30 years that you saw over the last hundred, and maybe a little more
depending on the how much the oceans contribute.
Sanchez-Sierra: Can you estimate the contribution from the power sector'?
McCracken: I think that the CO, emissions from the United States electric
power is about 30%, transportation a little over 30%, commercial about
15 to 20_74and direct residential use about 10 - 15%. That's putting ali
the credit for residential power use in the power sector.
Rossin: What about breathing? That makes CO,.
McCracken: That's recycled. There is recycling through the plants and the
food chain. The net exchange with the biosphere is about 60 million tons
a year, and the variations are only a few million tons.
Rossin: Are you saying that there is a big inventory out there almost at
equilibrium, and we are only talking about little wiggles on it?
McCracken: Yes. If we follow a carbon molecule, its exchange time with the
biosphere is on the order of ten years. But if you add a carbon molecule
to the system, the time before it gets removed from the atmosphere-ocean
system is of the order of 500 to 1000 years. The exchange processes are
much more rapid than the net processes.
McConnell: I just want to ask, how radical a solution would you look for'?
McCracken: Well, my strategy is to do ali that you reasonably can to slow
the rate of the change. We are using other components of the system: the
ocean, the land and other places to store the wastes of mankind. You want
to reduce them as much as you can. Are you going to say we can no longer
use the atmosphere? How do you balance out worrying about sea-level
rise and the people in Bangladesh who may be flooded versus the 100
million people in central China who need electric power to raise their
standard of living. I don't know how you strike that balance. It's difficult.
So far, we've heard a lot from the industrialized countries. It's going to
be interesting when the developing world starts coming into this disclls-
sion.




Every nation has its own unique characteristics and history. And so it
is with regard to energy and electricity. No single nation's story is
representative of many others, but each has its story, and there are
lessons to be learned from them. With many participants from the
United States, it was agreed that we should not ask someone to prepare
d summary paper. Categories like "industrialized nations" identify a
broad class. Within that class, our participants from Sweden, Italy and i
Canada each agreed to discuss their particular electricity issues to help
focus our discussions.
Sweden' situation is truly unique: a democracy faced with the conse-
quences of its own political decisions. Lars-Gunnar Larsson, of the
Federation of Swedish Industries warned:
"The energy policy is supposed to result in a sufficient supply of
energy for households, hospitals, schools, and industries while three
decisions by Parliament are respected: to start the nuclear phase-out in
the middle of the 1990's, not to increase the releases of carbon dioxide,
and not to use the remaining untouched rivers for new hydro power. It
is evident that there are serious conflicts between these decisions.
"...The most electricity consuming industries will not be able to satisfy
their need for electricity .... It is extremely difficult to predict to what
extent the increased prices of electricity will force industries to close
their operations .... Natural gas cannot be the long term replacement for
nuclear power."
"... The Social Democrats feel that a future nuclear accident will
happen. They feel that they cannot face such a situation without
remaining committed to the nuclear shut-down. Some call it 'a
vaccination for new accidents.' The politicians can say, We started to
phase it out. We were wise.
"... lt is frequently claimed that Sweden has solved the problem of the
nuclear phaseout. That is not true. That is a lie. We are having a
problem because we are not allowed to build anything anymore for
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power production .... Ironically, a limited energy supply is the greatest
environmental threat.
'_... Prof. Thomas Johanssen says that major efficiency improvements
can make up the deficit. But the incentives are already there, and it has
not happened. He says it will take education and government interven-
tion, and admits that it could only happen "if we in Sweden have the
political will.'
"... We do not so much have a problem with public acceptance of
nuclear po_,,,_r, we have a problem of political acceptance. In a
democracy, there can only for a short time be a difference between
public acceptance and political acceptance. We do not see it as possible
to avoid a very difficult situation of forced choice in which most likely
one or more of the Parliament's decisions will have to be revoked."
In Italy, public opposition to nuclear power, particularly after Chemobyl,
led to a government decision to shut down all nuclear power. Ironi-
cally, Italy now depends on French nuclear power plants for more than
15% of its electricity. Its economy is growing faster than some other
nations, but as GianFranco Cicognani reports, its balance of payments
problems are growing, and the people do not yet feel the impact.
Canada's largest utility, Ontario Hydro, just completed a 25-year
integrated plan. Based on four years of research, polls, interviews and
computer modeling, it appears to be an excellent example for utilities
to follow. [Elections in 1990 brought new leadership to the fore, and
shortly thereafter, before the public hearings on the integrated plall
were completed, the Government put the nuclear part of the integrated
plan on indefinite hold.] Lorne McConnell, who directed the prepara-
tion of the plan, describes how it was developed and its recommenda-
tions.
SWEDEN
Lars-Gunnar Larsson: I will try to tell you a little bit about what is happening
in my country. Usually, coming from a small country like Sweden to an
international meeting like this, I should be flattered that there is such a great
interest in my country. Here I think, Sweden may be used as a bad example
rather than a good example. But nevertheless I will try to explain what is
going on.
We used last year about 140 terawatt-hours (TW-br) in Sweden. Of that,
nuclear produced 47_: hydro 48%; and the rest, 5%, was fossil. It's a good
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system. We have nuclear for baseload and we regulate with hydro, and we
use fossil fuel for peak load power.
Industry in Sweden used 51 TW-hr, which is abou_ 36% of the electricity use
in Sweden. And about 2/3 of that is used by the electricity-intensive
industry: paper and pulp, iron and chemical industries. Also, we are very
dependent on the international market. We export half of our industrial
production.
The referendum system is only advisory. The decisions can only be taken by
the Parliament. In 1955 we had a referendum on which side we should drive.
At that time we were driving on the left side of the road, as Britain still does.
The result was that with a majority of two to one we rejected the idea of
driving on the right side. We wanted to continue to drive on the left side. In
1967 we changed todriving on the right side anyhow. Why? Simply because
the opinion had changed and Parliament took the decision.
In 1976 we had a change in government for the first ti_e in 42 years. The
Social Democratic government had to resign because of the election in 1976.
They resigned because there was a major win by a party called the Center
Party, which had an anti-nuclear platform. It is generally conceded that the
reason why the Social Democratic party lost was because of their pro-
nuclear position.
It is frequently claimed that Sweden has solved the problem of the nuclear
phaseout. That is not true. That is a lie. We are having a problem because we
are not allowed to build anything anymore for power production.
The Parliament stopped construction of any new hydro production in the
mid-1970's, because why should we use our last rivers when we had
nuclear? Then we had the nuclear phase-out decision by the Parliament. And
in 1988, the Parliament took the decision that the release of carbon dioxide
shall not be increased in Sweden.
That means that we are facing an impossible situation. We in the industry
claim that we need to enlarge our industry; we need industrial growth, and
that also means that we will need more electricity.
That energy policy we have now has no credibility with Swedish industry.
As a result, there is today no plan for any investment in any electricity-
intensive industry, l've been with the Federation of Swedish Industry for
four years, and there have always been some big projects going on. Today
there are no plans at all. Though no plants have been shut down yet, the mere
uncertainty that the present policy gives to industry creates a problem.
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The referendum thai was held in 1980 concerned the safeiy of nuclear power,
and also the question of welfare and employment. I will read to you what was
said on the ballot, on those two paragraphs thai won by a 2/3 majority in the
referendum:
"Nuclear power shall be phased out at the pace thai is feasible with
regard to the need for electric power for the maintenance of employ-
merit and welfare. In order to reduce the country's oil dependence,
pending the availability of renewable ,_ources of energy, no more than
the twelve nuclear power reactors that are currently in operation,
finished c_runder construction shall be used. There shall be no new
construction of nuclear power facilities. Safety aspects shall detennine
the sequence in which the reactors shall be taken out of service."
Now, was the outcome of that referendum pro-nuclear or anti-nuclear? I
think you could say it was both. It was pro-nuclear because it said we can
operate the twelve plants that were planned at that time, bu¢ ii was anti-
nuclear to the extent that we are not allowed to build any more.
tit is important to remember the emotion of the 1980 referendum
campaign. In coffee-break discussions Larsson explained thai the
wording itself was a compromise, because some groups were demand-
ing an immediate shutdown of ali nuclear plants.]
After that referendum, Parliament decided that ali nuclear power should be
phased out by the year 2010. But it is important to remember that the year
2010 was not on the referendum ballot. After 1980, there was no real
discussion of nuclear power in Sweden. The public sort of said that they had
enough of the discussion. Then we had the Chernobyl accident, which as you
know, was first discovered in Sweden.
We had a committee to look at Chernobyl and what consequences it should
have for Sweden, and I sat on that committee. We gave two conclusions: 1)
that the Chernobyl reactor was of such a type that ii could never get a license
to operate in Sweden because of its instability problems, and 2) the view of
the safety of the Swedish nuclear power plants has not changed because of
Chernobyl. So the results should be no change in policy because of the
accident.
But the Social D:mocratic party, still the largest party in Sweden with about
40% of the votes, was split. On the one side they had the women and youth
organizations: anli-nuclear, and on the other the labor unions: pro-nuclear.
There were discussions within the party about what to do. As a result, there
was a compromise: to start phasing out nuclear power in Sweden by shutting
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down two reactors, one in 1995 and one in 1996. And also, we should have
what the politicians call a "check point" in 1990.
Why did they do that'? To understand it, one can take an analogy. The Social
Democratic party had strong problems after the TMI accident and after the
Chernobyl accident. The decision to phase out two reactors six years into the
future is thought to be a "vaccination" for new accidents. The politicians
want to say if we have new accidents, "Isn't it wise that we started to phase
nuclear power out in Sweden?."
But Autumn of 1989 there was much heated debate. The labor unions, which
are closely identified with the Social Democratic party, has stated several
times that they are in opposition with the Government's policy. In an article
published in Sweden's largest morning newspaper, four major labor leaders
strongly attacked the Parliament's decision to start the nuclear phase-out in
1995-96. Their arguments are that it would change the industrial structure
in Sweden, which would result in lower industrial investment and higher
unemployment.
On the next day, a Social Democratic party working group, which had been
assigned the task of formulating the policy of the party for the coming
decade, published their report. And on the energy matters, the group stated
that there were serious conflicts between the three mentioned decisions in
the Parliament on the rivers, nuclear power, and carbon dioxide. There was
an admission that one or more of the Parliament decisions may have to be
re-evaluated. But both our Energy Minister and our Prime Minister imme-
diately denied that the conclusions made by the policy group were against
the energy policy of the government. It is, however, quite clear from the
public debate that the Social Democratic party is deeply divided on the
nuclear issue, and that the hot debate which has started within the party will
go on for quite some time.
Several expert groups are now working on ali the problems involved in
carrying out the government's energy policy and they will ali report to the
government before Spring of 1990, and energy policy within the party will
be discussed at the party congress in September of 1990.
After that debate the Prime Minister wanted a close up on the lines, and he
decided that he would chair a four-member committee to review the nuclear
issue and the energy issue in Sweden. That means that there will be some
changes made in the energy policy of the government. What those changes
will be however, is today impossible to say. I'm quite sure that there will be
a postponement of the 1995-96 decision, but whether it will go further, we
really don't know at this time.
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It's also interesting to know that there has been a major change in public
opinion in Sweden on nuclear power. The last Gallop poll in Sweden
indicated the majority of Swedes think that it was good that Sweaen started
with nuclear power, and in May of this year 51% said that they did not
believe in phaseout of nuclear power by the year 2010. In November of this
year, 77% of the Swedes said they did not believe in phaseout by the ye_)
2010. "_,,.., ,,:_ns if you look at the polls, this is exactl) the situation where
we were in 1985, before the Chernobyl accident.
However, if you look at the Parliament you'll see that a majority - 66% -
believe that nuclear power will be phased out by the year 2010. So we have
a situation where 77% of the constituency believes nuclear power should not
be phased out, but 66% of the Parliamentarians think it should be phased out!
Borg: Is the question "Do you believe it will happen?" or "Do you want it [
to happen?"
Larsson: The question is designed to ask whether they believe it will happen,
and we have asked the same question to those who design the polls: if
they say that people are answering the questions in the same way as what
they believe will happen.
Borg: So it may not be their personal preference?
Larsson: Yes, it is their personal preference. That's the way the people who
are doing these polls indicate that respondents are giving the answers.
I'm not familiar with the way they are phrasing the question. That's a
science in itself, but it's a valid question.
To ,:larify this confusing result: what the poll showed was that 66% of
the Parliament believes that nuclear power will be phased out by the year
2000, and 77% of the people believe it will not be phased out by the year
2000. So we have a little strange situation in Sweden. Nuclear power may
be generally accepted by the public but it's not accepted by the politi-
cians!
Perhaps we might not have a public acceptance problem in Sweden, but
more probat:)ly, we have a political acceptance problem!
Fowler: Could you explain that shift from 51 to 77% in so short a time?
Larsson: Yes, I think that there are two things that happened. First of ali the
labor union movement started tocriticize the position of the government,
which was a major thing. And also, it has to do with the environmental
problem: it has to do with the Greenhouse Effect. That's new. If you look
at the ballot when we had the referendum in 1980, nothing was stud about
113
environment. The word "'environment" did not go on the ballot. But I
think that if you had a referendum in Sweden today on any issue, the
politicians would certainly try to put environment on there, but at that
time it was not there. Now, when people start really thinking about the
phasing out of nuclear power and look at what are the alternatives, you
find that the alternatives are not better, they're worse from an environ-
mental point of view, and then they start to do some rethinking.
[An update on the political situation in Sweden with regard to energy
policy follows at the end of this Section.]
Shackelford: ts anybody in Sweden putting together any kind of a forecast
for the next I0 or 20 years'?
Larsson: Yes, actually right now we are preparing to launch a study of what
we think will happen - some sort of a forecast or market analysis of just
that.
Shackelford: Any idea of what that's going to show?
Larsson: Yes, it's going to show a steady increase in the use of electricity.
But the problem is, what could be the price? Because if we have to phase
out nuclear power in Sweden, that means that the price of electricity will
about double. That means that we will not have the basic industries,
paper and pulp, and iron and steel, and we will have deep problems in
Sweden. That means that we will not have growth in those industries.
So there are two parameters here. First, the price of electricity, and also
the use of electricity. But we see that in the residential sector, the use of
electricity is gradually increasing as weil.
Shackelford: The way you describe the political situation, it sounds as
though Parliament has said you can not build any kind of power plant. So
what kind of a power plant do they propose under those circamstances?
Larsson: What we are showing is that we need more capacity. That's what
we have to demonstrate to the politicians so they will give us a "go" on
new projects.
Shackelford: So again, what kind of new plants are they proposing?
Larsson: Weil, to back up a little bit, we have had plans to build a coal project
and that has been denied by the politicians. We're thinking about
importing natural gas, maybe from Norway, maybe also from the Soviet
Union, but those negotiations are in limbo right now. There is a coal
gasification project, a demonstration project, that a private company
wanted to start in the south part of Sweden, but it was denied by the
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politicians. So the ituation is that right now, we don't have any plans for
new plants.
Zebroski: How much independent generation do you have?
Larsson: You mean cogeneration, by factories, in large complexes, and
things like that'? Not very much. You have to use fossil fuel there too, and
with a ban on fossil fuel, you cannot use that.
Erdmann: But did the govemmem actually forbid individual companies to
use fossil fuel?
Larsson: Well, it's more complicated than that, because we have a local veto
in the communities and it's the communities that say no to these kinds
of projects.
Fulkerson: I've been reading this book from a conference in Sweden this
past summer, and the last chapter of that book is Johanssen's view of how
to deal with these problems. His view is that the need will be met with
biomass (biomass in Sweden seems to be kind of crazy, but I don't know)
coupled with a very, very strong conservation program (which also
seems to me to be kind of strange, because you think about Sweden as
being very efficient already). But this study says, "No, there's a lot more
that can be done there". So they do these scenarios which show less
electricity and more electricity services, with biomass replacing nuclear
power, if I recall correctly, and less CO, emissions. Would you care to
comment ?
Larsson: Sure. I think it's very important to realize that what's discussed in
"Challenges of Choices", which is the name of the report, is a number of
scenarios that could happen ira lot a things were to happen in particular
ways. For instance, you'd have to have a lot stronger central government.
The individual interests will not be able to make their own choices about
where they're willing to put their investments, whether they should put
it into market investments, whether they should put it in energy invest-
ments or other things. Because that study believes that the industry, for
instance, only makes investments in the energy sector, so to me these are
not realistic. It's the kind of scenarios that could happen. If you, for
instance, invest only in new technology, which of course in most cases
are more efficient than old technology -- weil, we've had that situation
for decades. And the situation in Swedish industry is that we're using
more electricity than the increase in production, because electricity has
other values than just the energy factor. It has to do with productivity,
cleanliness, environmental quality and things like that.
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Conn: Could the situation cause the Swedish industry to start to build plants
outside of Sweden?
Larsson: Yes. lt has already started with the electricity-intensivc industries
which are not having any plants inside Sweden. The expansion plans for
that part of the industry are outside Sweden today.
Li: Are you planning to buy electricity from neigi_boring countries as Italy
is doing?
Larsson: The problem there is that we have a very good exchange of power
between tile Scandinavian countries, but one of ihe base requirements is
that each country should take care of its own base load. So what we are
doing between the Scandinavian countries is that sometimes we import,
and sometimes we export, but we can't base our electricity use on large
imports from other countries, because that's simply not viable after the
agreement between the countries. Each country should be responsible
for its own base.
Erdmann: May it be possible that this agreement could be changed?
Larsson: Some fee! that maybe we can solve our mutual problem by
importing from other countries, and clearly, that's not a viable solution.
Erdmann: In Continental Europe it is now possible to import a large amount
of electricity from France.
Larsson: The situation in ali Scandinavian countries is basically the same:
new power plants are blocked. The most interesting situation from that
point of view comes from Finland, I think, who are discussing their fifth
nuclear power plant. But they will wait for those decisions until after
elections in 1_)91.
McConnell: Do you have have programs or plans that have to do with
electrical efficiency improvements in Sweden?
Larsson: Yes, If I may first talk from the industry point of view, we have a
situation where 2/3 of the use of electricity in industry is by electric-
intensive industry. That means that they're using so much electricity that
even though electricity is quite cheap per kilowatt-hour, they're using so
many kilowatt-hours that it's a substantial amount of the cost for those
industries. I think that electricity is being used very efficiently in
Sweden. If you look at the last decade, what has happened is that we are
today using about 30% of the amount ofoil that we used 15 years ago in
1975. Only 30% of the oil that we used in the mid '70s! But we use much
more electricity. If you take the electricity use and look at the production,
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those follow very, very close in Sweden. So if you want more production
in Sweden, we need to have more electricity in Sweden. So I would say
that we are much more energy efficient in Sweden than we used to be,
but we are using more electricity.
Borg: What's the average age of your nuclear plants?
Larsson: The first plant stalled in 1972 and the last one in 1985, so the
average age is about 10 ),ears.
Rossin" Let's follow through on Lorne's question a little bit more. Are there
any government initiatives which include subsidies or regulatory re-
quirements on energy conservation'? You mentioned the large industries:
are there any requirements that the government has placed on them? And
then, what about small industry'?
Larsson: There are grants that some industries can get to help on their
investment in energy conservation and electricity use. But the hope is
that the utilities will get involved, and look atnot only how they "reselling
electricity, but also at how that electricity is used. Ali major utilities in
Sweden are now having big programs on energy services, as that is
called. If you take the major consumers, however, their electric bills are
so large that they have already instituted those measures that are effective
from an economical point of view.
Rossin: I heard Johanssen speak at the World Energy Conference and if you
listen to what he said, his point was that largely through improved
conservation - and I didn't even hear that much about biomass - that
substantial savings in electricily use could be made. And I'm not talking
about a few percent.
Fulkerson: That's right. That's what he claimed.
Larsson: It's just not credible. Because if you look at the input that he gave,
there are a lot of"This could happen if you have a lot ofeducation...ifyou
have government interfering, ii you have ...."So lhere are lots of"ifs'" in
those scenarios. I was in a debate with Thomas Johanssen about a month
ago where he tinally proclaimed that his report could no! be used as
planning for what we're going to do with electricity in Sweden. He
claimed that it was a political document to show the politicians what they
could do ii"they had the will. But if you read it carefully you'll see that
there are so many "'irs'" in his scenarios that to us in the industry, it simply
is not credible.
Kaprielian: To what extenl do you have domestic steam heat as a utility
suppl}, in Sweden'? Whatever the answer is, the next question is: Is it
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possible thai there might be a shift towards allowing electric generation
with district heating using this by-product?
Larsson: We have quite a good program of cogeneration in Sweden but the
situation is such that we have used ali the economic opportunities now
available. This is because you have to have a grouping of houses that !
should be quite dense. We have district heating in those areas where it can
be used economically. We cannot use it where we have lots of villas or
housing that is spread out.
Kaprielian: And the source of that energy is what - oil?
Larsson: Some places we have oil, some places we have coal, but we also
in some cases use electricity for district heating systems. That is, in the
part of the year when we have lots of electricity because of the hydro. We
have to spill it out anyway, so then we like to use it for heating instead.
Li: Could you do more with energy storage? Could you use pumped hydro
for storage of electricity?
Larsson: We have that bac on further development of hydro. Four of our
main rivers are stii] ,,,'.touched. And people generally said, "Shouldn't
we leave these rivers the way they used to be since we have this
wonderful energy source called nuclear power?" The problem is that first
we had the decision in 1970 with hydro, we had the decision in 1980 with
nuclear, and then we had the decision in 1988 with fossil fuels. There is
no one in the Parliament who has looked at those sources at the same time
and weighed between them. It's one decision that's followed by another.
The production of hydro in Sweden today is a little bit more than 60
terawatt-hours. If we harnessed our four additional rivers, that would be
an addition of 15 terawatt-hours. So even if we take ali the potential
hydro power we have remaining in Sweden, it's only the equivalent of
three nuclear power plants.
Sanchez-Sierra: Could we say that Sweden is a kind of extreme case?
Among the major industrialized nations, aren't you having the same
problems? Problems with a coal plant in Florida? A hydro project in
Canada? A new nuclear site in Japan'? To mc. the lesson is that Sweden
is an important case, but still kind of an extreme case in the industrialized
world.
Larsson: I would like to challenge that a little bit. I don't think we are ali that
extreme. As I said in the beginning, in a way I'm glad that Sweden is of
such great interest here, but the difference is that Sweden is a small
country. Only eight million people; everybody knows each other. We
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have close links between decision-makers. We have a small nloment of
inertia, I think. That means from the time an issue crops up until an issue
is decided upon. it takes quite a shon time. And 1 think from that point
of view it is interesting to look at Sweden because we have a small
moment of inertia. Things move very fast in Sweden.
We take on a lot of views from other countries, but we impler_ .t them
very, very fast, The anti-nuclear movement came from this country, was
very fast coming to Sweden and was implemented first in Sweden. Now
I see a sort of comeback for nuclear. We still have a long ways to go, but
I think there are some changes, The politicians are not so sure anymore.
A year ago they were very sure: Yes, nuclear power should be phased out.
Now they are not so sure anymore. Now they are thinking also about the
Greenhouse Effect. Maybe we should take a second look. And from that
point of view I think that Sweden is of some interest, l'm not saying that
we're a model country, but I think from that point of view it is an
interesting phenomenon. !
Sanchez-Sierra: Maybe you didn't understand me. I think that what is
happening in Sweden is extremely interesting. But can we extrapolate
from Sweden to the rest of the industrialized countries? If so, fine, but if
not. do we need to study every country in similar detail in order to reach
any conclusions?
Borg: I think what Lars is giving us is an indication of the volatility of public
opinion there and whether ii be Sweden, a large country or a small
country, I think we al; are pretty much aware of the fact that there is that
same trend or undercurrent throughout the industrialized world.
Start: But I think there is a point which the description of Sweden illustrates,
which is fundamental for ali the industrialized countries, and it is a
fundamental point. The time constant for the political machine to come
to certain conclusions politically is very short compared to the time
constant for either technological change in industrial systems or for
information development about the environmental issues that are in-
volved. And so what you have is an instability in the democratic process.
The instability is that the r)olitical operation goes rapidly relative to the
other things that it's trying lo manage, and I think that Sweden is a good
example of this.
Wolfe: Let me argue just the opposite. Let me argue that I don't think there's
a heck of a lot of difference between Sweden and the U.S. in the sense
that in the U.S. you can't put up any large energy facility either-- coal,
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nuclear, dams, even ,,eothernlal -- the chances are essentially not there.
And 1 fllink the issue, the reason that it happens both in Sweden and the
U.S., and in ltaly for that matter, is that there hasn't been a need. If you
look at the U.S. in file past 17 years since the Arab oil boycott, we've had
a surplus of capacity. So you could be against everything. You could
point out ali the bad things about dams and about coal and nuclear, and
therefore on each individual issue say they're bad. We didn't build them,
and ii didn't matter.
I think what we're facing now is a change in that environment. We're
beginning for the first time in 17 years to find energy shortages in the U.S.
In Sweden, I gather from what Lars says, they're beginning to face up to
industrial problems with lack of power. So I think we're entering a new
regime, and the issue is, how are we going to solve the new energy
requirements that are developing in the 90's, which I think are quite
different from the surplus situation we had in the past two decades.
Olds: I think in the U.S. there's an interesting parallel in the political
instability with regard to energy maners. We heard Dr. Seaborg talk
(Section I 1) about h,s advice to President Nixon on nuclear power, and
Nixon made nuclear power a high priority. The breeder reactor was our
Number One energy priority development target as a follow-on to light
water reactors. Then, Mr. Carter was elected, and nuclear power became
the energy option of last resort, and there was no breeder, other than a
continuing study, no reprocessing, and the emphasis was ali on biomass
and renewables.
As I recall, at Alvin Weinberg's Gatlinburg Energy Conference Number
2, Stuart Eisenstadt, who was advisor to President Carter, said they made
this decision without really knowing anything about nuclear power. Now
that was a monumental political shift in terms of its impact on the world
as well as what happened in the U.S. But as you say, we didn't really need
it at that time, so it didn't really matter that much. But now we're
beginning to feel the consequences of those decisions. So I think there
is a distinct parallel between Sweden and the U.S., but you in Sweden are
a better laboratory on a smaller scale.
Hubbard: Furthermore, there was a reversal again in 1980 and '81, which as
a matter of fact came down heavily on the renewable alternatives, but at
the same time it did not bring a constructive nuclear progr'_m back into
being.
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Olds: The decision of the Reagan administration was that it was up to the
industry to do it and it's not the government's business.
Blue: The question here is: What is the actual situation now'? There is no new
hydro, no fossil, no nuclear. They are at a point of crisis. What is the
corresponding information in the other industrialized nations?
Starr: We're at different stages of the disease.
Blue: Are we terminal yet'?
Starr: But that's the answer. It's not terminal. Let's run a scenario on
Sweden. Eventually it's going to have to get changed. That is obvious for
lots of reasons. But when it gets changed, by that time, if it doesn't gel
ch_'nged soon, there will be a shift in the industrial pattern of Sweden.
Many Swedish industries will move out to other countries, and the big
companies I know in Sweden have already established relationships in
Western Europe and elsewhere, and they'll shift their big energy absorb-
ing technologies into other countries. There will be less employment, a
lower GNP, and so on, depending on how this gets done and the rate at
which this occurs. Sweden has tremendous numbers of public services
for the individual and a lot of that will have to get cut down. So it',, a
question of when the cure begins to work. It's a natural result. And one
of the things you hope to do in the other countries is somehow to call the
attention of the decisionmaking bodies to the course of this disease, in
order to prevent it from coming to a head in every other country of the
world. That's the problem.
Gottlieb: Ali right, say I have a picture of the Swedish situation. Now, if we
go over other individual industrial countries, how critical is the problem
in each of their cases?
Starr: Weil, you've heard about the U.S. from Bert Wolfe. The likelihood of
being able to get approval for any big station in the U.S. is very small and
for nuclear particularly small, and it'll take legislation and administra-
tive changes to really open up the door for any decision making. In the
UK you have in effect a de facto moratorium on new nuclear stations as
a result of the Thatcher reorganization and privatization program, so
they'll complete what they've got but the likelihood of new ones being
authorized is quite small. In Germany there's a big battle going on about
everything, and how its going to go is uncertain. France is the only one
that has laid out a policy that they plan to continue. In Italy it's been
practically dead on everything. Japan is continuing, but Japan is getting
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the first symptoms of an infection in tenns of public opinion, if you call
it a disease, there's various stages of this occurring in ali the major
industrial countries.
Eibenschulz: Are you talking only nuclear?
Fulkerson: He's only talking nuclear.
Starr: Coal and nuclear.
Eibenschutz: There's one important question that l've been meaning to ask
Lars from the beginning. When do you expect shortages -- actual
shortages? The demand keeps growing ....
Larsson: If you look at the demand curve and the supply curve, they'll meet
sometime around the mid-1990's. We've also had plenty of rain the last
few years, which means we've gol a lot of hydro. And statistically we'll
have a couple of years now with good summers, which means we*li have
not very much rain. So of course it depends on the statistics, but
sometime in the 1996 - _9"7time, we see the supply and demand curves
crossing each other.
Fulkerson: Is it too early to ask, Lars, if public opinion and ultimately
political opinion continues to grow toward accepting more nuclear
power, and you may again be considering new nuclear plants, are you at
the point yet where you've thought about what kind of plants?
Larsson: No, that's too far ahead for us. Let me give you two scenarios which
are in the Swedish thinking. One is that we'll not have any more Three
Mile Islands or Chernobyls anywhere. The other situation would be the
reverse. There's no doubt in my mind that if we have some sort of an
accident or major incident_ then all the politicians will jump on the
bandwagon and say, yes, we have to gel rid of nuclear power. So_ its very
crucial for us that things do not happen, neither in Sweden nor anywhere
else. That's the reason why the Social Democratic party changed and had
this premature phasing out in 1995 and '96. That is their vaccination for
new accidents.
Shapar: I was waiting for you to say what the extreme case was in Europe.
Probably Austria, with a completed plant just shut down and closed.
Sanchez-Sierra: Or Italy, where they shut down their plants that were in
operation.
Hubbard: Lars, another point of information on the Swedish situation:
What*s being done in Sweden now and by whom, to inform the people,
the politicians, whoever, of the implications of the situation that you see
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yourself getting into'? You said your crossover point will appear in the
mid '90's - that means you should be building something now, or
deciding to build something now. What's being done to inform the
public?
Larsson: We have, in the Federation of Swedish Industries, started a
program to inform the people who work ill the industry of this, and I think
it may also have an effect on public opinion on nuclear power. So we are
starting an infomlation program for our own people in the industry and
also we are writing articles, talking at radio and television stations and
things like that. I think we're gradually seeing a change in attitude. It's
slow, but it's positive.
Rossin: I think if there's anything that drove my thinking as to what the key
issues were for us, its perhaps the last discussion that we've had. Because
it comes back to lead time. Energy facilities take a number of years, the
public doesn't feel the pain at the time those decisions have to be made,
and the question is how can you inform a public that there are probk.ms
that are a few years ahead and yet they don't feel anything right now.
How do you get them concerned enough to get them to take a forward
looking attitude - the kind of attitude that industrial leaders have to take,
that utility leaders have had to take in this country, but that is not a very
palatabl,- position for politicians.
Zebroski: My favorite book of recent years is "The March to Folly" by
Barbara Tuchman, in which she holds forth on how countries can follow
policies which are to their own detriment for long periods of time. I think
in this count,y we have a difficulty in that many of these decisions are
never explicit. It's like "'the death of a thousand cuts." The public does
not really understand that last process. We talked about the expense of
nuclear power. It's expensive because of this very process. The Japanese
are building a plant in 39 months and the French still do it in 60 or 70
months, so the high cost in this country, which is the real negative, is a
consequence of that process. We seem to have found a way to make
policy decisions where the damage is many years later, and those who
make them are far out of the picture.
Erdmann: Perhaps we could discuss new evolutions in Europe involving the
opening of the East, because this will create a need to adjust existing
strategies and scenarios. Look at the Federal Republic of Germany. Ali
these energy scenarios which were made in the last ten years expect a ?_
constant energy demand _ no growth anymore. Perhaps more electric-
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ity, less oil, but overall energy demands were stable. Als(), the assumed
population is stable or even declining. But when you add the people
which are coming every day to the West, then it adds up to about one
million people during the last two years! So flow is the first time in 20
years that the population in Germany is growing! And of course, ali these
scenarios about energy demands must be thrown awav. They are not
valid when you have one million people more. They wil obviously ask
for more electricity.
Starr: The statement was made by Mr. Larsson that if there isn't another TMI
or another Chernobyl, things are going to go pretty good. I think the
Western world can control its nuclear plants so that there won't be
another TMI. I'm willing to accept that as an extremely low probability.
On the Soviet RBMK (the Chernobyl design), however, we have yet to
see any solid evidence that the USSR has done anything tangible that
reduces the possibility of another RBMK failure. In spite of ali the
literature, ali the talk and ali the reorganization, the information I have
seen in the professional press suggests that the actions that have actually
been taken are minimal. They've reorganized the players, but not the
machine. I think that the RBMK reactor as a machine is in a completely
different category than the Western world power plants, and that one
should not face the future of nuclear power planning in the Western
world based on the hope that they're not going to have another RBMK
reactor accident.
The second point involves the people who are staying in the East. They
are counting on the Western countries helping them in building up their
infrastructure, and the only way to do this very fast is to deliver to them
electricity. So East Germany, Czechoslovakia, Hungary are ali waiting
for deliveries of electricity, especially in the winter, in order to avoid
pollution, in order to avoid the shortages which exist in East Germany,
and indeed, in the whole East bloc.
Kaprielian: I'd like to make one observation, and that is that everything
we've said today in commenting on the Swedish situation seems to
center around current technologies, lt seems to me as we think about our
final statement, and I'm putting myself in the position of a reader, there
could very well be the criticism that these guys gathered around and just
talked about what everybody knows about already, and nothing was
suggested about whether some energy storage capability could be
developed with the surplus of hydro you have in Sweden. Does it fit into
the mix in any way'? Is any consideration being given to compressed air,
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batteries, t'ly wheels, these other technologies which we have looked at
and talked about over that last 15-20 years'? Are we eliminating these
possibilities in these discussions'? Lars, does storage figure in Sweden?
Larsson: We have been trying to do a lot with storage, but we have not come
out with anything that you don't have. In our statement we should make
clear that we do believe in future technologies, there's no doubt about
that.
ITALY
GianFranco Cicognani: Italians know they must cut back on their heavy
dependence on imported oil. But, little hydro potential remains, there is
strong opposition to coal and there already are very stringent limits on
emissions because of concerns about acid rain. This means that in the near
future, natural gas is going to play a significant role in the production of
electricity. A pipeline from North Africa will provide large, stable supplies
of natural gas.
Electricity use in Italy has increased about 5% per year tk+rthe past three
years. There is very strong dependence on imported oil and gas tbr
electricity production. Hydro sources make up 25_ of domestic supply and
there is a very limited contribution from geothermal energy. Hydro sources
are being used to their full capacity. There is also an eftbrt to modernize older
fossil-fueled plants.
Over the past few years, imports of electricity from foreign countries,
mainly France, have increased to the level of 15% of ali electricity in 1989.
Integration with Europe will mean compromises between national necessi-
ties and European necessities. In the context of a unified European energy
market. Italy could play an important role in the natural gas sector, thanks
to its interconnections with the producing countries, particularly in North
Africa.
As far as nuclear energy is concerned, even though ali of the existing nuclear
energy plants have been shut down, Italy has decided to retain a research and
development effort in order to arrive at solutions characterized by a very
high degree of safety and reduced environmental impact, lt is planned that
this endeavor should be carried out in strict collaboration with similar
programs in Europe and the United States.
McConnell: With the description of the situations in Italy and Sweden as
industrialized countries, we've asked you, Lars, is Sweden an extreme
case'? I think that the general response that we've heard around the table
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is, perhaps not. Perhaps its just helped to characterize the situation that
many industrialized nations are facing in different degrees: a sitlmtion
where there is indeed a very complex set of issues that have to do with
politics, and also with technical options, and with emerging environmen-
tal issues that are making the world seem very complex. We don't want
to "cry wolf", and say that we're about to have power shortages, but it's
quite clear that as time proceeds, that day of reckoning is getting closer.
This poses for ali the industrialized nations a question of how one deals
with that problem on a timely basis. What can we do by way of leadership
to put forward a position that will either resolve energy supply impasses,
and prevent major consequences, or at least mitigate them'? What Lars
has outlined this morning has at least put the problem in a little clearer
perspective!
Borg: lt occurs to me that is there a common denominator in ali the
industrialized world and perhaps descending into the less developed
countries as weil, that has to do with surpluses that allow the country the
luxury of banning the use of fossil fuels, banning nuclear plants, large
base load plants. Is that basically a threat that runs throughout'? And
conversely, where there are shortages, those sorts of bans and consider-
ations, don't the people affected have a voice'? Germany seems to be on
the fence, but you suggest that it's going to turn around too as their
demand goes up. Is that basically what ali our problems have been...that
we've had the luxury of surplus capacity?
Starr: There's a quick answer to that one. It's the definition of what you mean
by surplus. Every electric utility system, if given the freedom and if it can
raise the money to expand, expands enough to meet some reliability
criterion. This means that it has in reserve a certain amount of power
producing equipment (in the US 20% is considered comfortable as a
rough number) to take care of the unanticipated failure of equipment.
And so the customer never feels this. If everything runs very, very weil,
that reserve can always be used for additional load purposes.
What has happened in the U.S. is that in many of the major utility
systems, that reserve capacity has been been gradually drawn on for
normal load purposes and the reliability then is on the edge of failure.
Then the risk of brownouts and blackouts becomes greater. So there is
a variable called reserve, and you can play around with the delays,
inadequate planning for the future and so on, but you might pay for it at
the expense of reducing the reliability of the system.
126
Wolfe: Let me answer a little d, fferently. I think what happened in a large
number of industrial countries after the Arab oil boycott and the price of
oil and en,-rovv_. in ,__eneraldoubled, is that the electricity use growth rate
went dow_,. In this country it still grew, but it went from 7'7.,.a year to 4%
a year. At the time of the Arab oil boycott in 1973, we were planning on
a 7% per year growth, so there was a lot ot"capacity that was in the
pipeline. Even though we cancelled a hundred nuclear plants in this
country, we had, instead of the 20% normal excess capacity that was
mentioned, a national average of 33% until recently. I think that was in
general the situation in the industrialized countries. One difference was
France, where as a result of the Arab oil boycott, they concluded that they
had no indigenous resources. They just decided they were going to
switch to nuclear. But in most other countries, people saw they had a
surplus and therefore it wasn't necessary to do anything.
Borg: Weil, by surplus I rnean adequate margins.
Wolfe: You mean more than adequate margins!
Starr: But the point is that commitments to build those power stations tor the
future had been made in the early seventies, so when the economy
stopped growing so fast in the seventies, these plants had already been
built. So what would have been a normal 20% reserve came out to be a
30_, reserve. And nov, that reserve is now being used up.
CANADAmINTEGRATED RESOURCE PLANNING
Lorne McCormell: What I'd like to do is take a few minutes of your time to
talk about a case example that applies in Canada, in the Province of Ontario,
where I've been responsible for the planning and for designing the process.
The Ontario Hydro 25-Year Integrated Plan was the result of a commitment
my company made. We came to the conclusion that our traditional way of
planning for meeting projected demand and reserve requirernents by doing
our own planning and then presenting our decisions to the Provincial
Government as "'the way to Jo it" would no ionger be successful. So we
combined our planning into a process that involved the public. For three
years, we conducted public meetings as our plan wa,, being developed. We
interviewed thousands of persons, did in-depth polling, and analyzed
_ popular attitudes on the options we had under consideration. We committed
to do ali we could that would be responsible and cost-effective on the
demand side, and only then to determine the capacity necessary to meet the
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resulting demand. We analyzed more than 100 scenarios. Our investment
plan, its maior components of demand nlanagement and energy supply is
summarized below:
Total New Requirements 21,600 MWe
Demand-Reducing Options 5,900 MWe
Renewable and High-Efficiency Supply Options 4,200 MWe
New Base-Load Supply (Nuclear) 7,100 MWe
New Peak-Load Supply (Gas-fired) 4,300 MWe
Yesterday we got into a discussion about when we use various words and
what we mean by them. Sometimes, even when we think alike, we don't
always put the same value on words. In terms of starting with the obvious,
I think ali of us would agree, if we're talking about energy in the most
elementary sense, it is vital to the wellbeing of all of the industrialized
nations. There's a loop between the word ener?y and the word l)eople
ultimately, that's the loop, as I see it -- that we have to close.
The second word I'd like to talk about is the word need. In our company
we've found that we've enhanced our communicdtion with the public by
clearly separating between the word needs and the word requirements. In an
elementary sense, we talk about it being dark out at night, and we want some
light to help us to see. We're meeting a need. If we're talking about it being
cold outside and we want some energy that will keep us warm and
comfortable, we're meeting a need. One can go on with thousands of
examples - whether we want to provide some cooling in order to make us
more comfortable in the heat of summer, or whether we want a machine that
will preserve our food, a refrigerator or freezer, or whether we want to make
the utensils that we eat from more sanitary by washing them with hot water.
We_ve got a whole range of needs.
Now when we want to bridge the gap between needs and requirements,
without denying the needs of industrialized nations, we can do things that
will reduce the amount of energy that is needed. That, of course, falls into
doing things more efficiently or doing them differently. If we're substituting
a microwave for a regular oven, we may very well be reducing the amount
of energy that is required and we're performing the cooking of the food with
less energy. So we can reduce the requirement of energy while meeting the
r_ed. Now in an industrialized nation, is it our intent to try to change the
needs'? In the intensive public review that we've had in our province we've
been told, "'Now look. we're living in a free society - don't try to change my
needs. I don't mind if you intervene in terms of trying to reduce the
requirements."
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With a few rare exceptions, the process that we're following is if you're
going to provide energy to mee, people's need,s, that's SUl?l?ly.And if you're
going to influence the amount of energy that is required to meet the needs,
that's demand management. And there is a question" Will demand manage-
ment provide ali of our needs from now into the future? That becomes a
quantitative question in which you address opportunities for reducing the
requirements while meeting the needs.
Fulkerson: That's not a play on words, that's a very clear definition. That's
very important.
Starr: Lorne, this is something I know you know, but on demand manage-
ment, there are two sectors: demand management which is under control
of the utility, and demand management which is under control of the
user.
McConnell: You're a good straight man. Chauncey has already said it, and
I can repeat it here. We conducted 10,000 interviews: 4-hour interviews
with men anti their wives, in their home settings on Saturday mornings.
We talked to them about their values, and when we came to the question
of whether or not it was socially acceptable for their electric utility to be
trying to influence the amount of electric requirements, it came through
loud and clear, they want to make their own decisions. How the
electricity is supplied is the utility's .job, but how it is to be used is not.
But if, in fact, there's going to be anything mandatory, such as saying that
ali refrigerators have to be built to a higher standard, that's a,job for the
government. As a utility, we quickly got our act together and differen-
tiated the role of government, that would influence requirements for that
arm of demand management that would be done on a compulsory basis
and said that it's the people that are going to get elected that have to stand
tlp and tell people that there is going to be an imposed standard. And I
think in our province that will happen and it is happening. The compul-
sory component that will come about through standards will be imposed
by governments: the amount that can be influenced by the utilities is done
on a voluntary basis.
Rossin: Where do government subsidized incentives come in?
McConnell: You mean will you raise the price? I can't speak for the rest of
the world, but in the province in which I live, we went out and asked is
it acceptable that we bring about a reduction for the demand of energy
by raising the price of electricity above what it costs'? And the answer was
a resounding "No!'" lt quickly became quite clear that the Chairman of
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our company would not remain the Chairman if he tried to raise
electricity prices above cost.
Fulkerson: Does that preclude price changes that rellect low production
costs, like time-of-use rates?
McConnell: No, that does not influence time-of-use because time-of-use is
related to cost.
Fulkerson: As long as it matches costs -- that's OK. But you're not talking
about marginal cost now, you're talking about average cost, right? I
mean, is the tradition in your province that you charge an average price !
for electricity or a marginal price for electricity'?
McConnell: The average customer pays the average price, but on the other
hand, we do have time-of-use rates and so on.
Fulkerson: So the average customer doesn't pay what economists would call
the correct price for electricity, which is the marginal cost.
(Many voices: No! No!)
McConnell: That gets into a deep philosophical argument.
Fulkerson: No it doesn't! That's one of the things that's wrong.
Starr: The average customer does not pay the marginal cost.
Fulkerson: He should!
Slat'r: I know, but what he pays is the average cost because that's what he's
billed.
Fulkerson: That's right, but what he should pay is the marginal cost.
StarT: Perhaps, but the economists have argued this out with the ratemakers
for decades now. The answer to the question is, the customer pays the
average cost and the last customer, who ought to pay the marginal cost,
does not pay marginal cost.
Erdmann" In Europe there is now a very strong discussion about this point.
I think that in Switzerland we are going in the direction of marginal cost
electricity pricing. And what does marginal cost mean? lt means the cost
of the next power plant you build! But it is not built, t It's not really
"'marginal cost" that the economists normally talk about. They say that
it is marginal cost. but I say ii is additional build-tq_ cost. The problem
is that it means that these marginal electricity prices will rise about 50c_.
lt will be enough to stop electricity demand growth for ten years! I would
like to ask the question of what is going on in other countries, because
this is the major issue in Switzerland.
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McConnell: Another question we asked in these interviews is, what do you
think of strategic conservation? The answer was, I don't like ii.
(Several voices interrupt: What is it'?)
McConnell: And the second question they were asked was, what do you
think it means, and they said, "I don't know." Many people said "Ii
sounds an awfully, lot to us like you're asking us to do without." And,
"'My neighbor has an air conditioner and l'm bloody well looking
forward to getting one, and when I can afford it I want one and I don't
want you telling me to do without." So, by and large ......
Fulkerson: But what is strategic conservation'?
McConnell: That's what we asked the public.
Fulkerson" I know, bui what do you mean by it?
McConnell" l'd rather ask you that!
Fulkerson" What the hell are y'ou talking about?
McConnell" Well, the bottom line is, we took the words "strategic conser-
vation" out of our vocabulary.
Blue: Good! Thai sounds sensible.
Wolfe: Since you can't define ii, you did a good thing!
McConnell" Basically, what we talk about to our public now is the compo-
nents of demand management.
Hubbard: What did ii mean when ii was in your vocabulary?
McConnell" What it meant when it was in our vocabulary was a synonym for
electrical efficiency improvement. We were using it, but we're simply
not using it at ali anymore. In our vocabulary we've divided electrical
efficiency improvement into two components - one that has to do with
improving the efficiency, of the physical facilities, and the second has to
do with the human aspect or the behavioral aspect of how efficiently
those facilities are being used. And those are both components in what
we define as electrical efficiency improvement.
Of course, in demand management there was the question of not only
reducing demand through efficiency, but there was the question if one
could reduce the peaks by load shifting, by valley filling, and so on. The
challenge thai we found was thai we had to quantify ali the different
opportunities associated with electrical apparatus to tr}, to gel ii to the
same kind of mathematical accuracy as the components of building a
power plant. And believe me. thai is a major challenge: to stop talking
superficially and sian to quantify' ali of the components.
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For example, in tile Province of Ontario 38q of the electricity consump-
tion is in the industrial sector. And in that industrial sector, 73% of it is
for electric motors. When we analyzed the electrical motors in use and
determined technically what is the real opportunity to improve the
efficiency of the electric motors, and examined the motors that are
actually available in the marketplace, for the large industrial motors,
there was an opportunity to improve the efficiency by 1%. We found
there was an opportunity on small motors to improve the efficiency by
12%, and in some instances even higher. But in any event, we could
identify what the opportunity would be overtime. Thai gets complicated,
because one cannot achieve overnight penetration.
I think the analysis that Chauncey Starr took us through (Chapter 6), in
which he took a time horizon of 2060, indicated that this was not a total
solution in ternls of meeting the requirements of mankind, in terms of the
increasing population, and the desires for the have-nots to become the
haves. In our particular instance, having gone through a fairly rigorous
analysis of all these components, ali I could do is reinforce the conclusion
that Chauncey put forth yesterday.
The bottom line is that we're going to have to work awfully hard with a
4 billion dollar program to achieve a reduction of about 3000 megawatts
by the year 2000 in a system today which is 24,000 megawatts. When we
take the system size that we project for the year 2000 (30,000 megawatts)
that's approximately a 10% reduction by the year 2000.
Fulkerson: Do you have an aggressive demand side program using least cost
planning, where a dollar is invested on the demand side if it has a greater
return than a dollar on the supply side?
McConnell: Yes, I should've said that our whole premise is economic
demand management, where in fact, there is a net worth to our customers.
This is within the concept of least-cost planning.
Fulkerson: And you're able to recover a fair rate of return on demand side
investments as well as supply side investments?
McConnell: There are two kinds of tests. We haa to go through a public
review on this. One test is what is classically called the "'no losers" test,
in which the rates for our customers do not go up. And the other is the
more liberal, social test, which has to do with the concept of total
customer cost, and that's the case in which ali the rates for ali customers
do go up, but there's a net benefit to societ> as a whole, as a result of the
reduced kilowatt-hours that have to be provided. We use the latter: the
total customer cost.
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Fulkerson: The size of your system is 24,000 megawatts right now. What is
the size of your system that you're projecting in 2000?
McConnell: Our planning is being done on the basis of a bandwidth concept.
Our plans are to fill that envelope regardless of what happens, but
nominally it would be around 30,000, and in the year 2014 we're talking
about it being roughly 40,00(} megawatts.
Fulkerson: But the 30,000 megawatts in 2000 assumes that it would have
been 33,000 if you hadn't had demand side management. So you have a
net growth in 10 or 11 years which is substantial, despite the fact that
you're doing aggressive demand side management,
Borg: Now wait a minute. Does that 30,000 really assume that you've
already saved 3000?
McConnell: The demand would be a bit over 30,000 without the reduction,
but with our aggressive demand-side management program, we project
it will be 27,000 megawatts in 2000,
Fulkerson: Okay, I think that's a very, important point, lt shows roughly what
I think industrialized countries are going to be able to do. They're not
going to able to totally stop electric demand by demand side manage-
ment, but they're going to able to slow it down. That's basically what's
going to happen.
McConnell: It's my contention that in industrialized countries, in order to
make the public and the politicians come to grips with reality, there has
to be an integrated demand/supply discussion.
Fulkerson: Absolutely! Absolutely!
McConnell: And that any piecemeal discussion in which people say we
don't want hydro one day, and then another day say we don't want
nuclear, and then oppose another one ... it just doesn't work. If we're
going to come to grips with the issues we're talking about, we have to
somehow or other bring about the instruments in our society ti/at will
force integrated demand/supply planning and integrated supply and
demand discussions.
Oids: What fraction of your energy is from hydro'?
McConnell: The energy contribution of hydro in our province is 25%. The
contribution of fossil is 25c4. The contribution of nuclear is 50_.
Sanchez-Sierra: What is the situation right now,,? Can you build hydro or
nuclear or fossil?
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McConnell: The simple answer is, I don't know, but we're proposing the
construction in our integrated plan.
Starr: Lorne, before you leave demand-side management, I want tc)mention
experimental work that's been done for the past decade by some of the
U.S. utilities. Empirically, they've been able to find they can get about
a 5c_ reduction in peak power demand by demand-side management
techniques, such as time-of-day, turning off on request certain users for
a short period of time, and there's a whole series of techniques that are
being practiced, but the number comes out about 5c,_.
Kaprielian: Chauncey, is that energy or is that capacity'?
Start: That's peak demand -- peak shaving.
McConnell: I think one thing that it's fair to say is that in our situation, which
is similar to Sweden and perhaps the U.S. and other countries, that we
have been paralyzed since 1978. We have not committed to a major
generating station since 1978. And that when we ask ourselves the
question, ii"there is a shortage in the future who is at fault, the answer
came through very loud and clear. The utility will be blamed.
And so we said, if the utility is going to be blamed, and we are responsible
to provide electricity to meet the future needs, we're bloody well going
to file a plan, come hell or high water, that lays out clearly an integrated
demand/supply basis for the future. We filed that plan in December,
1989. lt accommodates the uncertainty in terms of what the loads will be;
it accommodates the uncertainties of what the yields will be from
demand management; it accommodates the uncertainties that are asso-
ciated with ali the cost estimates that we've done with ali the options, and
SO on.
But in any event, we've said it will be clear on the record that if this
province goes without power that it wasn't because of a failure of the
utility to get off its fanny and to take a position and to stand up and be
counted, and to quantif}' everything, including ali the demand manage-
ment components. Behind our supporting document, which is about 400
pages long, is another pile of documents that detail ali the individual
components.
Kaprielian: May I ask the question of how soon that will be revised'?
McConnell: Weil. the document itself clearly identifies that if you're laying
down a 25-year plan, you must adjust your plans annually, in accordance
with the reality of the way the world unfolds. Nevertheless, if you in fact
have done a 25-year analysis, that lays out a picture of the future from
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which you make some decisions having to do with the nexl five years.
And that document makes a formal application ti_r approval to build
power plants, l'm not saying how its going to end up. l'm just identifying
the action that's been taken.
Kaprielian: What will be the review process then?
McConnell: The review process for that is a fonnal review by an environ-
mental panel, under the Environmental Assessment Act of the Province,
and that will take piace during the next 18 months.
Shapar: Was there a press response when you released the plan?
McConnell: Yes. Interestingly, we had a premonition that most special
interest groups would say: Your demand management targets are too
low. We felt they would say that. We felt that special interest groups that
were opposed to nuclear power would say that, and so on. And we felt
that the political opposition parties would criticize the plan automati-
cally, because they would be trying to get at the current government. And
in a sense, we weren't disappointed. Ali those criticisms tended to come
in. But they were relatively minor! We were extremely pleased with the
general response that we got from the media and the public, because the
crunch was starting to come on. We had, in fact, dm,ng the course of last
winter found it necessary on occasion to cut interruptible power.
Shapar: Were your motives attacked'?
McConnell: By some special interest groups, yes, our motives were at-
tacked. We continued to be called a"monster out of control" by the usual
parties that like to call us a monster out of control. Yes, ii wasn't without
criticism. But generally it was well received.
Kaprielian: The point is you tried to quantify ali these things, and on the
demand management side you had stated you were taking into account
social costs as weil. The question is how do you do that'? How do you
quantify that'?
McConnell: It's a very complex question. Basically, we have a process
which we call "'Internalization of Environmental and Social Costs" and
another process that's called "Externalization" and the process that we
followed and described in our document has to do with internalization of
costs. For example, in our province, if you took, for example, a social
requirement that we have to limit our acid gas emissions to 214 million
kilograms per annum by the year 1994 and thereafter, our plan has ali the
costs in it that guarantee that we'll never exceed 214 from now until the
year 2014. So, by and large, ali the costs are internalized in our plan. Now
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there are acknowledged costs that one does not include in ali of the
options, and we attempt to describe those where they have not been
quantified.
Borg: If you were o build a base load plant in the next ten years, what do you
expect would be the options you'd use'?
McConnell: Our plan identifies the options we propose to use to use. Alter
having adjusted tk_r the dcmand reductions on demand management
which I've described, our strategy calls for top priority being given lo
hydroelectric. We have a hydro program which calls for 2800 megawatts
between now and 2014, which yields about 7 terawatt-hours. We have
a high priority for any non-utility generator that can sell us power by
developing small hydro or burning municipal waste or wood, and we
have that in our plan.
Dave: What about natural gas'? Can you do ii with gas?
McConnell: In terms of the economics, we are proposing to meet our new
base load requirements, after we've allowed for ali these other compo-
nents, with nuclear units. In the case of the median forecast, that
corresponds to a commitment oi'another 10 nuclear units, which is what
we proposed.
Borg: CANDU's?
McConnell: Ali CANDU's, yes.
Borg: When was the last one that was built ? A long time ago'?
McConnell: We've gol four under construction now. They'll be finished by
1992. and then we're proposing to start the program in 1993 for the
construction of the next one. We are proposing to meet our intennediate
requirements, from 20_ to 40e£_,by retrofitting our coal-fired plants with
scrubbers to meet the acid gas requirements. Ali our new fossil options
that we studied are with full acid gas requirements. And then we propose
to meet our peaking requirements with gas-fired combustion turbines.
I really want to bring out a principle. And that is, that in the period from
1900 to 1945 at the end of World War I1, our system load grew to 2,000
megawatts; today it is 24,000. The bottom line is that 92c)_ of our system
has been built since 1945, which has meant thai up to now, with regard
to our fossil and nuclear, we have not engaged in any heavy replacement
program.
But when we analyzed the next 25-year period, ii was very clear that even
ii we get 40 years out of our nuclear and fossil plants, we have to replace
8,000 megawatts in the next 25 years, and that's a very major part of our
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plan. It's 50% of the supply requirenmnt! 1 think that's a principle that
ali industrialized nations have to recognize now: we're just beginning to
enter an era that, with the very heavy growth that occurred between 1950
and now, those plants are going to be coming ot"age to be replaced in the
early part of the next century. So there's going to be a massive require-
ment, and when we did our analysis, it indicated that when we take
replacement into account plus a very modest growth rate, in fact, our
capacity requirements for the future were greater than anything we've
every experienced in the past.
Fulkerson: Lorne, you had an increase in 12 years of 15% in your overall
capacity, and it looks like that rate looks goes for another 25 years,
leading to a 3()_ increase in capacity. What's the population increase in
Ontario that drives that, and what's the economic growth rate in Ontario
that drives that'? That puts in some of the perspective that Chauncey was
bringing in yesterday for an industrialized situation.
McConnell: Our median load growth that we're forecasting, excluding
demand management, is 2.2% per year.
Fulkerson: And you bring that down to about one-point-something?
McConnell: That's the median; the lower value is about 1.7% per year and
for the upper it's about 2.7%. We did an analysis of our population
projections, and an analysis; of the productivity per person. We're
reaching a situation in our society where the baby boom era is already
fully entered. In our society we haven't fully reached maturity on women
entering the work force. That isn't a driver in this, but that's still going
on. So we are projecting a somewhat different forecast from the year
1990 to 2000 than we are thereafter. It's tailing off for a time. So there's
no simple answer to your question.
Fulkerson: I think its very interesting, because you've got your overall
capacity growth rates down to of the order of 1to 1 1/2%, and I bet you
that your economy and your population together are growing of the order
of-- I would guess of the order of 3c,4- so that's quite an accomplish-
ment, 1would say.
McConnell: But our economy is certainly not growing at 3c2_,our capacity
is not growing at all, and our reserve margins are getting tighter. We've
only put forward a plan. We don't yet have it fully approved. There are
a number of components in that plan that don't require approval, things
like demand management, the purchase of non-utility generation and
those kind of things, and they're going ahead lull steam. The demand
management program that 1described is underway.
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Now, I'm a Canadian, and you mignt be interested in the Canadian view
of demand management in the U.S. There were no documents available
to us that summarized demand management targets in the U.S. We
looked everywhere. So we hired a U.S. company to work for us, to do an
evaluation of the demand management targets that exist in the U.S. Are
you interested in what we learned'?
Zebroski: There is a whole host of documents at EPRI.
McConneli: Yes, we've got EPRI documents by the hundreds, but l'm
talking about what the bottom line targets are. What we did in this study
was to ask two things. We said we want to know, for the top 50 U.S.
utilities in size, what their demand management targets were. And
secondly, we wanted to know what the targets were for the most
ambitious utilities in the U.S., whether they were large or small. Of the
51 large U.S. utilities thai we studied, there were just under 30 that had
a program.
Borg: Ali in California'?
McConnell: No, no, ali over. And the number that I identified for Ontario
Hydro for the year 2000:3000 megawatts, which is 10% of our system
at that time, is the second highest number in North America. That gives
you some kind of feel for the number that I gave you, in terms of the
formal programs that exist in the U.S.
Fulkerson: Your approach, though, sounds very much like California's, and
much like the Northwest Power Planning Council, which takes exactly
the same kind of approach.
McConnell: At any rate, the bottom line that I would put here is thai I think
it's inevitable that ali Western countries, and ali industrialized countries,
West or East, are going to continue to face very complex and rapidly
evolving environmental requirements. The thing that I would encourage
is saying that it doesn't matter how uncertain the future is, it's going to
require aggressive action on the part of each nation and each utility to
come forward with a plan, and force tile public to come to grips with an
integrated demand/supply approach.
Borg: Weil, I'm curious. With these companies that you identified that have
programs to control demand management, how many of them did this
voluntarily the way you did it'? And how many were required by their
public utility commissions or energy commissions to have these pro-
grams'? You did it voluntarily apparently. Is that typical'?
Fulkerson: Did you do it voluntarily'? You went through this als part of a
regulatory process, didn't you'?
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McConnell: No, it had nothing to do with a regulatory process. This was our
own initiative. We started this process, and it took us five years to gel the
strategy in place, and then one year to develop the danm plan. (Q: You
beat 'era to it'?) Oh, we've got our regulatory agency,just like everybody
else.
Borg: You didn't answer my question. How much of it was voluntary in the
U.S.?
Slaw: There's a general answer to that question. For the U.S. utilities, it is
a mixed bag. Demand side management has been going on tbr a long
time. Time-of-day pricing, Ibr example, is an experiment that's been
going on for decades, where there are two different sets of rates for the
consumers; interruptible power pricing is demand-side management. St)
on a small scale, many utilities have practiced this to reduce their peak
demand.
An aggressive program to do this, like getting more eMcient air condi-
tioners, was a result of a combination of things, undertaken by most
utilities on a voluntary basis. The utilities actually decided they wanted
to run some experiments on whether they could subsidize more efficient
air conditioners to reduce peak demand during air conditioning periods,
and they had to get approval from their utility commissions, which gave
approval on an experimental basis. And some of those things worked.
And as years went on, about five years ago, I guess, some of the big
utilities tried to organize major programs. EPRI was involved in laying
out the program thai helped them gel the data. That's why I say the results
of the past few years have shown that they can reduce the peak by about
5c_ by aggressive demand-side management.
Fuikerson: We're talking about much more than peak power reduction in the
demand-side programs. Demand-side programs that Lorne's talking
about are across the board. I mean it is to improve the overall efficiency
of electrical energy use, and by that, he's going to reduce his system
capacity growth rate by about hail" by the year 2000, of what it would
have been ii"they didn't do that. Isn't that right'? And that's a very, very
significant thing. That's not a 5%effect, it's a lot bigger than a 5_2_effect.
And the Northwest Power Planning Council and the State of California
are finding the same thing.
Start: What do you mean "finding the same thing"? You mean proposing the
same thing. There is no track record yet.
Fulkerson: Doin_ the same kind of thing! That is, spending a dollar on the
demand side ii"its cheaper than spending a dollar on the supply side. It
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doesn't mean you won't need more supply, you do need new supply. One
thing this Seminar should come out with, it seems to me, is that this
integrated demand-supply side planning is the key to sensible
decisionmaking in the electric utilities. If you can buy services cheaper
by making things more efficient, then by God, do it! And set tlp the
institution so that you can make money by investing in that efficiency
improvement.
StarT: I don't think any utility would argue with that. But you have to
distinguish between base load capacity and peak capacity. It's the peak
capacity where the biggest variable comes in. There's some small
variable on the base load from demand-side programs, but that's very
hard to do and takes a long time to do, because it's a capital intensive
purchase on the part of the consumer.
Fulkerson: Absolutely, and you make it easy for the consumer to buy that.
Stare But that's a very slow process. On the peak side you can do more and
it's that side where most of the experimental work is being done.
Gottlieb: I think it's time to make a statement. What are we searching for?
We're searching for a statement we can make about future growth, future
needs for generating capacity, are we not? That's what we're searching
for. What we need is statements about what judgments we can make
about the growth of demand, about control of the growth of demand, the
limitations on this, and about the time scale at which this will become an
urgent problem.
I don't know for certain, but I suspect that one could make a statement
that perhaps, with the exception of Japan and France, it appears that
within the next decade that we will reach a severe supply problems in the
industrialized nations. There are a limited number of things one can do
about this of course. Demand control is one of them. But it's also clear
that you're going to have to rely largely on existing types of generating
devices. You're not going to get it out of R&D on any of these long-range
solutions that many of us are talking about. They're not going to solve
that supply problem within this decade. Even for the next decade, you've
got to choose from existing kinds of options. That sets a kind of time
scale. There's another time scale, which is a longer range time scale in
which you have a different, augmented set of options, provided of course
you take steps to create _;_oseoptions.
Li: With the creation of this 25-year plan, and then hearings, and review by
the government, it sounds to me very much like government planning.
In communist systems, this is generally done by the government.
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McConnell: Weil, in North America it's generally not done by the govemment.
Li: But in Communist countries, they do.
McConnell: Yes, in Communist countries, they do, or at least they used to!
Li: Do you think there is some advantage for the govemnient to do the
planning?
McConnell: I wasn't suggesting that.
Li: Of course you can't suggest that! 1was just asking.
McConnell: No, if you want my opinion, l think the people who should do
the planning should be people who know something about what the plan
involves.
Shackelford: What you just said is important, I think, and goes to the
question that I asked earlier as to the review process of that plan. In
California you have an Energy Commission and a Public Utilities
Commission. The Public Utilities Commission regulates the investor-
owned utilities and the Energy Commission regulates the non-investor-
owned utilities that the Utilities Commission doesn't regulate. Ali other
plans have to go before both of these commissions. Only the Energy
Commission has the authority in this state to rule on electric capacity
generation plans,
There ought to be integrated demand-side and supply-side planning, and
that planning ought to be open and subject to public review and
comment. And that's what will ultimately bring these plans to a point of
public credibility, because it's much more difficult to attack the plan
once that's been done.
Kaprielian: One more ingredient that I haven't heard mentioned as we've
discussed the plan and various resource options is the whole matter of
transmission. You can have the best energy sources, but until you can
build the transmission line to where the load is, you haven't accom-
plished very much except tbr expending the dollars. I! seems to me it
wasn't a very long while back that Ontario Hydro was faced with
precisely this kind of a situation in which you had major generating
stations which were ready to run and you had, at least for awhile, the
inability to get the public and perhaps even governmental acceptance for
the routing of those lines and tile need for those lines. Now in your 25- year
plan, what assumptions are being made with respect to transmission?
McConnell: That's true. In the 25-year plan the formal application includes
the request for the generating station together with the necessary inte-
grating transmission.
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Kaprielian: ts public acceptance changing from what it has been in the past?
McConnell: It will continue to be, in our situation, touch and go. lt will have
to do with NIMBY (not in my back yard)--the loc_'dimpact. On the other
hand, with our process we're trying to separate the debate into two parts.
One is the provincial need for the common good, and the other is the
reasonable impact that we have on the local communities. At any rate, we
don't have any pat answer to that question. It'll be a tough one.
Kaprielian: A follow up question. That part oi" the world has an almost
unlimited source of hydro-electric power potential.
McConnell: Where?
Kaprielian: Just to the north and east of Ontario: James Bay.
McConnell: No. The cost of hydroelectric power in Quebec, which is
adjacent to Ontario, we expect, will be higher than the nuclear option.
Fulkerson: Electricity costs in 1988 dollars? How does that change over
your 25-year planning period?
McConnell: For each cost estimate, we've done an 80% confidence band-
width analysis. As you appreciate, with the uncertainty of new environ-
mental requirements, there has to be a significant g,ndwidth because of
the uncertain requirements that have to be met. We expect that the bottom
line costs to Ontario customers in constant cents per kilowatt-hour will
be, with this plan, somewhere between plus 15% and minus 10% over
what it is today. Now, interestingly, between 1950 and 1990 the rates in
constant dollars are about the same.
Fulkerson: So what you're saying is, you accomplish ali this and the price
of electricity to consumers is going to be roughly constant!
McConnell: Actually, a significant part of that uncertainty is our cost
allowances for fossil-fired plants, considering scrubbers and ali the new
requirements that exist now. They've raised our cost tbr fossil about 25%
for the quarter of our energy we generate with fossil fuel.
Fulkerson: This is amazing because you're assuming you're going to build ten
new nuclear plants and the cost of those is not going to drive up power costs.
McConnell: The cost of our nuclear plants corrected for inflation has not
changed between 1957 and 1990.
Fulkerson: That's amazing!
Rossin: You've built them on schedule.
McConnell: We have a fairly standardized design, and we know how to
build them.
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Fulkerson: Maybe you should build a couple thousand nukes up in Canada
and send the electricity down here!
McConnell: Actually, New Brunswick has proposed to do thai with one!
Rossin: I think this indicates the depth oi the discussion we could get into
if we had unlimited time.
UPDATE ON SWEDEN
A year after the Seminar, Lars-Gunnar Larsson and Carl-Erik Wikdahl
of the Swedish utility RSK provided the following update:
In a count_, like Sweden. with half of the electricity being nuclear, the nuclear
program cannot be phased out without a heavy burden on the population. This
is a fact which has now been understood by, a clear majority in Sweden.
The Social-Democratic party,, now forming a minority government, ar-
ranges its Party; Congress every, third year, always in September, one year
before scheduled general elections. The decisions by, the Congress are
looked upon as commitments for the party until the next Congress.
The leaders of the trade unions, closely, connected to the Social-Democratic
part}', have acted very determined for more than a year to change the
decision of an early; phase out. The result was that nuclear power became a
major issue at the Party Congress in September 1990.
In the auzumn of 1989 there was a very open and [rank debate in the press
between the two groups of the Social-Democratic party. Prime Minister
Ingvar Carlsson then decided to form a group of four for an internal
preparation of a new energy' policy. The group consisted of Mr. Ingvar
Carlsson (chairman), Mrs. Birgitta Dahl (then Minister for Environment and
Energy'), Mr. Stig Malta (Chairman of the Swedish Confederation of Trade
Unions) and Mr. Rune Molin (then Vice-Chairman of the Confederation of
Trade Unions).
In January, 1990, Mr. Molin was appointed Minister for Industry', with
responsibility' also for energy matters. Mrs. Birgitta Dahl remained in
government as Minister for Environment.
The report from the group was presented in March 1990. Its main conclusion
was that three main decisions on energy matters taken by Parliament were
in contradiction to the party's main goals to maintain welfare and high
employment. The decisions were:
- no more major hydro power planls should be built,
- the nuclear phaseout should start in 1995,
- no increase of carbon dioxide releases above the 1988 level.
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The group concluded that one or more of these decisions should be changed.
In June the Prime Minister made it clear that he was aiming at a compromise
with two of the three non-socialistic parties in Parliament, the Center Party
(anti-nuclear) and the Liberal Party (neutral). He said that only in this way
would it be possible to come to a decision which could stand for many years.
At the Party Congress the Prime Minister asked for a mandate to start
negotiations with the two other parties without being bound to the old
decision of starting the phaseout in 1995, On the other hand, there was no
doubt that the party did not want to change the decision about a final
phaseout in 2010.
There was a vivid debate at the Congress, the leaders of the Women's, the
Youth's and the Christians's associations arguing against the proposal from
the part}, leadership. In the end, however, there was, as expected, a clear
decision to give the Prime Minister the mandate he had asked for.
The leaders of the Center and Liberal parties have now agreed to start the
negotiations about a new energy policy. The first meeting was on October
10 and the second on October 22.
After the second meeting it was announced that more studies are needed and
that an agreement was expected in the beginning of December. After that the
government will finalize a new energy bill, which was expected to be
presented to Parliament in February 1991. The formal decisionwas expected
to be taken by, Parliament in April.
In September 1991 there is a general election. If the nuclear controversy is
not solved before that, nuclear power might once again be a major theme in
an election campaign. That is something which no party except the Green
party would enjoy.
Now, is this a significant step in favor of nuclear power in Sweden or not'?
lt is obvious for almost ali political commentators in Sweden that the Social-
Democratic party now has changed its nuclear policy. Few, ii'any, do believe
that the nuclear power phaseout can start in 1995. That would be too costly
for the country and for the political parties (counting votes in the 1991
election) behind such a decision.
Opinion polls now show clearly that there is a great majority against an early
phaseout. This is als() tk)r those who say that they would vote for the Center
party. There i.'_also a majority for using the 12 nuclear units in Sweden as
long as it is safe and economical to dc) so, even after 2010.
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In opinion polls the following question has been asked:
What is your personal attitude to using nuclear power? The results:
Nov Feb May Aug
1989 1990 1990 1990
Stop nuclear now 7% 6% 5%
Phase out faster than 2010 14% 11% 12%
Phase out to 2010 21% 24% 21%
Total Anti-Nuclear 42% 41% 38% 37%
Phaseout, but not as 28% 30% 33% ¢
early as 2010
Use nuclear power, 25% 27% 26%
don't phase out
Total Pro-Nuclear 53% 57% 59% 59%
Don't know 5% 2% 3% 4%
The decision to be taken by Parliament next spring will almost certainly not
contain any starting year for the phaseout and will not change the Parliamen-
tary decision of 1980 to end nuclear power operation in 2010. lt might take
the political system another five years before that decision can be changed.
New nuclear plants are not permitted in Sweden according to a law adopted
in 1986. A new referendum might be needed before Parliament would be
ready for a change of that law. There are, however, now voices both from
industry and political parties advocating new reactors to be built in Sweden
in the future. That sort of talk has been a"forbidden area" in the public debate
since 1986. lt is obvious that the thaw at last has arrived to our cold country
in Northern Europe.
Mid-January 1991 the Social Democrats, the Liberals and the Center party
in Sweden agreed on a new energy policy. According to the agreement there
will be no start of the phaseout of nuclear power in 1995 as decided by
Parliament two years ago. No new starting date of the phaseout was
mentioned.
The agreement does not mention any time limit for the operation of the
twelve nuclear power units ( 10,000 MW) connected to the grid. The Social
Democrats and the Center party have, however, announced they believe that
the new energy policy will make it possible to phase out nuclear power by
2010. The Liberals said that there might be economical reasons to continue
operation after 2010.
145
In the agreement, the three parties say that they will start a five-year program
for the development of renewable energy sources (mainly bioenergy and
wind) and of conservation techniques. The total cost is estimated to be 3.6
billion Swedish Crowns (700 million dollars). If this program would be
successful, i.e., with the above-mentioned conditions fulfilled, then the
planning for closing down nuclear power plants could start. Otherwise the
operation of the existing nuclear facilities may continue, according lo the
agreement.
Government is planning to publish an energy bill. lt is expected that the main
parts of this agreement will be included. Parliament is then expected to
confirm the decisions.
The Social-Democratic party now forms a minority government. The next
general election will be held in September 1991. The "hree parties behind the
agreement represent more than 65% of the votes. They will almost certainly
represent a clear majority also after the election. Therefore, there now exist
good conditions ['or a stable energy policy in the Swedish Parliament for the
first time since 1976. Thus the energy policy will be a minor issue in the
election campaign.
There is no need for new maior power plants in Sweden before the year 2000.
The next main decision on energy policies could therefore wait until after
1995.
The Swedish industry looks upon the agreement with relief. The immediate
threat against a sound industrial development has been taken away. There
are many signs showing that the agreement is just a first step, and that more




This section of the Seminar is made up of three presentations plus our
discussions on Latin America, China, and a study of electricity growth
in a set of Asian and Latin American nations. Experience with
demand-side management is limited thus far, but is part of the picture.
Discussions focussed on electric supply capacity, and on financial
barriers to its expansion, such as capital shortages, deteriorating
infrastructure, and high financial risks. It is dangerous to generalize,
but certain problems are evident to some extent in most of the
developing world,
LATIN AMERICA
Gabriel Sanchez-Sierra is Executive Secretary of the Latin America
Energy Organization (OLADE) made up of 26 member countries. He
introduced his presentation with these comments:
Sanchez-Sierra: Few of the power utilities in Latin America and the
Caribbean countries can service their debts or even meet their operating
costs.
Actual energy losses are between 12 and 40 percent, including transmis-
sion, distribution and what we call non-technical losses. The "users" of
non-technical losses, the main ones that is, are not the low income
groups, but they are from the industrial sector and high income groups.
They can afford to pay to fix the kilowatt-hour meter! Some actually by-
pass it! Last year we completed a report on non-technical losses in the
power sector. It was very impressive to know that in some countries 40%
of electricity is lost. Part of this is stolen and part is technical losses, but
most of it is stolen. And in some nations, politicians try to solve the
unemployment problem through the power company.
Some countries in the region have up to 40_ surplus generating capacity,
but they have coverage of less than 50_ of the country. They paid a
disprop6rtionate share of attention to the supply side, and not enough to
transmission and distribution,
147
We share concerns of the industrialized nations about energy and the
environment. We regret this has not been a concern of yours since the
industrial revolution. We're ready to work together to restore the
equilibrium between energy end environment. But the industrialized
countries need to realize that we should share the costs in proportion to
the damage that has been caused. We want to cooperate. We don't want
a confrontation. But if we care about energy and environment, we have
to find ways to improve it in good cooperation between South and
North."
Sanchez-Sierra presented the following talk which he titled: "The
Financial Alternatives for the Power Sector of Latin America and
the Caribbean."
Dr. Gabriel Sanchez-Sierra:
What I would like to do is present the results of a series of what have to be
called "'erratic" policies at the national level in Latin America, and also in
our relations with the exogenous elements that we have to live with. I do not
pretend to generalize many of the points that I am going to make here for ali
of the developing countries. Of course, there are many differences. But
something that is true tbr Latin America and the Caribbean, for most of the
26 OLADE member countries, is also true in many other developing regions
and countries.
This presentation is based on what was approved during our last Ministers
Meeting in Lima, Peru, in November of 1989. This is the official position of
the Ministers of Energy and Mines of Latin America in regard to the most
critical issue of the energy sector, which for us is the financial situation in
the power sector. But don't think that the financial situation of the power
sector is something abstract, lt is the result ot" many things at the manage-
ment level, the operational level, the planning level, etc.
So, with that kind of framework, maybe we can extrapolate to some
conclusions supported by a lot of data and two years worth of analysis.
The power sector in Latin America and the Caribbean countries is experi-
encing a difficult financial situation which shows no prospects for improve-
ment. Most of the power utilities in the region are finding it difficult to
service their debts and even to meet their operating costs. This seriously
constrains their ability to make the investment needed to meet the growth in
demand.
I will try to draw some kind of relationship between our experience and
things that you are thinking are going to happen in the future if you don't pay
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enough attention to the expansion of the power sector. Some of the dangers
were discussed here. The fact is that we arc already passing through those
kinds of difficult situations.
We have identified three very important reasons why we got where we are.
The first are our own responsibility. We call them indigenous problems.
Second, we have problerns that come from each national economy. Third,
we have problems associated with changes in the international economy.
First -- ant ihis is crucial for us, the Latin American people, to understand
--is that we are the inain ones responsible for our situation. And, of course,
we now must be the first ones lo try to solve it.
Let me try to summarize the financial situation of the power sector in most
Latin American countries. The first is poor planning. We have to face il. In
most of our countries, planning was isolated from the rest of the economy.
We didn't pay enough attention to financial constraints, lt was a kind of
w'ishful planning sometimes.
Also, we forgot some important risks. I know thal countries like the United
States and many of the industrialized countries right now have already
developed a lot of hydro. Hydro potential is important, but in the developing
countries, with a lot of geological risk, we have to pay more attention to that
risk. There are many cases in Latin America where the original estimated
costs in dollars per kilowatt doubled, and sometimes tripled, during con-
struction.
Second, we have a problem of insufficient internal cash generation. There
are marl\ ways to explain w,hy, but this is a fact of life.
Third. as a consequence of insufficient internal cash generation, we bor-
rowed a lot of money. Especially during the 7()'s, when there were a lot of
petrodollars coming in following the oil price shock, utilities had a lot of
access to new loans, especially trom private banks. So these utilities grew
heavily dependent on external sources. Many people didn't think that they'd
have to pa}' ii back one day. We just worked along as iithis was a free source
of resources, but ii was not true.
Another problem of our own making is institutional. Maybe in some
industrialized countries you have it Ioo. In Latin America especially, we
have a complicated institutional framework fl)r lhc power sector in many of
our countries. In some cases it is like a very rich company, a good company
from the financial point of view, serving a good market, the industrial
market. But we don't have any way t(- transfer financial resources to other
parts of the countries" economies.
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Then we have effects of national economic policies. These are another major
factor in why our power utilities are in a very difficult financial situation.
Economic recession has been the history of Latin America at least during the
last decade. Economic recession means a lower demand for power, and of
course, less income to the public utilities, lt has been especially difficult tbr
our hydro development, lt is highly intensive of capital. But we didn't get
the expected demand in order to get the expected revenue.
Also, there has been the etl'ect of massive devaluations. Most of the
investments of the power companies -- at least 70 or 80 percent -- has to
be done in hard currencies: German marks, US dollars etc. But because of
the very, very massive devaluations in our currencies, the income for the
company is lower in hard currency terms and the debt is going to be much
more difficult to pay back.
Another factor is accelerated inflation. At the same time that we have
massive devaluation we have accelerated inflation.
At the same time, the tariffs, electric rates, were not raised. So there has been
erosion, less income of course tbr the utilities, and that attacks their financial
condition.
Another important point is financial deterioration in state oil companies.
What happened in many Latin American countries was that a healthy state
oil company was subsidizing and transferring money to the power company
for development. Power companies would include in their budgets at least
$100,000,000 a year, ali coming from the oil sector. But that kind of situation
changed radically during the 1980's and now, I would say, the transfers from
the oil companies to the power sector are very, very rare.
Some of the problems are associated with changes with the international
economy. There has been a severe deterioration in conditions for external
financing. Data in most of the Latin American countries demonstrate that
amortization periods tbr loans from the private banks and from multina-
tional organizations have been reduced during the past 12years. Previously,
average amortization period was 15 years. But it has been reduced. Along
with interest rate increases, they have had an adverse impact on the financial
situation of the power utilities.
Because of the fluctuations of the dollar on international currency markets,
tbr the Latin American region, between 1982 and 1987, the impact of the
devaluation of the dollar vis-a-vis ali other hard currencies, was 62% tbr the
region as a whole. There are some countries like Venezuela where the impact
of the devaluation was more than 100_,. lt was 124%. In Chile, the impact
of this devaluation was about 70e_.
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There has also been a severe reduction in flows of external financing. Private
banks especially are very reluctant to continue lending money to Latin
America and the Caribbean. They would like to reduce their exposure.
That's their main objective. With that kind of objective, external capital
flows to the region have been cut almost to zero. In 1987 and 1988 and 1989,
the net flow of resources has actually been negative, lt means the whole
region has been exporting capital to the industrialized countries. This is a
situation which we don't think is going to change in the near future.
Given that the situation is very difficult, what are we going to do'? We're not
going to say let's close the doors and forget it. We're trying to find ways to
tackle the issue. What are the prospects'? What is going to happen to the
traditional sources of funding'?
Concerning government contributions and transfers from the oil sector,
being realistic, we do not expect too much. Why'? The economic situation
in the region is one reason. Also the government has to pay more attention
to social sectors, like health, education, housing etc. Finally, getting money
from the oil sector is no longer realistic.
Concerning internal financing, there is a possibility. There are some coun-
tries that are trying to set up a kind of a power fund. It's working. But really,
we're talking of an amount of money that is needed tbr power development
of between 20 and 30 billion dollars per year. We're talking about a lot of
money which is not easy to recapture from internal savings. So, it can help,
but it's not enough to be a solution.
External financing from commercial banks, I would say, is unrealistic. In
1989, the only country which, in Latin America -- and this is incredible --
obtained an important loan from private banks was Columbia. Columbia is
the only country, in the region for which they didn't restructure the debt. But,
even for Columbia it is very difficult to get fresh sources of funds. Countries
like Chile didn't get any important private loans last year.
What about credit from bilateral and multilateral organizations'? They can
play a role. We are optimistic about that. We hope that the World Bank and
the International Development Bank will continue lending money to the
region, but according to their own estimates, it would be no more than 20%
of requirements of the power sector.
So, let's talk about strategies for financing the power sector. As I said before,
we are responsible. We are the main actors in what was happening and we
have to be the main actors for the solution.
The first point is to increase internal cash generation. It's difficult from the
political point of view, but it is the only tool that is in our hands. How'?
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17We need to reorient tariff policies. 'Ne think in OLADE, and ii was
approved by our ministers, we need, in some countries, to pay attention
to low income groups. But it is possible to have cross subsidies. But what
we cannot continue to do is to subsidize medium and high income groups.
2) Recover portfolio and control losses. And here I'm talking about the
most important issues in the power sector. What 1 mean by recover
portfolio losses, is that there are many state companies, public companies
which don't pay their arrears to the power company. This is an important
issue. If the water company doesn't pay it's power bill to the power
company, how can you manage a power company? It's difficult from a
political point oi'view, but we have to clarify this kind of flow of money.
3) Control tangible losses: This is another important issue in Latin
America. Losses in the power sector in Latin America are between 12and
40 percent and the average is around 22-23%. With that kind of losses,
how can you operate a power company efficiently? These include
transmission, distribution and what we call non-technical losses. It's
important to say that the "users'" oi"non-technical losses, the main ones,
are not the low income groups. There is a lot oi" this coming Dot_'.the
industrial sector and high income groups. They can afford to pay to fix the
kilowatt-hour meter! Some actually by-pass it!
4) Reduce real operating costs. This has a political message. In many
public utilities in the region we have a lot of political interference and
political decisions. They try sometimes to solve the unemployment
problem with the power company. If we want to subsidize that kind of
unemployment we have to do it in a more direct and a more efficient way;
not .just to hire people in the power company.
5) Another possibility which we have to tackle is to rationalize investment
and to improve sectoral planning. Planning which properly includes
financial constraints, risk, changes indemand, and priority in grants to the
rehabilitation oiexisting plants. This is very important. Let me give you
the example oi"Argentina a year ago. They had, in quotation marks, an
overcapacity of between 30 and 4(1_. When demand was high, they could
not meet it. But what had happened'? Most oi" the thermal part of their
capacity was simply not operational. With a small amount of investment,
rehabilitating the thermal plants in Argentina could have solved the
problem much better a year ago. But we have been very supply oriented
-- to build new plants and to build new transmission lines.
Achieving, a suitable balance of investment in generation, transmission
and distribution would help. For many different reasons we have been
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oriented to build new phmts and transmissioq lines, but made very little
investment in local distribution systems. There are countries in lhc region
where they have an overcapaciiy of more than 40%. They have coverage
of less than 50% of the country and they don't have the distribution lines
to serve these areas. They paid too much attention to the supply side of
building a plant, and lhc other part was not balanced.
6) Adjust project size. This is very important also, to adjust project size
to the subsector's financing capacity. We have been very eager to build
huge 2000, 3000, 1(),()00megawatt dams or power station complexes to
meet national or even regional long-term needs. But in the kind of
situation we live in, can we accept that kind of thing'? We need to change.
We need lo be realistic; maybe we don't have to go to the least cost
economic program. Even ii"economies of scale would be huge, we can't
finance huge projects.
Now, let's talk about national economic policy. What can we do'? One
possibility is to capitalize on using some contribution to the public enter-
prises. So let's say you're in a very bad situation, we're going to help you.
But, we in OLADE think that this is a very risky measure. Because two years
from now, they can say once again, "'Weil, the financial situation is horrible,
we need more money from the government." So, even though there is a
possibility, we have to be very careful with thai kind of alternative.
Maybe what we need is to do what is possible from the financial point of
view. Let me give you some examples. In Bolivia, the least-cost economic
program can call for a hydro plant of 200 megawatis. But can they do ii with
the financial and economic situation that they have'? The answer is no! What
they can do, and this is exactly what they are doing, is to build a gas plant
ofS() megawatts and go with the kind of approach that they can manage. Oil
would be possible for small plants, but oil is unrealistic, and depending on
oil can complicate the financial situation for the power sector even more.
Now, let's talk about national economic policy. What can we do'?
First, a possibility is to rely on some governmental contributions to public
utility enterprises. We in OLADE think that this is a very risky measure.
Because two years from now, they can say once again, "Weil, the financial
siiuation is horrible, we need more money from the government." So, even
though there is a possibility, we have to be very cltret'ul with that kind of
alternative.
Second, establish a specialized national financial organization for investing
in or loaning to the power sub-sector. This is a possibility. There are some
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countries in which they have this kind of experience. This is not going to
solve the problem; it's .just one measure which can help.
Third, establish more suitable tariff structures and mechanisms to protect
utility finances against exchange rate risk. This is a question of national
economic policy and a political decision, in most of the power companies
the managers would like to have more realistic tariffs, but they have to get
agroement from the political side. This is a topic which is very hot. Some
pressure comes from this country, especially with the Agency for Interna-
tional Development, which has been trying to promote reorganization in
some Latin American countries and other parts of the world.
Now I would like to make some personal comments. We're not against
privatization, but we need to be very realistic. The kind of investment that
we need in the power sector in the region is between $20 and $30 billion a
year. For a medium-sized country, that could mean $800 million a year. If
private investors are going to invest hard currency, say dollars, they want to
get a return in dollars. But we have very high inflation. A very moderate rate
of inflation in Latin America right now is 200% per year. In 1989, it was
about 5000% in Brazil+ 3000% in Argentina... on the order of 2500% in Peru,
and a very low one could be in the area of 26%!
Also you have to include political risk. The power company is not going to
decide what the tariff is going to be. The tariff is going to be set by the
national board of tariffs or whatever. So these are the kind of questions from
our side. With that kind of situation, are private investors ready to go and
invest that kind of money'?
One country which is often called a good example of privatizatien is Chile.
But what happened in Chile'? We discussed it with the Chileans. They
concluded that they could not privatize the power sector ii+they were not
going to privatize the rest of the economy. In Chile they did it and it worked
out. That is called a macro-economic policy.
You cannot say that the people in the power sector are going to have this kind
of exchange rate. but in the agricultural sector they are going to have a
different one, as if the inflation ['or the power sector in relation to tariffs is
going to be X and in the rest of the economy it is going to be Y! You cannot
manage a country with that kind of exception. You have to be realistic. If
there is not a macro-economic policy, you can't privatize a single sector.
Some say that partial privatization is an option, but it is not the solution for
this big financial mess that we have.
Let's move to policy for external financing.
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First: International organizations like the World Bank or the InterAmerican
Development Bank (and this is crucial for us) must make net transfers
positive. We cannot continue being net exporters of capital. We cannot
continue reducihg our possibilities for development. Even though this is
difficult to discuss with the banks, and to be accepted by the banks, it's our
position.
This means that at least we have to balance our payments of capital and
interest against fresh funds from the multilateral organization. That builds
our debt, but it is a lesser of evils in our view.
Second: Allow longer amortization and grace periods. Let me give you an
example. We are building hydro plants for which the planned life is about
40 years. Yet we have to pay off hydro plants in no more that 12 years. Even
using marginal cost analysis ii doesn't work from the financial point of view.
So. what is happening? Ali the debt with the multilateral banks are guaran-
teed by the countries. If the utility company doesn't have the money, who's
going to pa3' it'?The country! And how is the country is going to pay?
One way, is printing money, but that does not produce hard currency. The
other way is getting money, from the social sector; that is what is happening.
So we have to make a political decision.
Third: Share exchange risks. At the end of 1989, for instance, the American
dollar was positive for us. But if the dollar Js devaluated against a basket of
currencies, our countries have Io pay for that. What we're saying here is,
share the benefits and share the losses.
In relation to commercial banks, there is a possibility of restructuring debts
over lon,,er periods at lower interest rates. Also there are other possibilities,
like schemes for regional cooperalion. We have some very good examples
in the region, like Santo Grande between Uruguay and Brazil. And there are
very, good possibilities to strengthen the interconnections between power
systems.
What is important as a conclusion to ali oithese possibilities is that lhere is
not a single measure to take inorder to solve the problems of the power sector
in Latin America. We have to improve the management, we have to improve
tariff's, we have to reduce losses. There are many, many measures that have
to be taken. But. I w'ould summarize ii by saying thai the most important one
is to improve the management of our public utilities.
And finally. I would like to say something on energy and the environment
which is an important issue here at this Seminar. and also is an important
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issue tbr us. l'm going to say what I said at the World Energy Conference
in Montreal.
We share your concerns: the concern of the industrialized countries for the
environment. We regret this has not been the preoccupation for you since the
industria! revolution. However, we're ready to work together to restore the
equilibrium between energy and environment. But also, especially the
industrialized countries need to realize that we should share the costs in
proportion to the damage that has been caused. This is a position which was
discussed in OLADE, and I think it is going to be a dominant position. I don't
want to speak for ali the developing countries, but at least from the Latin
American region. We want to cooperate. We don't want a confrontation. But
if we care about energy and environment, we can find ways to improve it in
good cooperation between South and North.
DISCUSSION
Fulkerson: There's an initiative, which 1 think is beginning in Costa Rica,
to do something like we heard with regard to Ontario Hydro, a least-cost
approach to power sector planning. One of the problems is the difficulty
of financing on the demand side of the equation as well as on the supply
side of the equation. I noticed in your very comprehensive and interest-
ing coverage of the problems and solutions that this question of inte-
grated supply/demand side planning didn't come through clearly to me.
Was that part of your strate,,v_, also?
Sanchez-Sierra: Yes, it's a part. Working in that way, we gol some funds
from the EEC in order to have a pilot program for demand management
in the power sector. In that sense we feel exactly the way you think, that
it is a very important source of electricity. And maybe we can conserve
even in the expansion programs in order to use energy in a more rational
way.
We have a program in OLADE which we call optimizing the operation
oi'the power sector. But it doesn't mean we have sophisticated computer
quality. What we call optimizing the operation of the power sector means
trying to reduce losses at the plant level, at the transmission level and the
distribution level, and at the end-users level. What we have is a very
successful program of loss reduction.
Lasl year we completed a report on non-technical losses in the power
sector, lt was very impressive 1(_know thal in some countries 40c)f of
eleclricily is lost. Part of this is slolen and part is technical losses, but
most of il is stolen.
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You have that kind of situation in countries like the Dominican Republic,
where they have rationing during more than 8 or 10 hours a day. And at
the same time you have users complaining. They go to the power
company and they say. "I'm not going to pay the bill," and the power
company people say "'Why not'?", and they say, "Weil, with this kind of
turn-on/turn-off service, I got my refrigerator broken. Who's going to
pay for that'? My TV has been damaged."
So with that kind of very low quality of service, you start to have some
additional problems. And let me give you another example: I'm going to
tell you about tariffs at the residential, commercial and industrial level
in ali of the Latin American countries. In a country like Haiti, the
residential tariff is 17c_,. But the company from the financial point of
view is not in a sound situation. So it is not just a matter of tariffs. We have
to combine it with good planning, but basically we need good manage-
ment.
Stauffer: In your assessment of the power sector in Latin America, is there
anything optimistic? I think I'll summarize in just a few words the
perceptions of the donors of the countries who've been reviewing the
power loans to Latin America, the countries who would be expected to
put up any new money if any new money were to come. The obstacles
are frightening.
The power sector in South America has absorbed almost a third of ali
foreign lending to the region, and the assessment of the donor co,,mtries
over the last couple of years can be summarized as follows: With one
minor exception, not a single one of those loans is not in technical
default. One or more of ali loan covenants have been violated. In general,
the rates cover a return on capital which might be positive or might not
be. The accounts submitted to the banks, the lending institutions, are so
poor that it's hard to know from the financial statements whether the
company is making money or not. It's next to impossible to know what
it has invested. And these are the companies that are coming in asking for
more money. The reaction on the part of the U.S. Treasury and the British
government as well has scarcely been hospitable to these kinds of
requests.
Moreover, a further problem, which transcends that of the power sector
but hinges very immediately upon perceptions in the US as to any new
lending to the power sector in Latin America, is the fact that in many
instances we could trace the money that was ien! to Latin America right
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back into our own banks. For example, in the specific case of Venezuela,
with which I am most recently familiar, one can show that the known
deposits of Venezuelan citizens in the Miami area exceed the total known
debt. So, it becomes extremely difficult to go to the Congress and gel
approval for funds, or to get transfers or guarantees out of the Federal
financing banks under these circumstances. And the public doesn't
particularly care one way or another. But the obstacles that are very real
for this sector are these kinds of questions raised by the half-dozen donor
countries, other than Japan, who have lost sympathy. And I don't quite
know what the Latin American utilities are going to be able to do to get
themselves out of this. Because for example, once a Congressman asked
a very practical question: Can you believe that a company manages its
investments properly if it's unable to present a set of accounts which
permits one to know if it's making a profit? That's a very hard question
even for a well-intentioned loan officer to answer. So your eloquent
statement is almost too optimistic. The donors are beginning to lose
patience.
Eibenschutz: Weil. the use of the word donor in this context makes me mad.
You cannot forget that most of the loans are commercial loans, and
bankers are supposed to make money. The fact that there is a great deal
of corruption in many Latin American countries makes these transac-
tions particularly difficult. But you have to remember that those banks
in Miami are not exempt from corruption. The banks are lending money
and somehow the money finds its way back to the U.S., because in this
country you also have people who benefit from that and who are not
supporting the essential needs of the developing countries. I think we
have to tW to be as objective as possible in this confrontation between the
north and the south. The simplistic answer that the immoral and corrupt
are only in the south is definitely false, lt is a two way street.
But I think you have to be careful of how you assess this, because
ultimately, because of this nearsighted diagnosis of the situation, the
whole world is going to get into a very messy situation.
Stauffer: First of all: "donors". That is the term of art used for the
international lending institutions. And the donors have a great deal of
trouble now justifying further lending under these kinds of conditions.
I'm simply reporting the assessment made at the board of directors level
of major institutions over the last 2 years. The Japanese government
doesn't seem to care terribly much, but the European governments do,
and have been giving more attention, particularly with the prodding from
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the U.S. Treasury, to these questions. So, I'm simply noting for the
record here that the attitude is much less indulgent than it was five years
ago, particularly in regard to multilateral official lending.
Now as Gabriel pointed out, in the last analysis, this tends to be a political
decision made irrespective of the economic merits of the projects in
question, because you can always use the project loan as a transparent
guise tbr the balance of payments. But the problems are coming from the
political sources within the donor countries as weil, given the budget
stringency in most of them. So there's a new concern and a new
reluctance. And as others have said, this is going to be worsened by the
opening of the East.
Sanchez-Sierra: I would say that I totally support Juan's position because the
World Bank and the IDB, they are not donors. I used to work for the
Bank. And the Bank is a bank! They have been very successful lending
money to developing countries. And I'll explain why. They don't care if
the project is not sound from a financial point of view because at the end
they know that the country is going to pay. They don't care if the money
in order Io pay for the power loan is going to be coming from the health
sector, the education sector or whatever. And I strongly support Juan's
position, because you can't call that kmd of assistance "donors". It's a
good business for the bank. In 1986, tbr example, loans just to develop-
ing countries totalled over 1 billion dollars.
But in your assessment on capital flight in Latin America, and that's why
Juan is totally right, we have to be careful what we are talking about. I
would say that even the loans for power projects in Latin America, from
the technical point of view, are sound: they are working. We don't have
the kind of mistakes like the industrialized countries had in Austria. We
heard it this morning. Ali of hydro plants which have been financed by
the IDB and the World Bank, ali of them are working. Look, be very
clear. From the very beginning of the negotiations, you know as a banker
that the project is not sound from a financial point of view: who is
responsible for that'? Both parties. The country and the bank also.
The banker doesn't care because he knows that he is going to get his
money. And the country doesn't care because they need the money. And
that's why we try to be realistic. If from the financial point of view we
find out that with a 15 year period of amortization it doesn't work, maybe
what we need is a 20 year period of amortization. So we say let's try to
balance this kind of financial situation of the power utilities: let's try lo
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have sound financial utilities in the region so you don't have to go to the
government to get your loans.
When you were talking about capital flight, most of that was coming
from private banks and most of thai money' wasn't going to the energy
sector, and le,,s to the power sector. You're talking about a period where
a lot of money went to the financial sectors in Latin America, but to
extrapolate that to the power sector, I think thai is not fair.
Fulkerson: Why don't the Japanese care?
Sanchez-Sierra: Let me tell you something about the Japanese. The Japanese
were ready to put 10 billion dollars into the IDB. Then they got a position
from the U.S. government. Here we're talking about high politics. And
why? Because the U.S. wants to maintain its control of the IDB. And what
happened during the last meeting in Amsterdam? They, were opposed to the
recapitalization of the IDB. lt was a success because the EEC countries and
especially the president of the central bank of Holland where the meeting
was held, in Amsterdam, was very strong in order to get some kind of
positive response from the industrial countries to the IDB.
Here maybe we're going to talk about high politics! But you know, when
you are going to talk about the U.S. Congress, you're talking about just
that! Even though we respect this country very much, and we know that
it is the most dynamic and most important economy in the world, we
cannot accept that we have to be managed by some politicians in this
countr T. The other thing is that you need to realize ... and that's why I was
very realistic: I don't want to be optimistic, negative, or whatever ... I
wanted to show you here what the situation in the region really is.
I know yesterday we had a very good presentation in which it was pointed
out that the most important energy problems in the near future, in the next
10 years, will come from the demand in developing countries. So this is
not an isolated problem for us. That's why I think that this is an important
meeting, so we can discuss and look for ways to solve it.
Our first point was that we are the main actors in this picture. Lets improve
internal net fund generation. We're not expecting more than 20c,4 of our
investment requirements from the multilateral banks. We're not saying that
the solution has to come from any, one in particular. We are the main actors.
CHINA
Prof. Yingzhong Lu directed centralized energy planning in China. He
was on a sabbatical at Stanford and the Lawrence Berkeley Labora-
tory. He said.
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"Ali energy planning in China must begin with assumptions and
projections about population. Population controls everything. Sce-
narios with fertility rates of less than two children per family are used,
but the current rate is not that low, and the future reality may not be
either." [Although the Group discussed population growth and its
impact, ii was not featured in the Findings. Several people who sent
comments criticized our failure to deal with it.]
Prof. Lu's paper on energy supply and environmental impact in China
is reproduced in Appendix 1. Here is how he introduced his discussion
of China's future energy picture:
Prof. Yingzhong Lu:
We are increasing what's going on in the Chinese power sector, and in the
energy sector as a whole. China has adopted a centrally planned economic
system since 1949. Of course, such an economic system has some defects,
but it has some merits also. In particular, in the energy sector because of the
long lead time and the large amount of investment needed, I see thai in many
countries, even capitalist countries, most of the utilities belong to the state,
they are partially or wholly state-owned. In China we are an exclusively
state-owned enterprise in the power sector.
Our power sector has developed very, very fast. Table 10.1 shows the
growth of national income in the PRC. We have annual statistics of"it so as
a rule we use national income instead of GNP as a relative measure. The
1952 figure, for the first year of the first five-year plan, is taken as 100
percent. The growth is shown through 1987. In just 35 years, the national
income increased just ten times: 985.9c_.
Table 10.2 shows the gross energy production and consumption, Energy
production increased from 100% to 1873.6c7r: production and consumption
by 15 times to 1588.3q. The difference between production and consump-
tion comes from crude oil exports and small amount of coal exports.
Zebroski: How is electricity counted'? ts it in terms of primary energy in the
fuel used to produce ii?
Lu: Yes, and thai includes hydro power. We have a conversion factor for
hydro power.
China's electricity growth is shown in Table 10.3. Ii shows the growth of
electricity consumption in terawatt-hours (TWh) per year. From the year
1949 at 4.3 TWh to 1987,496 TWh it increased more than 100 times. To
compare this figure with total energy growth above, from 1952 to 1987,
electricity use increased by a factor of 68.
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I01 Growth of National Income in FRC
(Incomes in current prices;
percentages in constant price8)
Year Aggregated Netlorutl Per capiT_t Ne_ionaZ
Income Income
109 YU_'I t ¥UOL_ t
1952 58.9 i00.0 104 I00.0
1957 90.8 153.0 142 135.5
1962 92.4 130.9 13% 111.5
1965 138.7 197.4 194 156.7
1970 192.6 294.6 235 203.6
1975 250.3 384.7 273 237.6
1980 368.8 516.3 376 298.1
1985 703.1 826.6 673 448.1
1987 932.1 985.9 868 520.0
10.2 Energy Growth (Ref. 20, Appx. 1)
Year Energy produ_lon Enez_y Cormuap_ion
106 _ce % 106 tee %
1952 48.71 I00.0 54.11 I00.0
1957 98.61 202.4 96.44 178.2
1962 171.85 352.8 165.40 305.7
1965 188.24 386.5 189.01 349.3
1970 309.90 636.2 292.91 541.3
1975 487.54 1000.9 454.25 839.5
1980 637.35 1308.5 602.75 1113.9
1985 855.46 1756.2 770.20 1423.4
1987 912.65 1873.6 859.43 1588.3
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10.3 Growth of Electricity Consumption in PRC
(Ref. 21, Appx. i)
(terawatt-hours/year )
Year Electricity Cons. Year Electricity Cons.
1949 4.3 1969 94.0
1950 4.6 1970 115.9
1951 5.8 1971 138.4
1952 7. 3 1972 150.0
195 ] 9.2 1973 164.0
1954 11.0 1974 165.9
1955 12.3 1975 192.2
1956 16.6 1976 199.6
195 7 19.3 1977 218.8
1958 27.5 19 78 25 1.1
1959 44.3 1979 275.0
1960 59.4 1980 300.6
1961 48. I 1981 309.3
1962 45.8 1982 327.7
1963 49.0 1983 35 1.4
1964 56.0 1984 377.0
1965 67.6 1985 4 lO. 7
1966 82..5 1986 449.6
1967 77.4 1987 496.0
1968 71.6
Source: The Scaciscics Year kok of r.he FRC, various volumes.
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The ratio of electricity growth to national income growth over these 35
years averaged 1.27. But there are two distinct periods: betore 1980,
before the economic retorm, the ratio averaged 1.48. Then, after 1980
and up to "87, the ratio dropped abruptly to 0.544. Beginning in 1980 we
adopted a series of measures and formulated integrated policies tbr
energy conservation. We see real success alter the implementation of
these policies.
But at the same time. we encountered a serious energy shortage. This was
because the centrally planned economies put emphasis, much more
emphasis, on heavy industry. Obviously, this is very energy intensive. So
consequently, in nearly every region we encountered serious energy
shortages, in particular, electric power shortages.
If you visited China in recent years you will find that every city has some
rules for blackouts. Many factories, even in Beijing, stop work one day
per week to share the electricity with the other factories. And each
factory gets a quota of power supply. If you use any power exceeding
your quota, you'll be fined 5 or 10 times the tariff.
For each family we have only 70 kilowatt-hours per month. If you exceed
the quota you'll be fined five times the tariff. I've got a European
refrigerator. Unfortunately, they consume 2 kilowatt-hours per day, so
I'll be fined! So we prefer to get a Japanese refrigerator, lt consumes on
the average of 1 kilowatt-hour per day, so we can afford it. And in the
winter, we stop the refrigerator and put the food outside the door.
Hubbard: Is it a smaller refrigerator'?
Lu: Similar capacity but more efficient.
Hubbard: More expensive'?
Lu: Not quite so much more. The Europeans don't care about the electricity
consumption of their refrigerator. It's just a small amount of their overall
expense.
We are involved in the long term forecast for our State Planning Commis-
sion from the year 1985 to the year 2050. The major result of the forecast is
shown in Table 10.4. We use a sector analysis approach, and analyze each
sector very carefully. Our target is sel by the government. The government
has a very ambitious development target: by the year 2050 we must approach
the lower limit of the developed countries today. We take the energy use per
capita level of Spain and Italy as the target for the year 2050.
According to such a target, the total energy consumption in the year 2000
will be 1500 million tons of coal-equivalent (TCE), or 1.5 billion TCE; in
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2020 that is 2.4 billion TCE, and in 2050 it is 5.2 billion TCE. The average
growth rate from 2020 to 2050 is about 4c,_ per year. The planned economic
growth rate is 5.69k per year, so lhc ratio of tile growth rate of energy
consumption divided by growth rate of the economy I used above is less than
1. lt is around 0.6, which means we have considered and are counling on
many energy conservation measures.
To supply such a tremendous amount of primary energy we will still rely
primarily on our own resources, because we don't anticipate any imported
energy resource tha! could meel such a huge demand. Today 4()_5_, of ali
industrial activity in China is inw)ived with coal: mining, transporting and
burning coal.
Our oil resources are not enough for that development. As the table shows,
oil starts from 200 million tons in the year 200(] and goes up to 250 million
tons by, 2020. lt drops to 116 million tons by 2050 because of depletion of
our oil resource.
Natural gas: our reserves and resource base is rather poor, so it does not
contribute a very high percentage. But it still increases somewhat, and it
exceeds oil use by 2q by the year 2050. However, it is still only 5e,4 of the
total supply.
Hydropower: we have plenty of hydropower, but it will be fully exploited
by, the year 2050. up to 263 gigawatts installed and 900 TWh per year
production, lt consists of just 6c/_ of the total primary energy consumption,
corresponding to 16_7rof our electric power supply, And some of our new
energy - lk_rinstance, solar and wind and geothermal, and so forth, will not
be so much, we estimate.
So a major part of our energy supply must rely' on coal or nuclear or both.
The energy resources of our country arc summarized in Table 10.5: The
proven reserves and the potential resource,just by estimating oi'course. Coal
- the total proven reserve by the year '87 as 769 billion Ions, or gigatons, and
per capita that is 710 tons, a sizable amount. The potential is even larger. Per
capita, a resource of 3010 tons could be used for centuries.
But oil, with the total proven reserve ot"5 gigatons, represents just 5 tons per
capita, li is very small compared to our population. The potential resource is
estimated at 68 gigatons, so the per capita resource of just 56 tons is so very little.
We have not found much natural gas.
Hydro: the per capita amount is equivalent to 1700 kw-hours per year. That
is not so much when compared to consumption by the year 2050.
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Table 10.4 Scenarioa for the Structure of Primary Energy
Itea Un£_ 2000 3030 30SO.,
--_._----m -.--..tamm .,,, -..---...m
Tot:al I_¢e 1SO0 _400 SS00
011 N_ 200 350 116
Ntce 386 :358 166
% 19.1 14.9 3.3
MIt_. GIS Gll 3 40 100 300
lq1:ce 53 1:33 366
t 3.5 S.S 5.1
HycL_o (;lie 8:3 174 263
Tlm 291 609 931
Wcce 100 310 330
t 6.7 e.e 6.s
Nev Energy Wcce 0 10 350
t 0.0 0.4 4.0
Case A Case li Case ¢
C_l Nt 1470 3380 SlO0 4370 3640
li(l:¢e 1051 li;ill 3640 3120 3600
t 70.1 67.8 70.0 60.0 50.0
JtucleaE GWo 5 30 391 543 035
:30 180 1'750 :3378 SOO8
N_Ce 10 63 558 10"71 lSgi
t 0.? 3.6 10.7 30.7 30.7
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Table 10.5 Energy Resources of the PRC
Resource P_oven Reserve Potential Resource
TotaZ Per Ctplta* Total Per Capita*
Coal 769.2 Gton 719 ton >3200 Gton 2994 ton
Oil 5.5 Gton 5.2 ton 60 Gton 56 ton
_. Gas 1000 Gu 3 93E n 3 33000 G_ 3 30853 s 3
Hydro .... 19 TWh/y_ 1770k14h/yr
Uraniua** 10 kton 0.Oi kq ....
* Based on 1907 p:pulat&on value.
** Based on official publlshad figure ot uran&us supply
available tor 15 GWe nuclear power plants.
Table 10.6 Chinese Share of Global CO, Emissions
I_en Unit 2000 2025 2050
Global:
Carbon 109ton 7.2 10.3 14.5
China:
Population % 19.17 20.91 19.92
CaseO CaaQA CaseB Camac
Carbon 109ton 1.131 1.717 3.952 3.455 2.991 2.627
Share % 15.71 16.67 27.26 23.83 20.63 17.43
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Back on Table 10.4, we take three cases for the development _1"nuclear
power. A is a low nuclear power option. Nuclear power will constitute a I()¢,_
of the total primary energy. Even so, by 205(), 291 gigawatts of nuclear
power stations wouM be installed. If we lake high nuclear option, then we
have to install 800 gigawatts of capacity. That's almost impossible.
Now, to estimate the CO_ emitted from the Peoples' Republic in the next
century, we use Table 10.6. We can see in the last line oi'the table what our
share of the global emissions will be.
Ii" we do not adopt nuclear energy, the result is Case Zero (()). Our share
consists of 27c_ of the total global emissions because we use extensively
coal. If we take the low nuclear option, our share of carbon emissions will
drop by 4_;f to 23.8c/c. If we take the high nuclear option, our share will drop
to 17c,_, and by that time our share of the world's population is 19c/_. So ii"
we do not adopt much nuclear energy, our carbon emission share will exceed
our population share in the world by the year 2050,
That's an overall view of the energy future in China. The electric power
forecast is summarized in Table 10.7. You can see that total energy increases
from 1.5 to 5.2 billion "I'CE, and the share of electricity increases from 29c_
in the year 2000 to 5()c_ by the year 2050. The electricity demand increased
from 120() TWh to 8150 TWh per year, and the installed capacity is
enormous, lt goes from 240 gigawatts to 1630 gigawatts. Hydropowcr
supplies just 16_/_, and coal plus nuclear the rest: 84c/_. Ii"we adopt the low
case (A) of nuclear power coal furnishes 66c_ of ali electric power genera-
lion and nuclear 18c/_. If we take high nuclear option then coal generates 32c-,_
and nuclear 52_.
So from these figures, our energy future should rely heavily on nuclear
power, and there is no ()/her option: our coal means not only pollution, but
also the supply will be very difficult. For instance, presentl), we have to
transport 1()()million tons of coal from Yangzhee Province to the seaport and
then use ships to transport such a large amount of coal to the south and the
east of China. By the year 2000 we will have to transport 400 million tons
of coal from Yangzhee and Inner Mongolia. And by the year 2050, ii"we do
not use nuclear energy we have to transport 4 billion tons from the region.
It's impossible, because we have not so many seaports to load the coal to the
ships and to unload the coal to the south and east of China. So it's mostly
impossible.
Now that's the energy future. Recently the political climate changed a little
bitt The developing growth rate has slowed down, but for the long run for
such a big country like China, and we have ali the resources fl)r development,
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Table 107 Forecast of Electricity Production for the PRC
Year 2000 2020 2050
Item Unit Case I Case 2 Case 3
Total Energy I09 ice 1.50 2.40 5.20 5.20 5.20
Share of Electricity % 29.0 40.0 50.0 50.0 50.0
Electricity Product. TW_ 1200 3008 8150 8150 8150
Installed Capacity GWe 240 600 1630 1630 1630
Among which :
Hydropowe r GWe 83 174 263 263 263
Coal Ge 152 396 1076 804 532
Nuclear GWe 5 30 291 563 835
* 5ource: Wu Z. et al, The Energy Demand of the PRC by 2050, Inst. of
Nuclear Energy Technology, Beijing, China, Decea/_er, 1988, p.126.
the overall growth rate will not be slowed very much. Only, to attain this goal
by the year 2050 or 2070, 20 or 30 years earlier or later, eventually China will
bum so much fuel and enfit so much CO_.
Starr: lt seems to me you are shortchanging your coal future. As the
transportation Load for coal goes up the relat;ve cost of high voltage
transmission lines becomes very attractive. A mine-mouth plant now can
send electricity 2000 miles on high voltage DC with maybe a 15% power
loss. So it would seen, to me that somewhere along the line, instead of
building more railroad cars and more ships, you will go in for a high
voltage DC grid and use your coal resources much more fully.
Gottlieb: There's a water availability problem in that province.
Lu: You're right. We considered mine-mouth generating stations, but
cooling water is a serious problem. We considered dry cooling even, very
large dry cooling towers now exist in the world. But eveu high voltage
power lines to transmit such a large amount of electricity are also very
difficult. So we must combine ali these measures together.
Fulkerson: So the place for us to sell nuclear plants is China, right'? Let me
ask that question a little bi: differently. What kind of nuclear power
plants do you see being used in China':
hu: Our nuclear policy has been debated over two decades, and we ,qarted
our first plant in 1983. We adopted the PWR as a first genera:ion nuclear
power plant, but are developing the fast breeder very soop, because our
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uranium resources are not so plentiful for the full development of nuclear
power. Of course, currently we can import uranium because the wocid
has some surplus. But in the future, maybe not. And besides, we consider
nuclear for district heating as well as nuclear electricity, because 80% of
our primary energy is consumed as heat. In the future, even by the year
2020, even until 2050, still, 50% will be used as heat. So we are also
considering development of a high temperature reactor for the cogenera-
tion of heat and power.
Erdmann: What was the population growth rate that you used?
Lu: Our population will grow at the rate of about 1.4 to 1.5% per year into
the middle of the next century and then drop. The maximum population
will be about 1.5 billion, and then drop slowly.
Erdmann: Weil, but for your 2050 projection of energy needs, which
population growth did you use?
Lu: It's a medium growth scenario. I will explain:
The current population of China has already exceeded one billion
people. Even though rather effective population control was imple-
mented in the late 1970's, the population will probably continue to
increase over the next several decades. Four scenarios of population
growth have been suggested by researchers for analysis of government
policy.
1. The average fertility of Chinese females will decrease steadily from
2.63% (the 1982 rate) to 1.7% by 1990 and 1.5% by 1995, and then it will
stay at 1.5% from then on.
2. The same as above before 2001, but return to 2.0% attcr 2001. This is
the "'two-child each family" policy tbr the next century.
3. The average fertility decreases slowly from 2.63% to 2.0% by 1990,
and holds steady thereafter.
4. The average fertility holds at the 1984 level of 2.4% indefinitely.
Tile numbers for these scenarios are shown in Table 10.8.
Scenarios 1 and 2 were preferred by the authors of the energy policy
study, and recommended to the Government for planning. In Scenario 1
the total population peaks by 2019 at 1.23 billion, and Scenario 2 in 2031
at about the same level. However, actual developments reveal that these
are unrealistic, and the third scenario is more likely, and is being used.
Its maximum is reached in 2037 at 1.44 billion, and declines slowly, but
stays above 1.3 billion people.
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Table 10.8 Scenarios of Population Growth for the PRC
(in millions of people)
Year Scenario 1 Scenario 2 Scenario 3 Scenario 4
1983 1022.07 1022.07 1022.07 1022.07
1989 1095.56 1095.56 ii00.i0 1101.63
1995 1147.99 1147.99 1179.35 1207.88
2001 1191.21 1191.21 1254.04 1307.73
2007 1218.68 1247.35 1309.60 1385.78
2013 1233.57 1288.35 1353.35 i_54.25
2019 1234.37 1312.92 1392.14 1530.74
2025 1221.10 1323.77 1424.52 1609.14
2031 1192.55 1328.81 1441.57 1672.32
2037 1148.47 1324.11 1441.58 1718.55
2043 1091.68 1306.09 1431.36 1761.73
2049 1026.19 1278.07 1416.53 1809.33
2055 956.37 1248.54 1397.58 1855.70
2061 887.64 1223.79 1376.16 1898.15
2067 823.27 1203.22 1355.48 1942.48
2073 763.88 1184.50 1337.29 1993.67
2079 709.39 1167.92 1320.55 2048.59
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In any case, the Chinese population sill probably increase by more than
400 million over the next 40 years. That presents a formidable challenge
to planners, and certainly, to decisionmakers.
The PRC economic plan calls for doubling the Gross National Product
from 1980 to 2000. Beyond that, there are no stated goals, but there is the
suggestion that the per capita income of china will reach the lower limit
of today's developed countries in 50 years. In this study, I use a medium
growth scenario. Our high-growth scenario would imply a pattern like
Japan and South Korea during their take-off stages, and that is not
realistic for China. But even this medium growth rate of 4.7% per year
brings the per capita income of China to $4,000 in 1984 dollars by the
year 2030.
Eibenschutz: China is designated by world energy planners as one of the
most intensive users or producers of biomass, biogas, etc. What's their
role in the future?
Lu: Presently, 80% of the energy in the rural regions is biomass, and of
course we developed many hydro and biogas plants, they only account
for a few percent of the total generation. So in the future we will still use
biomass, but we will use more efficient means to save the biomass, and
ultimately to supply commercial energy to the rural regions, so that by
the year 2050, 80c_ will be commercial energy. The biomass will not
increase in absolute amounts.
Larsson: When you say biomass you mean use of firewood'?
Lu: No. Mainly agricultural waste. Our forests are meager. There is very
little forest left.
Borg: Is that agricultural waste and dung?
Lu: Yes, but dung is the lowest efficiency, and makes bad smoke.
Shackelford: I was just going to ask how see the financial aspects working
out.
Lu: We take on the average around 30'% of the total investment in the power
sector, including primary and secondary energy. It consists of almost 50%
of the industrial investment fbr the past decade and in the near future.
Shackelfbrd: I guess I was wondering how you feel about how the economy
will go" and whether you'll be able to continue that sort of financing
picture.
Lu: For the past decade we've seen a successful 30c_ investment to the
energy sector, and it seems appropriate.
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Davis: Will you be looking for outside financing'?
Lu: Sure. We get outside financing sources, also but the common policy is
that the total outside investment shouldn't exceed 30c_ of the internal to
avoid debt problems.
Rossin: If the outside investment is very slow for the next few years, what
happens to the plan'?
Lu: That's quite possible, I fear. In particular, nuclear projects are heavily
financed by outside sources.
Shapar: Is it fair to say that the use of coal in China will double by the year
2000'?
Lu: To be more precise, last year we produced 1 billion tons of coal. By the
year 2000, 1.4 billion.
Start: Will you give us your guess as to what's going to happen on the
environmental aspects of the use of coal'?
Lu: It's very serious.
Starr: I know it's serious. But what do you think is going to happen'? Do you
think thai your coal installations will put in flue gas desulfurizers, or do
you doubt it'?
Lu: I doubt that we will put in desulfurization equipment. I mentioned
yesterday that on the one hand it needs high investment, and on the other
hand most of the coal is low sulfur except in the Southwest region. So
presently the most serious pollution comes from the particulates, the fly
ash, and not the sulfur dioxide. Of course, sulfur dioxide and the acid rain
not only pollute the city, they pollute the rural regions too. So the
municipal governments don't care very much about the sulfur dioxide.
That's the problem. And CO+ emissions are CO+ emissions. That's not
going to change.
ELECTRICITY TRENDS
Dr. Stephen Meyers is in the Energy Analysis Program at Lawrence
Berkeley Laboratory. He discussed a portion of the work they are
doing on energy use pat/ems in various regions oi" the world.
Meyers: At LBL we've been looking at issues of energy demand and supply
in developing countries as well as the industrialized countries at LBL.
I've focused on the power sector. We look at the larger countries
specifically, and try to do an overview of selected groups of developing
countries in Asia and Latin America. We gather historical information
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about these countries and about what their plans are. Then we make
assessments of financial issues and environmental issues.
Researchers generally study relationships between electricity demand
and growth in GDP _Gross Domestic Product). I wish to present
aggregated :tara covering the seven years 1980-1987 for thirteen coun-
tries: nine i_'_Asia: China, India, Indonesia, Malaysia, Pakistan, Philip-
pines, South Korea, Taiwan and Thailand: and four in Latin America:
Argentina, Brazil, Mexico and Venezuela. Table 10.9 shows the electric-
ity growth and GDP growth for the year 1986-87 and for the seven years
1980-87.
In the larger Asian countries, but excluding China, energy has grown
somewhat faster than GDP. Electricity has grown quite a bit faster, and
the fastest growth has been in the residential sector. Although there are
some similarities between Asia and Latin America, there are some
differences that are quite striking. Energy and GDP have tracked each
other quite closely, but the ratio of electricity to GDP has grown even
faster in Latin America than in the Asian countries. There has not been
very much growth in GDP, as we know, yet electricity has continued to
grow at a fairly high rate.
Residential use has less impact on growth in GDP than growth in the
industrial sector. Perhaps an important point is that although some
new electricity supply has been added in these Latin-American
nations, their economies have been beset with broader economic
problems that resulted in little GDP growth during this period.
Table 10.10 shows the wide range of growth rates for the industrial,
residential and commercial sectors for the countries in this study ( 1980-
87). In the same table, the average growth rates for the nine Asian, four
Latin American, and for ali 13 countries.
Fulkerson: This raises an important question. Could I ask you about the
credibility of the GDP as an indicator of growth?
Meyers: That's definitely an issue, but these GDP numbers are used by the
International Monetary Fund and everybody else. But after adjusting
them into real terms, like constant dollars, over a long period, I think
there are some legitimate reasons to question the use of GDP.
Fulkerson: But the stories I have gotten from visitors from these countries
is that the underground economy in most of these countries, which
doesn't show up in the GDP records, is a major user of electricity.
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Table 10.9 Average Annual Growth in Electricity Consumption and GDP
1986-1987 1980-1987
Electricity GDP Ratio Electricity GDP R_o
(%) (%) Elec/GDP (%) (%) Elec/GDP
China 11.0 9.3 1.2 7.4 9.5 0.8
India 7.0 3.6 1.9 8.5 5.1 1.7
Indonesia 12.4 3.3 3.8 15.8 4.0 - 3.9
Malaysia 7.6 5.4 1.4 7.7 4.6 1.7
Pakistan 10.3 7.7 1.3 10.5 6.9 1.5
Philil_ines 10.5 5.0 2.1 3.1 0.5 6.2
South Korea 12.9 10.9 1.2 10.0 8.7 1.2
Taiwan 10.3 1 l. 1 0.9 6.7 7.4 0.9
Thailand 12.7 6.3 2.0 9.6 5.0 1.9
ArgentWm 6.4 1.9 3.4 3.3 -0.5
Brazil 3.5 2.8 1.3 6.7 2.8 2.4
Mexico 5.9 1.4 4.2 5.9 0.g 7.4
Venezuela 7.3 3.0 2.4 4.8 0.2 24
Asian-9 10.5 7.1 1.5 8. I 6.6 1.2
Latm-4 4.8 2.3 2.1 5.9 1.4 4.2
Total- 13 8.2 5.3 1.5 7.4 4.4 1.7
Includes industrial seLf-production.
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Tables 10.10 and 10.1 1
"l'ablc 10.10: See'total Growth Ral_ for Eie_ncily (kmsumplion, 1980-87
(% pcr year)
[ndusmaJa Re_ck_nuaJ Commercial Toud GDP
Chinm -7.00 14.5 I 1.6 74 9.5
India 6.8 12.1 8.5 8.4 5.1
indonesia 22,7 13.0 7 2 148 4.0
Malaysia 4 6 12.2 8.3 7.4 4.6
PaJos_n I0.0 164 I1.0 11.2 69
Phflippmes -0.7 7.2 40 2.9 0.5
SouthKon=J 9.2 11.6 12.5 10.1 8.7
Tauwan 5.4 6.6 I1.7 6.6 7.4
ThaJlaJld 8.4 II.I 10.2 9.6 5.0
Argenuna 3.9 3 5 4.3 3.7 -0.5
Brazd 6.9 7 4 5.9 7.0 2.8
Mexico 6.2 6.7 2.3 58 08
Ven_z'ueta 4 6 53 5.8 5.1 0.2
A.s,_-9 7 I 11g 9.9 79 66
Laun-4 6 2 6.4 5.1 6.1 14





['abl¢10.1 I:Average {}rowlhRates m







Indonesia ! 3.8 7.7
Malaysia 12.6 5.0
Pakisl.an 7 5 9 8
Philippine s 4.5 4.7
South Kon_a I1.4 4.6
Taiwan 9.2 4.6
Thailand I 1.3 7.3
Argentma 6.6 a 2.8
Brazil 6.1 6.5
Mexico 62 4.9
Venezuela ! I. I 2.7
TOTAL 75 6 3
(a) 1979-1985
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Meyers: Right! That is probably one of the factors in Latin America.
Shapar: I note you don'l include self-production in the industrial sector.
(Self-production is defined as as energy generated in the home and used
in the home.)
Meyers: In this case, we don't. But the main country where that's a large
factor is Indonesia. In others it's generally estimated to be about 10%.
But in Indonesia, it's quite large.
For these 13 developing countries as a whole, Table 10.11 shows growth
in installed capacity, not including self-producers. Growth in Asia has
been very high during this period. We gathered information on plans for
the power sector in these 13 countries. Of course, these plans are often
optimistic, sometimes quite optimistic. Take lhc case of Latin America,
as we've heard, where the plans are in part a political document as well
as a technical document, and financial reality is of course, something
else.
For some of the other countries the plans are somewhat more realistic,
parlicularly the countries in Asia that are doing better economically.
Financing is especially problematic in Latin America, but it's also a
problem in some of the lower income Asian countries where the power
shortage situation is very severe, like India and Pakistan. But financing
is an even greater problem in Latin America. In South Korea and Taiwan,
(and ii is questionable whether we still want to call them developing
countries) and those at the next tier, such as Thailand and Indonesia, the
growth in demand is extremely rapid now and to add sufficient capacity
just to keep up with demand is somewhat difficult for them.
tin some counlries demand growth is limited by supply. In China,
as our participants noted, electricity is shut off at different times in
various cities in order to keep the grid in operation.
Taiwan and south Korea, as Dr. Li suggesled, should more properly
be called "emerging industrial societies" rather than developing.
Their capability to supply electricity is matched by high rates of
industrial growth. This ratio of electricity growth to GDP is near
unity, like thai of the U.S. and other industrialized countries. In
these emerging industrialized nations, both of these indices are
growing more rapidly than in most nations.]
Meyers: Public opinion and environmental issues are becoming more
important in these countries than they have been, and are starting to play
a significanl role. Mostly, it's been affecting planned hydro projecls, in
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Asia at least, and it's beginning to affect some projects in Latin America
as weil. Plans for nuclear power in Taiwan and South Korea are also
beginning to be affected by public opinion.
One other point: In some cases the demand is very likely to grow slower
than forecast because the forecasts are very optimistic in terms of
economic growth, particularly in Latin America. In many of the Asian
countries, on the other hand, the shortage of electricity is so severe that !
whatever the utilities are able to provide will be absorbed by consumers.
The numbers in Figure 10.12 are either official plans or our estimates out
to the year 2000. Actually the plans are at a slower growth rate than what
was actually achieved in a number of countries from 1980-87 in
Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, North Korea, South Korea. Taiwan,
Thailand and in Latin America as weil. Part of this is due to the fact that
official plans for economic growth were deliberately made for slower
growth. Some of these countries are entering a more mature phase of
their growth trajectory, the GDP in Taiwan and South Korea is growing
somewhat slower, although they've found that things are happening
faster than they thought, and in South Korea and Thailand it now appears
that their estimates are somewhat conservative.
The Asian countries, including China, are projecting a growth rate of
6.8% per year, the Latin countries 5.2%, but again this is probably quite
optimistic. The 6.8ck for Asia is probably optimistic, but given the
financial situation, it is certainly more achievable than the 5.2% in Latin
America.
In terms of the fuel mix, what we're seeing is a movement toward coal
in many countries. Figure 10.13 is the aggregate picture for the nine
Asian countries, including China (which obviously weights things
heavily toward coal) and then for the four Latin countries. You see the
marked difference between these regions in terms of their fuel mix, and
also in terms of the direction in which things are moving. In the Asian
countries, coal will become more important. In the Latin American
countries could come out a little bit different: hydro is to become
somewhat more important.
Table 10.14 shows what the plans for installed capacity are for the
different countries for the year 2000. The total is going from around 45(1
gigawatts in 1987 up to about 720. Probably some of the plans for hydro
will have difficulty coming to pass. It's quite possible that some of the
planned nuclear capacity will become something else, although that's
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Table 10.12 Table 10.13
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hard to say. Taiwan is looking at alternatives to some of their plans;
Korea too, perhaps. In ali cases, in Asia al least, they're looking much
more aggressively to try to bring in private power generation, mostly
cogeneration, but also they are looking al various other options for
financing power projects. Taiwan is implementing American PURPA-
type type regulations, probably the most advanced in this region. They
are also, as has been mentioned, looking at reducing losses and improv-
ing power plant efficiency.
[The PURPA regulations are only beginning to be implemented in
the U. S., and how they will work out in temls of financing and
performance remains to be seen.]
But because of capital constraints, it is likely that the roles ofoil and gas
are going to be larger than these countries are planning. Already
countries are starting to move in the direction of installing fairly low-
capacity gas turbines because of their capital problems. Some countries
do have substantial natural gas resources that they're beginning to tap,
and they will try to bring those on line as quickly as they can. Probably
though, particularly ifoil prices remain as most people generally expect
them to be, there will be more use of oil than the countries have been
envisioning recently.
Figure 10.14 Planned or Estimated Installed Electrac Power Capacity
in the Year 2000
(not including self-producers)
(thousand Megawatts)
H_dro Coal-hned Ga.s-lir_d Otl-fircd NucleaLr Geothermal Total
Chmaa ;p) 720 1470 00 16.0 50 00 2.100
India ,E) 41 4 86 _ 15 3 2 0 30 Q0 1485
Indonesia _P_ 4 0 1 I 0 29 4 0 00 04 224
Malaysia (E) 1 8 0 6 54 0 8 00 0 0 _ O
PaX_,tan _P) 64 2.,1 32 ..19 01 00 17 1
Ptuhppmes lE) 2 5 2 I O0 3 3 00 26 10 5
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Talc, an _P) ..15 11 9 2 7 36 7 I 0 0 "9 9
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_rgenuna _E) 9 1 0 2 6 5 I 2 16 00 I_ 4
Brazd JP) 93 3 30 OO 36 3 1 O0 1030
Me._lco rP/E) II 0 II 1 1 1 176 14 I 5 437
_,enezucla _E_ 17 7 00 4 8 28 00 O0 25 3
TOT-_L 2"709 295 8 505 05 1 336 4 5 ")204
Source Countr'3,.pla,"t.s(s_ country, chap_er_) and aut_r_' esttmates
,P) = OfliCl._l plan
,E) = E_,timated by authors based on _,arJousinformation (see notes DCIO_,I
(a) Includes some self-producer_
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We at LBL spend a lot of time looking at prospects for improving end-
use efficiency in developing countries. One project Dr. Lee Shipper was
involved in involved electric appliances in Indonesia. If you froze the
end use energy intensity at !9818 levels but assume a certain increase in
penetration of these appliances, which is occurring fairly rapidly in a lot
of the Asian countries, you see a slowing of demand growth, and ii"you
took more advanced technology that is almost cost-effective, it could
take you down to around 5()_7¢,of the energy use that it might otherwise
be. These are rough numbers, but in any case there ix a substantial
potential, and the World Bank and other institutions are looking into this.
Wolfe: When you say that adwmced conservation technologies are cost-
effective in developing countries, is there a definition that we can use'?
Meyers: These would be technologies thai would probably be cost-effective
in the neighborhood of the marginal cost of electricity, say, in the 5- I0
cent per kilowatt hour category, as opposed to the others that might be
in the 3-5 cent range. At LBL we've done quite a bit of analysis of
appliances for the U. S. Appliance Standards. These would be technolo-
gies that, according to their calculations, have been cost-effective but
haven't been included in the standards.
Wolfe: There are very few places in the developing world where electricity
can even be generated ['or as little as five cents a kilowatt-hour! But the
problem with many oi'those conservation plans is that they really require
large capital investments up front.
Meyers: That's one of the key issues: to compare the additional capital
investment for pulling more insulation in a refrigerator with the capital
investment in power generating plants.
Wolfe: Don't forget, ii takes a lot of capital, energy and time to go into mass
production of efficient refrigerators. Have you seen Amory Lovins' light
bulb, the 18 watt light bulb'?
Meyers: There's a group that has done a very interesting analysis with
compact fluorescents for India and Brazil. They're doing that exact
analysis you're talking about, looking at the additional capital cost,
which is substantial with compact fluorescents, looking at the effect of
that on the utilities, and doing a financial analysis at the consumer level,
the utility level and the national level, and seeing how it's different in
each case. Then they compare the supply side and demand side invest-
ments. That kind of more sophisticated analysis is obviously what needs
to be done.
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Wolfe: But what happens, ii seems to me, is that those analyses don't always
take into account the capital availability of the country of the people that
are actually involved.
Meyers: A certain amount of capital is available tk_rthe power sector. What
is the most optimal allocation of that among the various resources?
Obviously, you can't just turn a switch and people are going to install
compact fluorescents. You have to come up with a viable strategy that's
really going to deliver that power.
Wolfe: And even for the compact fluorescent, in a place where capital and
individual wealth is very low, you'd be using those kind of bulbs to a
minimum extent, even if they have high efficiency. So it doesn't have the
same savings as it does in a country like the U. S., where we might keep
that kind of bulb on a lot of the time.
[Our participants from developing countries had explained that capital
for the power sector is simply not available today. The investment is too
risky. The question is whether international banks that might be hesitant
to lend money for the construction of a generating station would lend
money to the same utility or country for investments in demand-side
management. ]
Fulkerson: Lovins likes to point out that in India electricity prices in villages
are so low that, in effect, it's almost free. Therefore it pays a utility to
invest in a high efficiency lamp because that's less expensive, since
people aren't paying anything for that power anyway. The less you use,
the more money the utility actually makes, so there's a crazy economics
going on there.
But the analysis should show whether I should invest my money on the
demand side or should I invest it on the supply side? You take the best
return and that's the way you go, obviously.
[As Sanchez-Sierra explained, the problem is that when rates are
set so low in response to political pressures, there is not enough
money left to invest in anything.]
Fulkerson: Your results, Steve, for Java indicated about what Chauncey
Starr was indicating, which was that electricity is going to grow signifi-
cantly. You can halve that growth by requiring very efficient appliances,
but it's still going to grow. So you have a situation in the world where
electricity is going to grow - period, and you can make it grow less by
investing in efficiency to its ecozlomic justified level. But it's still going
to grow.
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Meyers: There's no doubt that implementing efficiency in most developing !
nations is much more difficult than in industrialized countries.
Start: l'd like to make a comment on just one point in your tables: on the
expected rate of growth in the future. In ali these countries, thai number
is a political number, lt is not really a planning number. What happens
is, if you put down an expected rate of growth in the future that is the same
as what you've had in the last 10 years, it looks too big. What happens
then is you have to start worrying about applications for plant sites,
financial resources, transmission and distribution lines, and buying
equipment with hard currency.
But the disturbance that this creates to the plans for the economy is so
great that there's a big psychological pressure on the people who come
out with the future growth rate number to try to diminish it. This happens
year after year after year. If you go back 5 years or 10 years to the same
countries, you find the same phenomenon. When you look at the future
growth rates, you have to find some other base than just a statement made
by the country itself as to what the planners use.




DECISIONS IN NUCLEAR ENERGY
KEYNOTE ADDRESS:
Prof. Glenn Seaborg
This year will mark the fiftieth year of my involvement with nuclear energy,
beginning with the discovery of plutonium. I was a staffmember at the wartime
Metallurgical Laboratory at the University of Chicago when Enrico Fenni
achieved the first nuclear chain reaction on December 2, 1942. At the Met Lab,
I was responsible for the development of the chemical process used in the
isolation of plutonium for its use as the explosive ingredient in the atomic bomb.
In 1946 I was appointed by President Harry Truman to the first General
Advisory Committee (GAC) of the newly established Atomic Energy
Commission. In 1959, I was appointed by President Dwight D. Eisenhower
to the President's Science Advisory Committee (PSAC) under its first
chaimlan, Dr. James Killian. Consequently, during the first 15 post-war
years I watched with interest the industrial development of nuclear energy
for its use in the large scale production of electricity.
Perhaps the best first-hand demonstration of my interest is to present to you
some quotations from my speeches of that era. The following is from my talk
recorded for CBS in San Francisco on July 30, 1955 for release during the
International Atoms tor Peace Conference held August 8 - 12, 1955 in
Geneva, Switzerland:
"lt will be a good many years before energy of this type will compete
with common sources of energy such as coal. Such machines must run
at high temperatures in order that the energy can be extracted in useful
fonn, and this means that there will be many problems involving
materials of construction, corrosion and so forth.
"'The materials of construction must be chosen from those whose
neutron absorption is small and this limits the choice to uncommon
substances. Adequate coolants must be found, and the method for
control of the reaction must be assured, lt will also be necessary for the
chemists and chemical engineers to develop procedures to purify the
plutonium and uranium, and also to re-purify these materials in order
that the unburned fuel may be used again.
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"Probably tile most difficult problem, which may well be the limiting
factor in detemlining the extent lo which nuclear energy will be used
for industrial power, is that of disposal of the tremendous quantity of
radioactive nuclear waste."
(This statement I made 35 years ago!)
"'Of particular importance to the future of nuclear energy in the field
of nuclear power is the potential program of greater participation of
private industry. This has been made possible as a result of a revision
of atomic energy law in the fornl of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954.
Under the old law the government had a complete monopoly over
atomic energy. Under the new law, these restrictions have been largely
removed and industry now has the right to use fissionable materials,
the right to own and operate nuclear reactors, and a certain amount of
right to patent inventions and discoveries in the field of nuclear
energy.'"
(This was a great step forward 35 years ago!) Continuing from my speech:
"There is now a widespread interest in this field by many industries,
and it is certain that they will take advantage of the new possibilities.
However, in spite of these changes, I feel that progress in the field of
nuclear energy for industrial power is being unnecessarily hampered
by too much secrecy.'"
This first Geneva Conference did much toward relaxing secrecy and
launching commercial nuclear power.
Next, in order to illustrate the rapid progress that followed, I quote from a
speech I made about three years later, "'Nuclear Power: Its Scientific Basis,
Its Current Status, and Some Conclusions". This speech was at the Asilomar
Conference on the International Atom, sponsored by the World Affairs
Council of Northern California, on April 18, 1958:
"'What son of commitment to atomic energy in temas of ongoing large
scale projects do we see as we look around the world today'? In brief,
we see a great deal of construction in England and the United States,
quite a few plans and a moderate amount of construclion in continental
Europe, and an unknown but apparently only moderate amount of
construction in Russia, some elaborate plans in Japan, a modest effort
in India and very little development other than minor research plans
anywhere else in the world ....
"The nuclear Big 5 of the world are the United Stales, Great Britain,
the Soviet Union, Canada and France. Within Europe, these five are
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followed by Sweden, Belgium and Norway. Power reactors are also
expected soon in Italy, Switzerland and West Gernlany. Through the
rest of the world, the most likely place for large construction of nuclear
power plants is Japan ....
"The United States has oecn active in encouraging nuclear develop-
ment in other lands. One form this aid has taken has been bilateral
agreements to share infornlation and design data, and to supply nuclear
fuel, instruments, and reactors. We also were instrumental in getting
the United Nations to establish the International Atomic Energy
Agency. The first 18 signatory powers had agreed to the United
Nations statute by July 1957, and the Agency was then officially in
business. Some 53 nations had joined by October 1957. The headquar-
ters of this agency had been established in Vienna and Representative
Sterling Cole, fornmrly on the Joint Atomic Energy Committee of the
Congress, is the first Director General.
"This agency has nothing to do with the control of atomic weapons, as
a quick glance at its name might lead some people to assume. The
United States has allocated 50,000 kilograms of U-235 for peaceful
atomic development abroad of which 5000 kilograms is earmarked for
this agency's use. The United Kingdom and Russia have added 50
kilograms and 70 kilograms respectively. The action of the United
States in this matter can only be interpreted as one of great generosity.
"'A six-member supranational authority called Euratom has been set up
in Western Europe by Italy, France, the Gemmn Federal Republic,
Belgium, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands. Under this agency,
nuclear developments in these six nations will be free of many
economic and manpower restrictions. In many ways, Euratom re-
sembles the European Iron and Steel Community and the European
Economic Community and, in fact, includes the same six nations.
Euratom has made some very ambitious tentative plans calling for the
construction of up to 15,000 megawatts of nuclear power in the six-
nation complex by 1967."
Following a stint as Chancellor at Berkeley, 1958-1961, I was called on
Jan.9, 1961, by President John F. Kennedy to come to Washington D.C. to
serve as Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission, a post 1held until
1971.
I might say that when President-elect John Kennedy made this call, which
was a surprise to me, to come to Washington to serve as Chairman of the
AEC, I more or less said, "Gee whiz, how much time do I have to make up
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my inind?" And he said, "'Take your time - let me know by tomorrow
morning!"
That night I went home, and al the dinner table with my wife Helen and six
kids, told them about this offer to come to Washington. Of course, they
would have to accompany me; it was a full time job and more, and tile kids
demanded a vote. They voted 7 to 1 against our going to Washington. I
exercised the privilege of the head of a democratic household: 1exercised
a veto vote and we went.
Here's a picture soon alter I arrived on January 31, 1961 (page 000). I saw
President Kennedy, and he immediately said he would like to visit AEC's
Gernlantown headquarters. On February i6, within about two weeks, he and
I, and McGeorge Bundy and others flew out to Gennantown in a helicopter.
I gave President Kennedy a brief tutorial on nuclear physics and atomic
structure, following which we went into the Conference Room for a briefing
on the whole program.
In March 1962, Pres. Kennedy asked the AEC to take a "new and hard look
at the role of nuclear power in our economy". (Actually, and I don't know
whether I should confess this or not, my administrative assistant Howard
Brown and I had planted the notion of such a study in the White House,
hoping that this might increase the President's interest in civilian nuclear
power and thus give it a higher priority. I might say, in this we were
successful.)
The President asked that the study "identify the objectives, scope and
content of a nuclear power development program in light of the nation's
prospective energy needs and resources and of advances in alternative
means of power generation."
The year 1962 was an appropriate one for a new and hard look. By this time
2,';experimental or prototype nuclear power reactors had been funded by the
government, while 12others had been funded by cooperative programs with
industry. From this work had come substantial advances in nuclear technol-
ogy and considerable operating experience, sufficient lo make the goal of
economically competitive nuclear power seem attainable, at least in areas of
tile country with high conventional fuel costs.
Not surprisingly, such progress had stimulated increased industry interest in
nuclear power and in the private ownership of nuclear fuel. On the other
hand, general economic conditions did not seem lo warrant the construction
of additional experimental facilities without more definitive program guid-
ance. Guidance was needed particularly to help de/ermine what reactor
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concepts should be emphasized in the coming period. The plants thus far
built had been of several different types, each having its virtues and its
champions.
Light-water cooled reactors had demonstrated their reliability, having been
used extensively in nuclear submarines and in the Shippingport Atomic
Power Station near Pittsburgh. They were not extremely complex, either in
construction or operation, and could be built and operated with the available
technology.
Gas-cooled systems were known to permit relatively high thermal effi-
ciency. Potentially, the coolant gas could drive a turbine directly, and this
concept, known as the HTGR (High Temperature Gas Cooled Reactor),
showed promise of being able to use thorium fuel, which was in abundant
supply.
Through operation of experimental reactors, it was known that liquid-metal
cooled reactors could achieve high temperatures and high thermal etTi-
ciency. Their further development could therefore be considered essential
to achieve the full development of nuclear power.
Heavy-water cooled and moderated reactors had been examined, but had
limited support because of availability of enriched uranium fuel in the US.
Heavy-water reactors could use natural uranium fuel but required larger
facilities, because they could not produce as much energy per cubic foot of
reactor as those using enriched uranium.
In November 1962, the AEC issued the requested report to the President. [!
was of major significance to the civilian reactor development rJrogram, lt set
forth program objectives and proposed planning lhr a national energy
production effort for the President, the Congress, the utilities, the nuclear
industry and the general public --ali those whose support would be needed
to carry, out the program.
A major contribution of the report was to establish the national and
international need for nuclear electric power and to set forth why there
should be a civilian nuclear power program in the United States to help meet
this need.
lt did so by first analyzing the availability of alternative fuels for energy
production. II then indicated that nuclear energy was technically feasible
and economically reasonable for electric power and process heat applica-
tions, and thai it should extend indefinitely the fuel reserves of the LJnited
States through the use of breeder reactors which could utilize awfilable
uranium and thorium resources.
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Other advantages of nuclear power cited in thai 1962 report to the President
were that it would: 1) eliminate geographic variations in power cosls, 2)
piace the United States in a position of international leadership, 3) improve
the defense posture of the United States, and 4) reduce air pollution.
After the death of President Kennedy, President Lyndon B. Johrlson contin-
ued as a strong supporter of nuclear electric power. Figure 2 is President
Johnson giving me the word. This was a claaracterislic of Lyndon Johnson.
I recall a meeting of the Cabinet held on Oct. 20, 1964. You might have an
interest in the topics we discussed al the meeting. (I might say that it's not
a matter of nay having such a fantastic memory that I remember ali of this
in such detail, but I kept a rather detailed diary for the whole period that I was
in Washington.) On this date, we were discussing the extremely interesting
infomaation we just received thai the Peoples Republic of China had just
exploded their first nuclear bomb. I should also add thai the CIA had
reported inlmediately that the explosive ingredient was plutonium, and I had
the task of gently correcting the CIA and informing the members of the
Cabinet that the explosive ingredient was, of course, U-235.
At this same meeting we discussed the fact that the Soviet Union had
changed leadership just a few days before. Brezhnev and Kosygin had just
replaced Kruschev. And at this same meeting, we discussed the election in
England that had been held just a few days earlier, where Harold Wilson, by
just a couple of votes, had become Prime Minister of England.
One of the important trends in atomic energy development in the 1960"s was
the emergence of economic nuclear power. On March 26, 1964, the Jersey
Central Light and Power Company applied to the AEC for a permit to
construct a 515 megawatt nuclear power station at Oyster Creek near Thoms
River in New Jersey. The company had chosen a boiling water reactor, a type
for which there was a considerable accumulation of operating experience.
While the capacity was large, other plants being planned were not much
smaller. The plant was to be wholly investor financed.
The most significant aspect of the Company's application was its statement
thai nuclear power has been chosen over alternative, that is, fossil fuel
generating systems, on the basis of economics alone. The plant vendor, the
General Electric Company, took the bold step of submitting a firm bid for
the turnkey construction of this plant.
Westinghouse and other nuclear reactor vendors also became very active. In
the three-year period 1966 to 1968, US utilities ordered, without direct
government assistance, 67 reactors -- the units ranging in size from 450
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megawatts to more than 1100 megawatts. By the end of !970, three of these
reactors were operable and more than 50 were being built. Ali but one of
these orders were for light water reactors, the exception being an HTGR.
Development of the various reactor concepts had proceeded more or less as
planned and proposed in our 1962 report to the President.
Emphasis had begun to be placed on the development of high-gain breeder
reactors, as recommended in the 1962 report also, especially the liquid-
metal cooled fast breeder reactor. On June 4, 1967, at a climactic meeting
of President Nixon's Cabinet, including some key members of Congress, I
made a presentation proposing a vigorous program for the development of
the LMFBR (Figure 3).
Following that meeting, President Nixon supported the idea, stating,
"Our best hope for meeting the nation's growing demand for economi-
cal clean energy lies with the fast breeder reactor. Because of its highly
efficient use of nuclear fuel, the breeder reactor could extend the life
of our national uranium fuel supply from decades to centuries with far
less impact on the environment than power plants which are operating
today."
He also said that it was important to the nation that a commercial demonstra-
tion of a breeder reactor be completed by 1980, but the breeder reactor
development was discontinued, as you know, during subsequent presiden-
tial administrations. (We may have helped a little bit in the preparation of
thai statement.)
As an aside I might add that I participated before and during my days at AEC
in the development of the nuclear fusion program. And even recently, in
Spring 1989, I was called to Washington to bcief President George Bush and
Chief of Staff John Sununu, on cold fusion (Figure 4). Fortunately, I
assumed a very skeptical attitude. I must say that this was a matter of days
after the announcement from Utah of cold fusion when it was at a high and
everybody - weil, an awful lot of people - thought that this was an answer
to our energy problem. I look back with a little bit of satisfaction that I was
able, even at thai time, to assume a very skeptical attitude.
At the end of 1971, 130 central station nuclear power plants representing an
aggregate capacity of more than 108,600 net megawatts of electricity were
built, under construction or planned in the United States, as follows: there
were 25 operable units including two licensed for fuel loading and sub-
critical testing, representing a total capacity of 11,400 megawatts: 52 units
representing a total of 44,500 megawatts were under construction or being
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reviewed for operating licenses; 39 units were under AEC review for
construction permits representing 38,400 megawatts of initial capacity, and
there were 14 units for which utilities had contracted but yet filed construc-
tion permit applications, representing 14_000megawatts. However, many of
the planned units were cancelled due to rising cost of construction and the
success of the anti-nuclear movement.
On July 23, 1971, the U. S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
made an historic ruling directing the AEC to revise ill several respects, its
rules on consideration of non-radiological environmental matters in licens-
ing facilities. That is, it directed the AEC to broaden its responsibilities.
The court held in the consolidated cases of Calvert Cliffs Coordinating
Committee, et al, versus the US AEC, et al, that AEC regulations for
implementing the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 NEPA) in
licensing procedures did not comply in several respects with NEPA. The
petitioners had also questioned several aspects of the AEC's application of
NEPA procedures to the Calvert Cliffs nuclear power plant of the Baltimore
Gas and Electric Company, a facility near Lusbie, Maryland, on the
Chesapeake Bay, for which a construction permit had been issued six month
before enactment of NEPA, and the court agreed.
The AEC took several implementing steps immediately following the
court's decision. The net effect was a severe setback to civilian nuclear
power in the United States. The United States who had led the world in early
nuclear power development was also the first country to be affected by its
decline.
Over the past decade the US nuclear power industry has seen no new
domestic orders due to a combination of low load growth, environmental
pressure, regulatory uncertainty and increased costs. Many of these same
pressures are now affecting nuclear power worldwide. However, in the US,
which has led the world in the birth and then the decline of the nuclear power
industry, there are signs that its rebirth may be imminent.
Worldwide, the growth has actually been impressive. A nuclear electric
power generating capability has been deployed throughout the world at an
unprecedented rate on the order of five times faster than any other previous
new source of energy. More than 430 nuclear power plants are operating
around the world today, generating more than 310,000 megawatts of
electricity in 25 countries.
Most of these countries depend vitally on the electricity generated by
nuclear power. In 1988, France generated 70_ oi'its electricity from nuclear
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power plants: Belgium 66%, South Korea 47%, Taiwan 41%, Sweden 47%,
Finland 36%, and Japan 23%. What may not be familiar is that in the Soviet
Bloc, Bulgaria generates 36% of its electricity ft'ore nuclear power, Hungary
49% and Czechoslovakia 27%.
Furthermore, although the US is not a leader in percentage, it has the largest
total electric output from nuclear power, 95,000 megawatts electric from
108 plants, generating 20% of the US electric power. And what 1 hadn't
realized, since 40% of that 20% is generated from plutonium, there is
actually more electricity generated from plutonium in the United States as
a source of energy than frorn the burning of oil!
Nuclear power remains the ultimate component of an electrified, non-
smoking energy system. As a non-smoking system ii is exempt from the
political and potential economic troubles of acid-rain from coal combustion
or the longer-range concern over the Greenhouse Effect which mark ali
combustion systems. In my opinion, the need for nuclear power will
intensify before the other promising non-smoking energy sources, fusion
and solar, become both economically attractive and widely developed.
DISCUSSION
Fulkerson: You mentioned that nuclear power was going to have a rebirth.
What is the basis tbr your optimism?
Seaborg: That's of course going to be one of the topics of discussion here.
lt has to do with a number of factors: the finite supply of some of the
alternate sources of energy, such as oil; the problems of acid rain; the
environmental effects of burning fossil fuels which has been referred to
as the Greenhouse Effect, and the need, as we progress and begin to take
a more rational attitude, to use some of these fossil fuels for sources of
chemicals, for which they are indispensable, and for which we will be
paying quite a price if we continue to just burn them, and as we run out
of supplies as time goes on.
Starr: Glenn is one of the pioneers in the use of accelerators for making
artificial elements. Would you want to take a guess, looking forward, as
to the possibility of using accelerators again to break up the fission
products into their stable components?
Seaborg: Weil, I've given that a lot of thought. You're thinking really
perhaps of more than accelerator,;, but neutrons, and l've read the studies
that Professor Tom Pigford has made of ali of this, and so forth, and l'm
afraid my net conclusion is that I don't regard this very hopefully.
192
AEC Chairman Glenn Seaborg briefs
President John F. Kennedy in 1961
President Lyndon B. Johnson talks
with Chairman Seaborg (1964)
Chaimaan Seaborg discussing the breeder President George Bush asks Prof. Glenn
reactor with President Richard Nixon (1970) Seaborg about cold fusion in 1989
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SECTION 12
LEADERSHIP AND THE ROLE OF
THE UNITED STATES
After two full days of presentations and discussion, the participants
discussed the points that they wished to include in the Action State-
ment. Dr. Davis chaired the discussion and encouraged participants to
offer their thoughts and proposals. At the conclusion of this discussion,
the Seminar split into small groups to draft specific items for consid-
eration by the whole group.
Davis: What I would like to do is see if we can come up with specific
recommendations that say what should be done, not what the goal is, but
what should be done to reach those goals. Who should do what'? lt won't
be helpful to say "The world should do such and such." lt ought to be
addressed to the people that inj'act can take action. There is no sense in
telling people to do things they can't do!
In terms of time frame, we should be recommending those things that
should be done now. They may have an impact ten years from now or
even thirty years from now. But regardless of the time frame of the
impact, we want those actions that are needed now.
Our objective is to locus on electricity, though we need to keep in mind
the implications on overall energy and environment. But we need to keep
our focus.
We need to make a series of recommendations, but first concerning what
should be done in the U.S. The report will get more attention if we get
specific about the U.S., which of course would have wide international
implications. We also need to make recommendations where appropri-
ate with respect to international and global actions. But those would
inevitably be less specific. I'll start with my short list:
I think there is a desperate need for leadership. This country, and many
others as weil, don't have any real dynamic leadership in the electric
power area. We don't have it in our own government, we don't have it
in the electric utility industry. I don't think our recommendations could
have any impact, or be carried out, unless there is dynamic leadership.
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One of the key questions is what is the balance we ought to give between
the short-term problems related to energy production and the long term,
that is, the greenhouse effect, and the short term more pressing problems
of acid rain and specific pollutant emissions. In some respect, these may
be incompatible. But we need to look for the right balance between them.
We've had a lot of discussion about energy efficiency. Certainly there is
agreement that energy efficiency and conservation is ata important
subject. But what there isn't much agreement on is how you go about
achieving it. If you are going to make recommendations, you can't just
recommend that conservation is a great thing, you have to say something
useful about how to bring it about. You can't just wave your hands. Are
you going to drive it by economic forces'? By taxation? By regulation?
All of the above? How are you going to do it?
I would put more attention on the economic consequences of the various
things that might be done. We tend to ignore the overall economic impact
of energy and environmental actions. One of the problems, of course, is
that the economists can't seem to agree on what the economic impact is
of any particular thing. But we'd better make sure we look at them.
On nuclear power, one aspect is rather unique to this country. For the
investor-owned utilities, they have the basic question of how they are
going to get their invested money back. The recent history in this country
with their state utility commissions has been that they have not been able
to recover their investments. In order to allow new investments in
electric generating plants, at least by the investor-owned utilities, that
has to be fixed somehow.
However, the problem is not restricted to nuclear power: some states
have denied rates for other types of major new facilities as weil. For
nuclear plants, the licensing issue looms extremely large, ts the new
NRC regulation adequate or does more have to be done? And you cannot
dodge the issue of nuclear safety, U.S. and worldwide. Finally, the ever-
present issue of nuclear was +emust be resolved.
Now, I teel we must deal with the issue of cost-benefit. Some people
don't like to include the word "cost". But the fact is that we are plagued
in many ways by arbitrary regulations which are not necessarily advan-
tageous from the overall point of view. We have institutions which are
basically prohibited from using cost-benefit analysis, like the EPA, and
we simply don't have the money as a society to do everything, and at the
very least we are going to have to set priorities, lt has been suggested by
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some of the speakers, and I concur, that we need to strengthen the cost-
benefit approach in making policy decisions.
What should be done in terms of reactor development'? Global climate
change?
We've had lots of discussions on how to finance power plants in the
developing countries. One of the problems there is who should one
address suggestions to? But it is an area we must not ignore.
That's my short list of subjects tbr starters. Bart, do you want to add
anything'?
Shackelford: I tried to put answers to some of these questions into words.
This is what I wrote on state utility rate regulation in the U.S.:
The investor-owned segment of the electric utility industry should
commence a joint effort with FERC and NARUC, aimed at revising
utility rate-making and accounting practices to the end that utilities may
have reasonable assurance that planning, engineering, construction and
operating costs will be recovered with a reasonable rate of return.
Specific factors which should be addressed include the treatment of
CWIP, how to handle deviations of costs from estimates, equitable
treatment of temporary excesses of generating capacity, amelioration of
rate shock, and recovery of costs of aborted projects.
I have an idea about what it would take to mobilize thinking in the U.S.
Whether it would be helpful in other countries, I'm not sure.
The President should declare that a reliable electric power supply is a
national priority. He should call for NERC to prepare a national power
survey for the next 25 years, lt should include demand-side energy
efficiency and energy-use reduction techniques to the extent they are
economically justified, and measures for reduction of greenhouse gases.
I recall that just after World War II, everyone was worried that there
would not be enough power capacity. The utilities were worried that this
might increase the Federal Government involvement in the process.
So at that time, the first national power survey was called for. lt was
managed by FPC. NERC grew out of it. It had the effect of mobilizing
a lot of utility brain power. NERC continues, though its forecasts are not
long term. lt is going to be a problem for NERC to go long-term, but it
might be helpful in focussing on the real problems.
On nuclear power: NERC would be able to indicate the need for base load
power.
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On risk assessment: I feel that measures to reduce environmental risk
should be prioritized on the basis of reasonable evaluation of costs and
benefits to society.
Starr: What is the one big message that has come out of ali this discussion'?
The world is facing a chasm as far as electric power supply is concerned.
And in varying degrees and different parts of the world, that chasm has
various depths and various time scales about when you're going to hit the
edge of it. And that chasm is so important it is going to override in
importance around the world, including the U.S., the whole issue of
environmental concerns.
Now I'm taking a position that some of you may want to argue about.
What I'm saying is that its economic productivity and its wealth-
production, which provides the health and welfare of the world, is a hell
of a lot more important to the people of the world than some marginal,
long-term and hardly measurable changes over time. That doesn't mean
that environmental impacts are not important. But on a relative scale,
sustaining the economies of the developed and under-developed parts of
the world is the major objective of the peoples of the world ina real sense.
And the amount of sacrifice they are willing to make on this for
environmental improvement may vary with the various cultural groups
and economic levels, but it is not the highest priority. Their economic
health and welthre is their highest priority. And electricity supply is the
key. It seems to me thai unless you car_get that across, you are not going
to _,,etsupport for the other things.
In ali the discussions you've heard, from Mr. Lu about China for
example, and about other countries in the developing world, this is a
fundamental truth that seems to be coming out of the actual, empirical
operations of society. Now if you accept that point, the other conclusions
follow. Bart's suggestion that this be made the message of a presidential
statement has the substance that the President might consider. The things
that need to be said about conservation and efficiency follow logically.
The audience'? The real audience is the media. Nominally you write it for
the Department of Energy. But you are writing for the reporter who
interviews one of us, and says, "Weil, your group met. Tell me. What
message does that group have?"
The supporting material must be there to take care of the endless
arguments you will have with ali the critics. To me, the media is the
transmission line to the public.
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Borg: We can't afford to be parochial. If we are going to have a global view,
we can't just talk about the U.S. or various states. There's no way these
recommendations we just heard would have any appeal to someone in
India. Starting from what Chauncey said, some effort must be made on
the part of the governments of ali countries to disrupt the complacency
we have with respect to electrical power, and to educate the general
public to the effect that it is not only critical but is on the verge of being
in short supply, and that the lead times needed are not there anymore, and
that we are approaching an acute situation.
Kaprielian: But the press today, in the U.S., has before it ali kinds of
information which says that there is a terrible oversupply of electric
energy in the U.S. And CEO's say that we are not going to be building
anything for the next 10to 15 years. Now, is a reporter going to believe
what we say here'? Or are they going to run across the Bay and say, "What
is this'? That's not what they are saying over in Berkeley! They say we
are running short!"
Shapar: I agree with Chauncey Starr's analysis, but I think it would be wrong
to say that energy deserves a higher priority than the environment. That
would discredit our report if we say ii. I think we have to say that there
is a real energy crunch and we have to do something about it, taking into
account environmental considerations, and not that environment de-
serves less priority than energy. In today's world, you cannot say that.
This is my opinion.
Fowler: I heard Chauncey's statement differently. It has been interpreted as
"'Energy should override eta, ironment.'" I think what he is saying is that,
unmanaged, it will override environmental protection actions.
So that the issue is if we don't do things in advance, the priority will not
go to environment and overall good. The priority will go to meeting
immediate needs. The whole point of management is to recognize those
things that are going to overwhelm you, and be prepared in advance.
Starr: Ken, I accept the improvement in my comment.
Shapar: Now I agree!
Hubbard: In fact, that's a better environmental strategy anyway! My
concern is that the environmentalists don't realize it. But one has to be
careful how you pbrase that. You see how easy it was to misinterpret
Chauncey's statement in the first place!
Eibenschutz: I think it is very important to gel across the message that
Chauncey is saying. One has to be careful not to offend people, and not
198
put in words that would discredit the whole report. But the point is i
extremely important.
What I would like to add is that the lack of power has economic effects
which are normally orders of magnitude more important than the excess
in power availability. This phenomenon is particularly important in
developing countries. Developed countries have suffered from this
misunderstanding. I think it would be useful to say something at the
outset about the difference between the cost of excess power and the cost
of lack of power.
Starr: We have many studies which show that the insurance cost of electric
supply is a very small fraction of the penalty you have to pay if you run
into major deficiencies. That is the answer to why some of our utilities
have a surplus at times.
Fowler: Is there dissent? Who disagrees with the statement.
Shackelford: I don't disagree with the general statement. I do think that
somehow you have to make a distinction between countries that have an
adequate electrical energy supply now and those that are striving to attain
one. What I heard earlier in the Conference was that in countries that are
striving to attain an adequate energy supply, environmental consider-
ations are important, but they are not as important as in countries that
already have it. I don't know how that is going to be said, but I think it
is what I've heard.
Rossin: May I read a draft statement for your comments:
"Leaders do not have to imagine the consequences of not having enough
electric energy supply capacity. Many nations in Latin America, Asia
and Africa are unable to improve their economies, their life-styles or
their environment as they wish, because of a shortage of electricity."
Is that the essence of what you are saying, Ban?
Starr: I think Bart said it better, frankly.
Gottlieb: The point here is that the overwhelming need for energy in the
developing countries is so great, and its importance is so great, ii tends
to make the environmental concerns occupy a secondary role. However,
the environmental consequences of the production of electrical energy
are going to be dominated by the developing countries. Therefore,
whatever we do to help the environmental situation with respect to our
own energy supply will be useful but not dominant, lt will be a relatively
minor element in the world. Unfortunately! And we have to recognize
that in the rest of the world, the basic needs are overwhelming.
199
Rossin: One of the things we heard is that those needs will not be satisfied
automatically. There is nothing that says that we will actually build the
necessary infrastructure for electrical and other energy needs. If we
don't, the situation continues to deteriorate, with its environmental and
health consequences at the same time.
Fulkerson: Therefore, and I think this was Gabriel Sanchez-Sierra's point
too, if they want environmental concerns to be given appropriate play in
development, the industrialized countries are going to have to pay part
of that bill.
Rossin: Your group said that technology transfer can help if more efficient
ways to use energy that are achieved in industrialized countries could be
transferred so that as power systems are established they don't repeat the
mistakes that we made concerning waste e,f energy in our equipment and
ways of doing things. This represents another need for capital. Perhaps
it can be shown that this is a better investment than some alternatives.
Fulkerson: The issue is integrated planning, like Ontario Hydro. This
involves demand- and supply-side planning for future development,
which applies just as well for utilities in North America as it does for
utilities anywhere in the world. The point is to minimize the overall cost
of supplying the services that are neces-;ary.
Gottlieb: I got a different message from the developing nations. As much as
they would like to be efficient, the very limitations on their capital will
make them invest in inefficient systems just to get to some minimum
level. So let's not be so rosy about this! We have to take reality into
account!
Fulkerson: But one of the main reasons for that, Mel, is there is not an easy
mechanism to apply capital to efficiency improvement, lt is easier to
apply capital to the supply option, even if that is a more expensive option.
The trick is to get the capital to be available to both. Utilities or
governments can provide that.
Gottlieb: lt is meaningless to talk about improving the efficiency of an
electric supply system that doesn't exist!
Eibenschutz: You are discussing two different points at the same time. One
of them is that when you have nothing, it is much more important to have
something. This is one point we have been trying to make. But the other
point is that there are electric utilities, even in developing countries.
There are, however, no agencies to improve efficiency in the utilization
of electricity. That is what is lacking.
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Fulkerson: Tile utilities could do it, just as they are it doing in North
America.
Eibenschutz: But in order for that to happen, you must have a difl'erent setup.
This is what does not exist in developing countries. The reason why you
can apply this is that there has been some regulations, and because you
have easy access to sources of capital.
Fulkerson: That's the trick. Do that in developing countries. I think ii can be
done!
Borg: Oh, no. Haven't you been listening'?
Rossin: Stauffer and Sanchez-Sierra were arguing abgut how much harder
it is than we realize. It's not a matter of if it can be done, it is a matter of
Dow it can be done.
Fulkerson: Weil, we're trying an experiment in the Dominican Republic,
with the World Bank, along those lines: how to get funding for small-
scale end-use efficiency improvement. The idea is to work the capital
down through and into actual community social organizations who make
loans to individuals. I think there are lots of ways of doing it.
Rossin: Let me summarize what we heard earlier: You can develop ways to
use electricity more efficiently, and conservation measures which will
save electricity in certain applications or sectors. The difference is that
electricity, by its very nature, is so much more flexible that it is available
for so many end uses. And there are some of those uses that are
desperately in need. So when you say maybe we can save more by
investing in conservation, that may solve a problem here, but the flexible
need is not being solved unless you've got the capacity there to provide
,;ervice to a broader sector.
Fulkerson: Certainly. It's the same point. If you don't have a system, you
don't have anything to conserve.
Rossin: That point is one we have to make clear.
Sudarsono: Conservation and demand-management programs in tile third
world are being implemented. They are important and significant pro-
grams. But in many countries the main question is really tradeoffs in
investments between the power sector and agriculture and health, and so
on. It's a relatively minor part of the investment program. So most of the
questions are, how should we invest the money that's available'? ts ii for
the power sector or for health or for agriculture or for education? The
main problem is to increase the electric supply. F'or now, we have only
20c/_ of the population connected to the grid.
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Starr: You have to distinguish between the theoretical objective and the ideal
accomplishment over a couple of generations. Over the next few genera-
tions the developing countries are going to set priorities in which the
environmental issues will not be at the top of the agenda. We have to
recognize that and accept it. Long term, we should do what we can to help
them move this priority up. But they have to make their own decisions.
These decisions will involve comprornises which we have to recognize
will exist and will affect the global environment. Coming back to the
Greenhouse Effect, we stimulated a lot of the discussion. We are not
going to be able to run the rest of the world when it comes to Greenhouse
issues.
[Over the past year, the European nations, Japan and some others
have pushed the U.S. in international conferences to set ambitious
goals for lowering emissions of Greenhouse gases over the next ten
and twenty years, lt is the U.S. that refuses to go along with them
and adopt these goals as national policy. For that, the U.S. is being
heavily criticized, and within the U.S., environmental groups are
extremely critical of the Administration.]
McConnell: Bart suggested that we might recommend to the President an
action by the NERC. I think that has some merit. After being chairman
of the Engineering Comm. of NERC, I know its strengths and limita-
tions. I don't know that NERC action alone would be adequate. When it
comes to the regulatory disincentives in the U.S., I do not think rea!
progress can be made without a change in the attitude of the regulatory
commissions.
I do agree with Chauncey that even if you have your focussed audience
(the President) you can still simultaneously communicate to the public
at large, whether it's through the media or not. But to communicate to the
media, per se, I think is a bottomless pit.
Rossin: You said the media is a conduit.
McConnell: I see three packages of infornaation: communication that is
factual and general, some recommendations that are specific to the U.S.,
and so_,_erecommendations that are specific and international.
Borg: That's the hard one. How can you give specific global rect;mmenda-
tions?
Rossin: One example that came out of the international group was to have
a specialized agency of the United Nations that focuses on energy
investment.
202
Eibenschutz: Yes. lt has to do with the eiwironmental responsibility. We feel
that developing countries share the responsibility of taking care of their
own share of the global environment. But also, thai the developed
countries take some responsibility for history, ['or they are the ones who
started the damage to the environment. In order to have a working
mechanism we propose an international body thai would put together ali
the energy and environmental agencies in a specialized agency. Now,
you ask about UNEP'? UNEP does not deal with energy. They are anti-
energy! They are the people who claim to defend the environment, and
try to push everything that way. If you don't have some sort of coordi- I
nating body, it is very difficult to have mechanisms that could make a
viable solution for developing countries not hanning the environment
for the reasons we discussed here.
Davis: Do you think the UN is capable of setting up such an organization'?
Eibenschutz: No. But we think that there should be an agency anyway. We
do need consultation and coordination.
Starr: How do you tie the President into a global issue? Given a global issue,
what role is there for the U.S. in managing that global issue? I'd rather
phrase ii that way, as far as a Presidential commission is concerned, l'm
a little concerned about whether we want to get down into the specifics
of what the U.S. must do to to clean up its own internal energy business.
In the first piace, it's sounds very self-seeking ibr people in the energy
business. As to acceptance, if the report just sounds like another vehicle
to tackle once again the U.S. problems, the global side of it will get
pushed aside. What is it the U.S. can contribute'?
Fowler: 1noticed that we really do seem to be gravitating into fatalists and
opportunists. We are saying that we don't know how bad the global
problem really is, but the fatalists in this meeting are saying we don't
know how effective any kind of a fix could possibly be. My proposal is
to take the "'do what you can" attitude, and to balance your ignorance of
the problem with your ignorance of the solution.
Start: Why can't we be schizophrenic about it? From the point of view of
what we know about tomorrow and what we can do about tomorrow,
we're ali fatalists. From the view of taking care of the future, we're ali
opportunists. So we're both!
Shapar: One of the main trends thai has been advocated is thai we try to help
the third world avoid the same mistakes we made. The way lo do thai is
obvious: to have the wealthy industrialized nations provide technology
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and funds to help the third world avoid the same problems we have been
making.
Li: I think that in this meeting we should pay more attention to the U.S. than
others. Secondly, I don't like the ternl developing countries. There are
very few developing countries represented here, and we cannot speak for
the developing countries.
I worked for an international organization for twenty years. And I can tell
you frankly, I am very biased. I am against international bodies They are
bureaucratic and inefficient. So I suggest that when we talk to the press,
the main direction should be about the U.S. If you talk about a developing
country like India, what effect can anyone make'? One friend of mine said
that Japan was very wise. The Japanese give aid to many countries, but
they do not give aid to India. Why? Because this would be a drop into the
ocean, lt would not be appreciated.
Another thing that occurs to me in talking about environment and
adequate power supply: In my own case, if we don't show our concern
about the environment, we will have no power stations. This is very
definite. You know, we cannot build any new power stations! lt is
because of the opposition from the environmentalists. This is not only for
energy plants; we cannot build any factory because of the opposition. So
the environmental concern is, for me, not of second priority to agriculture
or health, lt is not!
Rossin: We've been struggling with this. I respect your statement, Dr. Li.
But if we don't say in our statement that we either recognize the type of
problems faced by some developing countries (and we have to be very
careful thai we don't imply that we could cover everything with one
brush) in capital fornlation and the need for large amounts of energy that
might have to be produced in environmentally less appealing ways, then
I think we have failed to do our job. We still have to say that we are aware
of the complexity of the situation.
Li: Yes, but make it clear that we are concerned about the environment.
However, we do not know enough about the differences between
countries.
Davis: Don't presume to make overall recommendations about developing
countries, right'?
Borg: Some of these insights we have gained from our various participants
are not weil understood by the public. Certainly, they have helped temper
some of the ideas we raised concerning the U.S.
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Li: My propo:_ed paragraph is:
"As conditions in countries in different parts of the world are not the same,
it is recommended that there should be several meetings on a regional
basis with groups of countries facing similar problems. These serninars
would examine subjects in depth. Experts from industrialized countries
should be invited to participate."
Starr: You know, if we were deaing with the world's food supply, we
wouldn't be having these sorts of arguments. Everybody would recog-
nize the objectives, and how you get each part of the world working
together to increase food supply. We'd be sending new seedlings back
and forth, and doing experiments on hybrids, and everybody would be
saying "Amen!" From my point of view, the energy supply is in the same
category and has about the same lead time. The fact is that the public does
not recognize this, which is our basic problem. I would suggest not too
many messages!
I like the idea of Presidential attention, simply because it mobilizes
everybody else to do something. Suppose the President connects the
Greenhouse Effect, which he has recently stuck his neck out on, with
energy and the economic development of the world, and says that this is
a very serious mix of issues, we'd better have a good hard look at it, and
although the U.S. is one of many actors, we have a responsibility. I'm
going to ask our government agencies to see what they can do to work
with other nations to resolve this problem. If the President would say
that, it is about ali you could ask for as an end objective.
Rossin: When the President says something, it is not so much the that the
President believes it, but the fact that ii has worked its way up through
this fantastic structure of the bureaucracy and the Administration to the
point where you've got it on the President's screen. If you get him to say
it, it means there is support for it throughout the government, and
something might come of it. I don't want to get the cart before the horse
and suggest that we can just ask and get the President of the U.S. to say
something. That just doesn't happen.
Davis: But I would remind you of the history cited by Glenn Seaborg. Here
was a man who managed to persuade three successive Presidents of the
U.S. of the positive aspects of nuclear power. That had an enormous
effect, not only in the U.S., but around the world. Now, that is what you
are going to have to have! Unless you have leadership of that sort, you
are just talking nonsense!
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I also think we need leadership from industry. We're in a period in which
our utilities have been explaining why we c'm't do anything. They are
very plain about it. They can't do it. They haven't taken the attitude of
if we can fix some of these things, then we would be prepared to do what
is absolutely necessary. They really haven't had a need to do this because
there hasn't been a pressing need to b,ild things until very recently. I
think we should urge the electric utility industry into taking a positive
position, which could be: If we can solve these problems, and we're
working on them in a cooperative way with government, with the state
commissions, etc. then we are prepared to meet our responsibilities. That
is not what they've been saying, and it is not the perception that the public
has.
[This is just what a group of utility leaders did with their Nov. 1990
statement about what it will take to get nuclear power back into the
marketplace.]
Shackelford: 1 think it varies across the country, but generally I agree.
l-'_owever, that's why you have to extend your time frame out beyond ten
years. There are utilities around that don't have a supply problem until
the year 2000 or thereabouts, and they think they have solutions that will




GLOBAL ACTIONS IN RESPONSE TO GLOBAL ISSUES
We recommen,J that heads of government in industrialized nations exercise
appropriate leadership:
* To turn public attention to the emerging problems of electricity shortfalls
in many countries and their dramatic implications for health, employment,
economic hopes, and the environment.
* To encourage a conservation ethic, balanced by a realistic assessment of
the need for new electric generating capacity.
* To remove regulatory roadblocks and institutional obstacles to new power
plants, without compromising safety requirements, environmental stan-
dards, or public participation, so that the energy industry can make sound
decisions in lime to meet growing demand.
* To respord to public concerns such as the safe handling of radioactive
waste.
We recommend that government leaders send messages to their national
parliaments and legislatures on electricity issues, as well as introduce action
statements at international meetings such as the annual Economic Summit
and the World Energy Council.
Further government actions should include:
* Steps towards more prudent electricity use in industry, in services, and by
households.
* Research and development on improved energy technologies covering
diverse options, including fossil, nuclear, renewable energy, fusion, and to
identify, develop and evaluate the potential of new initiatives for conserva-
tion.
* Support of programs that will encourage young people to choose careers
in science and engineering that will be vitally needed in demand manage-
ment and in energy generation and delivery.
We further recommend that the industrialized countries initiate work with
international organizations and the developing nations:
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* To assist in financing their electric supply systems, including methods to
minimize emissions to the environment;
* To explore innovative international investment structures for constructing
electric systems ill selected regions, even under current financial difficul-
ties:
* To take advantage of technological progress in energy efficiency, conser-
vation and reducing wasteful use of energy and resources:
* To achieve regional responses to global problems; and
* To avoid repeating the adverse consequences of tile industrial revolution
which now require costly pollution controls and cleanup efforts.
ACTIONS BY THE UNITED STATES
United States' leadership can help all nations achieve the goal of sufficient
electricity and greater well-being for their people. Participants pointed out
that what the United States does, or fails to do, will impact public opinion
and political decisions in many nations.
We believe that the United States electricity supply situation is deteriorating
to the extent that the President should deliver a special message Io the
Congress regarding the importance of adequate electricity to the economic
and environmental health of the country. He should recommend specific
programs to deal with the threat of electric power shortfalls well before they
become realities.
We recommend that the President's program include a strong emphasis on
conservation, but must also recognize the urgent need for new base load
electric generating capacity in the United States in this decade. Specifically,
we recommend that the President re-affirm that nuclear power and clean
coal generating stations will be vital contributors toward meeting the United
States future electricity needs.
Concurrently with the President, utility leaders should express confidence
that they are prepared to move forward with new construction once sound
recommendations are implemented.
We recommend measures to:
1) Encourage state regulatory commissions to provide for assurance of
investment recovery needed to allow utilities or generating companies to
undertake and finance needed major new generating facilities.
2) Improve regulatory procedures on the federal, state, and local levels to
remove obstacles to economical and timely construction of new electrical
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facilities. For example, retroactive application of emission standards after
plant _onstruction has been committed should be avoided, and nuclear
power plants should be licensed in a one-step procedure.
3) Provide the public with assurance that nuclear waste storage will be
accomplished safely and in a reasonable time period.
4) Develop. through the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission and
appropriate legislative changes by the Congress, measures to clarify com-
petition in G,,. _,,cvi_ion of bulk power to distributing utilities.
5) Ask the North American Electric Reliability Council for a long term (25
years) forward look at electricity demand and supplies including economic
demand reduction and economic use of alternative sources.
6) Support increased research and development on environmental control
technologies and understanding of global environmental effects, on de-
mand-side energy management and efficiency, and on the total long-term
impacts of promising energy conservation strategies: also work with the
States on cost/benefit evaluation techniques for demand-side management
investments.
7) Strengthen the program for development of renewable energy technolo-
gies, advanced nuclear power systems and fusion, and encourage demon-
strations of emerging alternative energy sources.
8; ",,pport improvements in the public education system, starting at grade





As a Summary, we offer the transcript of the Press Conference held at
the end of the Seminar. Perhaps a most important test is how well we
can explain our views to reporters, and through thern, to the public. So
we offer our own summations, the questions of the reporters, and our
answers.
Only San Francisco and East Bay press attended and filed stories. We
found that the national media were not particularly interested in future
energy or electricity needs during January of 1990. Events since have
shown that even awar does not sensitize the American public to energy
issues that are not already crises. That is why this book is being
published now.
Fowler: This is a conference thai is hosted by the University of California
and sponsored by the Department of Energy. We have had 32 represen-
tatives here from 12 countries over the course of the week. Dr. A. David
Rossin, who is my co-host for this meeting, was a former Assistant
Secretary of Energy for the Department of Energy and has helped to
organize this conference. He'll comment on the Findings and Conclu-
sions we have reached.
Rossin: What we've tried to do is bring together a group of people with
experience and responsibility in the electricity supply world, and others
who are in academia, government, or associations who have been
working with these problems throughout their careers. We debated
!ssues: we tried to identify important points that we thought were
essential to communicate, and we've condensed these, with great sweat,
into two pages.
The tell points in our findings and conclusions tell the story that we
foresee problems in ensuring an adequate supply of electricity in the
coming decade. Our concern, and the urgency we see for this, and why
we're talking about it now when the lights are still on, is that the lead time
for building power plants is long. The period of time for getting pemlits
to build power plants is unpredictable. If we don't have the capacity
ready that we're going to need later in this decade, we're going to find
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ourselves doing quick fixes and facing what I call "The Downside Risks
of Electricity Shorta zes".
We have written Environmental Impact Statemm_ts, and every day we
hear and see stories about the risks to the environment of every form of
energy production and use. Rarely does any report include any discus-
sion of the possibility that we might not have enough electricity. That's
the downside. We've been ali to busy looking at the risks on only one side
of the equation.
These a"e the Downside Risks"
1. You use the kinds of fuels that you would rather not use, if you had
done your planning and your construction on time.
2. Regions may reach a point where there isn't enough electricity to go
around. That means, in the extreme, that we find ourselves in a situation
where electricity has to be rationed, or we have to resort to enforced
conservation. We don't really know what that is like in the United States,
but a number of our guests from other countries have been living with this
kind of thing for a long time. Where some of them live and work,
electricity is only on for a number of hours during the day, certain uses
of electricity are prohibited except during certain periods of time, and in
some countries, the government allocates electricity supply among uses.
In some countries one has had to go to the government to get a permit if
you're going to become a user of a large anaount of electricity - like a
factory that's going to produce some goods. Ali of this means bureau-
cratic control, delays and potential abuses. This has not been the history
in the United States, where our unstated energy policy has been that
utilities must be ready to meet future demand.
3. If utility companies fail to meet their obligations to the region they
serve, the people may demand that government take them over, and then
a politically-sensitive body will have to tr3, to do the same things the
utilities were trying to do.
4. In a region where there is not enough generating capacity being
planned and built, employers will look ahead, see power shortages and
rising electricity rates, and instead of staying and expanding, may move
their operations elsewhere, and maybe overseas as well.
5, The final downside risk we discus,,ed is war over fuel supplies and
energy.
Our Findings and Conclusions and the Recommendations that we're
working on tend to focus on the United States more than they do on the
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world of nations. This reflects something thai was pointed out by many
of our participants: What the United States does, good or bad, has a
profound influence on what the other nations decide to do, maybe an
unpredictable influence, but certainly an influence. So if the United
States fails to act responsibly, it may make it more and more difficult for
others to set responsible policies in their own countries, when they've
already got a tough enough time trying to get ibe electricity that they
vitally need for the growth and well-being of their own people.
Fowler: We've had with us this week representatives from North America,
Central and South America, Asia and Europe, "rod the situations are
somewhat different from piace to piace. One of our most important
conclusions from getting together was to confirm what we as organizers
had thought from the bits of information we're getting, namely, that the
potential for electricity shortages is in fact beginning to show up
worldwide.
Lorne McConnell comes from Ontario Hydro where they've been trying to
grapple with this problem. We've all heard discussions like these: do we
conserve, do we build nuclear, do we develop something new, do we just
go with small solutions a piece at a time, and will we have enough
cogeneration and power from independent producers'? Weil, Ontario
Hydro has spent a great deal of effort coming to a plan on how to deal with
the future, that is now before their government for approval.
McConnell: I think its fair to say the situation that exists in every country in
the world is a little bit different from each of the other countries. But then,
on the other hand, there's a lot of similarities. As we talked this week, it
became quite clear that one of the things that we have in common is that
we can ali benefit from using electricity more efficiently. In other words,
use demand-reducing options to delay the need for new capacity addi-
tions. On the other side. we agree that demand-reducing options alone are
not going to meet the big requirements that exist to satisfy ali the peoples
in this world.
We've pretty well agreed as a group that to make sure thai we don't have
shortages, we can't just go around saying don't do this and don't do that.
We have to have an integrated plan that looks at the advantages and
disadvantages of ali the options. These integrated plans have to consider
the demand-reducing options as well as the supply increasing options. At
Ontario Hydro, we had to set priorities, but we did it after two }'ears of
studies, interviews with our customers and public meetings.
"_1"_
Tile 1989 Ontario Hydro 25-year demand/supply plan is an example of
an integrated plan. This proposed plan meets future Ontario electricity
needs as follows:
Total New Requirements 21,600 MWe
Demand-Reducing Options 5,900 MWe
Renewable and High-Efficiency Supply Options 4,200 MWe
New Base-Load Supply (Nuclear) 7,100 MWe
New Peak-Load Supply (Gas-fired) 4,300 MWe
We are committing an investment of more than $5 billion Canadian to
reduce demand. But even then, we will have to build more generating
capacity.
Fowler: Our next speaker is Gianfranco Cicognani from Italy:
Cicognani: The European community presents a complex situation as far as
electricity production and capacities are concerned. Countries such as
France, the United Kingdom, the Federal Repub!ic of Germany, have a
fairly good supply of electricity from domestic sources. I emphasize that
this includes nuclear power. For example, in France nuclear power
accounts for about 70% of the total production.
On the other hand, my country, Italy, imports a high percentage of both
its total energy and its electricity. Domestic hydro and geothernlal
electricity account for only about 20% of our total needs. The balance of
our electricity is produced by fossil fuels, most of them imported, and by
direct importation of kilowatt-hours from other countries. No nuclear
plants are in operation in Italy, following the referendum of 1987.
Despite our conservation measures, electricity demand is now strongly
increasing at the rate of about 5c_ per year. We are now at the limit of
imported electricity. Most of this comes from the French nuclear power
plants. So we must get additional power plants connected to our grid.
These, of course, must be fully compatible with environmental con-
straints.
In general the problem of future electrical energy supply in Italy has to
faced within the European community, according to the harmonization
goals outlined for 1993. These goals define the unified European market.
This organization includes the energy sector, which includes electricity.
Italy favors a strong role of the European Community, which means
decision-making that incorporates the interests of ali the 12members. As
far as energy is concerned of course, this includes decisions on infra-
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structure, such as power stations, transmission lines, natural gas net-
works and so on. In this framework, Italy intends to work to obtain high
efficiency and rational use of energy, without jeopardizing the competi-
tiveness of Italian industry. Our industry demands about 60% of our
present electrical power.
Fowler: For a different look at Europe we ask Mr. Lars-Gunnar Larssen from
Sweden to comment. He's with the Federation of Swedish Industries.
Larsson: I represent a small country with only 8-1/2 million inhabitants. We
have a very international industry. We export half of what we produce
in Sweden. The situation on electricity supply is the following: In the
1970"s the Parliament decided that we were not allowed to build any
more hydro in Sweden. In the beginning of the 1980's the Parliament
decided that we weren't allowed to build any more nuclear power in
Sweden. In mid-1987, shortly after the Chernobyl accident, the Parlia-
ment decided that we would start phasing out nuclear with two nuclear
power plants to be shut down in 1995 and 1996. And in 1988 the
Parliament decided that we weren't allowed to release more carbon
dioxide into the atmosphere. Now that means that all the viable, realistic
energy sources are out. We now produce about half of our power by
nuclear and half by hydro.
We in the Swedish industry have taken a very pro-active attitude toward
solving our environmental problems. We recognize the environmental
problems and we say we'd like to solve them. The largest threat to that
policy now is inadequate power supply. I think we need tohave the public
and the politicians un_lerstand that specific threat to the environment. If
not, industry will ..netbe able to give the public what they request from
industry, namely to produce the basics for welfare and quality of life.
Fowler: What you've seen in our Report and heard here are our key Findings
and Conclusions. This situation i,_not well appreciated by the public. We
are beginning to see evidence in trade journals. This morning we
received a journal from the electrical engineering field which sounded
the same concerns we are raising here. But the real purpose, having
reached some consensus on the problems, is to develop recommenda-
tions.
Davis: There is a clear conviction that economic health and growth certainly
requires adequate supplies of electricity. What we've had in the U. S. is
a situation in which we've had enough electric capacity. The rate of
growth in demand for electricity dropped off in 1973. We had more
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plants under construction than we needed to reach the new expected
demands. We have not, in fact, had a shortage of power plants for the
period from 1973 to the present time. Now we're coming to the end of
that period and we're seeing growing signs of increasing problems and
potential shortages.
Our recommendations will come to nothing unless we can get .e
attention of leadership, and I mean both nationally and internationally.
And by leadership, I mean that it is vital that the President of the United
States take a strong position on the need for adequate supplies of energy
to sustain our economy. Similarly, leadership is needed from other
countries. In this country this also means courage in the Congress and
also from the leaders of the electric utility companies, who are respon-
sible for supplying the electricity.
This kind of leadership will influence the public; it certainly will have an
impact on our energy policies; ii will have an impact our our relation-
ships in the international energy scene. And certainly it would drive us
to do those things that have to be done by the Congress and by the
regulatory agencies to ensure that we have the power to sustain our
economy. So what I'm stressing is leadership, and the vital need for it if
our recommendations are to come about.
Seaborg: The energy problem has always had my intense interest. I think this
is a very timely study. I agree with its Findings, and l'm pleased to be a
part of it. We certainly do need to assure ourselves that our country, and
the world, if we could, have an adequate supply of energy in the future.
The indications are that we will not, unless we make some changes in the
way we are going.
Fowler: There is much public concern in the industrialized countries,
particularly the U. S. and Europe, about the environment, and about the
impact of energy use and energy generation on the environment. One
thing that one must not overlook: when it comes down to the bottom line,
if one is really not prepared with adequate electricity, the priority will go
to providing it.
The result of this, something we refer to as downside risks, will very
likely be that very bad decisioi.s are made in response lo public outcry
upon finding themselves in a situation that they cannot tolerate.
In much of the developing world, as we heard in the report from the
Peoples Republic of China, electricity usage has gone up 100-fold in the
last forty years and will go up many, many times in the next fitiy years.
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This is not to reach the energy use level of the U. S., but to a level
corresponding to per capita energy use in Spain and South America.
In many countries the constraint is not environmental concerns but lack
of financing. But if we do not deal with this inability to supply electricity
responsibly, first in the industrialized countries that are already the big
users, and then in ali of the world, environmental issues, rather than being
resolved, as is now the hope of the public, will just become worse.
QUESTIONS FROM REPORTERS
Question: What is your response to the critics, probably mostly environmen-
talists, who have said that no one is doing much to develop renewable,
alternative sources of energy'? This is a common complaint. We saw a
small surge in the US in the 1970's, but now tax credits have been
removed, and there does not seem to be much getting done.
Fowler: The fact is that a lag in interest in energy means a lag in research.
lt goes across the board, no matter what fornl of energy you are interested
in, from conservation and efficiency to more distant things like fusion
and solar energy. Public apathy due to lower oil prices has had an
enormous detrimental influence on funding for research. How to balance
research investments is still important, and depends on what people see
as the potential value of each path.
McConnell: In the 25-year plan we developed for the province of Ontario,
about 20% of our future needs are met from what we call renewables and
high-efficiency cogeneration. Of course you are ali familiar with the fact
that hydroelectric generation is renewable, lt is part of our supply now,
and is a piece of our future, although it is inherently limited.
We've done research on other renewables, such as solar, and of course
the amount of energy per square meter that's falling on the Earth's land
surface varies over the world. In our particular case in Ontario, we have
some solar installations which are relatively modest, and serve isolated
users. We do not see them providing a major contribution in the next 25
years, although our research will continue, and we will be watching
what's happening in the rest oi' the world.
Our plan does involve electricity production from municipal waste. As
an example, this year we placed a contract for a station that is using
methane drawn off of a landfill project, lt will generate ur_ lo 22
megawatts for about 15 years. The garbage is the "renewable". Our plan
incorporates using wood waste from the pulp and paper industry. As far
as wind is concerned, in Ontario, with the exception of the hot air thal is
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associated with the area around our Federal government, our wind
velocities are very low. To give you an idea of the land use, if we were
to substitute windmills for one of our nuclear stations, it would take six
times the land area of Toronto. The environmental impacts with our"low
velocities do not make wind tractable. We do use wind generators at
some isolated stations in Northern Ontario. So we do not exclude
alternatives, and give them priority when they can make a contribution,
but we have to be practical about what can be done.
Rossin: When I was at the DOE one of the battles that went on ali the time
was where ali the money goes. Of course, the battle between nuclear
power and conservation and renewables was always visible, but il was
ju:'. one of the many, many battles about money. The fact is that even
today the amount of money for nuclear research and the amounts of
money for conservation and renewables aren't that ditt'erent. That is
because a lot of the DOE money is going into cleaning up old facilities,
and more of that came out of the nuclear budget than anywhere else.
The point is that what responsible people have been saying ali along is
that we are going to need ali of our options. Utility people will tell you
that if we could gel 1% of our power from solar, we'd be delighted. II
would be marvellous! I don't know a nuclear engineer anywhere who is
the least bit in opposition to solar energy, because they are perfect
complements. Nuclear plants are base-load plants. The Sun shines
during the day. That's when the peak loads occur. Solar can help, but in
reality it competes with natural gas that we burn at peak load times, rather
than with nuclear which is a base-load source. So there has never been
any actual competition between solar and nuclear in the real energy
supply scheme.
The competition for research dollars'? That's a political thing. We are
eager to see the development of ali viable alternatives, and there will be
continuing battles over research budgets. Simply stated, no one source
is going to do it all. Conservation isn't going to do it all. And certainly,
no responsible person has ever said that nuclear is going to do it all.
Question: Mr. McConnell, in looking at Ontario Hydro's plan, nuclear
power is about a third (30_.) of the additional capacity. Is that typical'?
You say you have to be practical about what you can do. Is that kind of
reliance on nuclear power what you can see as typical on a global scale'?
McConnell: Idon't say that it is typical. I commented earlier that the op,ions
thai are available in different countries, and indeed in different parts of
217
the same country, call fbr different solutions. In Canada, hydro power,
which is renewable, is meeting most of the needs in British Columbia.
And we see that happening for some time. In Alberta, most of the needs
are being met with fossil fuels. We see that continuing. The Province of
Quebec uses mostly hydro and has a couple of nuclear plants, and we see
that balance continuing. So it varies from one location to another, the
indigenous resources, the costs and the environmental impacts. I think
the same applies to other countries. What is optimum in one part of the
U.S. is not optimum in other parts of the U.S., or in Russia or in China.
Erdmann: You asked about new technology development. We are doing a
lot in Europe on this, but actually, it will take too much time to fill the gap
between growing electricity demand and existing capacity. The same
thing is also happening with nuclear energy, if decisions are not made
about new capacity. Because it takes time before you can get electricity
out of these plants, decisions must be taken now. This is because we
foresee the demand for electricity will still continue to grow, even if
additional measures to improve electrical efficiency will be undertaken.
In all countries of Europe, there have been different kinds of approaches,
but no country has succeeded in stopping or reducing the growth in
electricity demand. Therefore, we need more capacity. The situation is
the same in America. People are sleeping, when they should be deciding
now!
Question: Does the U.S. need to rely more heavily on nuclear power?
Rossin: l'd say it is a tradeoff. If we do decide to add more nuclear plants,
that can be done. If we don't, we're going to have to make it up by making
power another way, even assuming that conservation initiatives are
successful. We're going to have to make that difference up by burning
coal, oil and gas. What we see right now in the U. S., since utilities aren't
building large power plants of any kind, either large coal or nuclear, is
that 90% of the planned additions to capacity in the U.S. today are small
power producers, either independent powe: producers or cogenerators,
and they are designed to burn natural gas. Now that's too many eggs in
one basket for the future. The fallback for this will be to bum oil in
existing stations that are on standby. Utilities have tankage there for
standby, so that if they really get into trouble they can burn oil. That's OK
for emergencies, but I don't believe that's where you want your long-
term planning to be headed. We just don't have anything else in the
planning stage, other than those small plants, with few exceptions.
Question: Why is that'? Why haven't we planned tbr the future?
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Rossin: We had a bubble in electric capacity because 18 years ago when
electricity demand was still growing at 6 to 7% per year a lot of power
plants were ordered and under construction, both nuclear and coal. After
the OPEC embargo, the growth rate in demand dropped dramatically to
2 to 3% per year. Even though it was still growing, a lot of nuclear plants
that were not finished were cancelled. What we're seeing now is
projections for the future of growth at 2% per year when the actual data
are coming in at 3% or even 3-1/2%. What has happened in the U. S., and
it's happened in other countries too, is that the growth in total energy use
has almost levelled off, but the growth in electricity use has continued to
track the grawth in the economy. Demand is rising more slowly, but
supply is going up even slower, and we are beginning to see large reserve
margins whittled away every year.
Fowler: Our main concern is to not let this become a sleeping problem that
causes wrong short-term decisions. A coal plant or a nuclear plant is a
long term investment: it takes a long time to build it. We are now at a state
where good luck has made us complacent so we are not even doing what
we know we need to do about long-term things and research, and a state
at which we don't understand the urgency. Hence our concerns about
doing it right in terms of coal emissions, nuclear wastes, and ali the other
environmer,al issues are not equally balanced by the concerns about
what happens if we do nothing at all.
Davis: The history is even more complicated. Starting with the OPEC
embargo in 1974, we had a period of more than ten years in which our
use of fossil fuels stayed constant, and even went down in some cases.
But the electricity use increased, though at 2 - 3% per year rather than the
previous 6-7%. So we had adequate supply of conventional energy,
declining imports, but the amount of energy that was going into electric
power was steadily increasing. In 1973 we used about a quarter of ali our
energy to produce electric power. Last year it had risen to 36%.
Electricity has become the mainstay of our industrial development and
our standard of living. But when it comes to building any kind of plants,
nuclear, coal, or even hydroelectric, not only is it going to take five years
to construct it, but also, we have built up a licensing and regulatory
structure that has more than doubled those time periods. Now we're
starting to look at real shortfalls in electricity supply in the 1990's in a
number of parts of this country. We simply don't have ten years time to
build new plants! So we have a feeling of urgency, and even the public
is beginning to sense that we may have to do something that few felt was
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necessary before. Now we are beginning to lind public opinion polls that
say that 70 - 80% believe that there is an energy problem and that more
power plants may need to be built. And polls also show that 70-80% say
that they would be willing to see some of those be nuclear power plants.
Now that's quite a change in the last few years, lt is why I say that we need
real leadership to get this going.
Question: Why has electricity use increased? Are we using more toasters?
Davis: Well first of all, we've got a lot more people, and electricity is very
versatile.
Rossin: The Electric Power Research Institute has published reports that
show what is happening. Time after time in industrial processes, people
figure out a way to do something with induction heating or laser energy
that used to be done by burning oil or gas at the work site. You get a
cleaner production process, you get much more precise control, you
actually use less energy to do the job, energy costs are saved, the products
become more competitive, production increases and you end up using
more electricity. And the shift from direct use of fuel to using that fuel
to make electricity is continuing. The most dramatic thing is the possible
future impact of electric cars. You look at the Los Angeles air quality
plan, and it is vehicle emissions that drive the problem. If we are ever able
to develop a successful electric car, the impact on this is going to be
tremendous. Then the question is how are we going to get the electricity
to charge these cars from the power plants we have today?
How counterproductive it would be if we ended up charging electric cars
by burning oil and gas to make steam to make electricity to charge
batteries! Talk about the need to improve efficiency! That is a terrible
way to do it!
Question: Given the danger you folks foresee in the lag time between
building capacity and demand, would it be an equally good idea to curb
population growth as it is to produce more electricity? Do both need to
be done? lt seems to me that population has gone up 2 - 3 billion in the
last few years.
Rossin: We talked about it, but we doubt that this group can have much
influence on this. But, you are right on target. Our participant from China
expressed this very clearly, lt is not only that population is increasing.
But the demands of people and the aspirations of people keep rising. We
said, "Weil, how are you going to supply this electricity'?" The answer
is, "Mostly coal.'" The only thing that will really change that very much
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is the extent to which they can do some of it with nuclear. The rest is going
be coal. We asked him about environmental controls, and it was clear that
these are a lower priority than getting the electricity.
Davis: We have a relatively low rate of growth of population in the U. S. and
in tile industrialized countries. As Dr. Start" pointed out, if you look at the
increase in the standard of living cornbined with the growing population,
and you find that tile increase in the demand lhr electric power grows
very rapidly. And the proportion of this that is sought by the developing
countries combined with their population growth combines to have zt
major impact on the demand for electricity in the world. This is
something that is contint,tally overlooked in energy projections, and we
must face up to ii.
Rossin: Right now, the emissions of CO-2 are dominated by the industrial-
ized countries. But in three decades, that won't be the case any more. The
emissions of CO-2 for power generation and heating in the developing
world will totally dominate this issue in the next century.
Fowler: The equilibrium between demand for electricity and supply has not
been reached for a large portion of the world. And the evidence shows
that where there is enough electricity, there is better health and sanita-
tion, a better standard of living and longer life.
Education is a very large concern. Prof. Seaborg was co-chair of a large
meeting on pre-college education here last month. Glenn, would you
care to talk about that?
Seaborg: I could talk about that ali day, but not this morning. In the U. S.,
relative to many parts of the world, we are not doing as well in science,
math and engineering at the pre-college level. Changes in the high-
school cun'iculum have not made as much of an impact as we had hoped.
Sec. Watkins of the Dept. of Energy has taken a special interest in this.
But it requires melding of differing points of view and more resources.
Question: The environmental restraints on the production of more electricity
seems to be at the core of this debate. Mr. Larssen said you are aware of
the environmental concerns but the threat of a limited energy supply is
the greatest threat there is. Could you explain that'?
Larsson: Let me give examples from Sweden. We had a Government
investigation because people get more allergies and sicknesses-- school
kids, people working in office buildings. They found out thai one of the
reasons is lhat we have sealed and insulated our buildings to such an
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extent that the air in our buildings is not healthy anymore. They strongly
rec'gmmended that we increase the ventilation in our housing and our
office buildings. And that will mean we have to use more electricity. That
shows that we must get away from the general attitude saying that "No,
we cannot have more energy because of the problems of producing it."
Instead, we have to look to see where we use that electricity. In many
cases, electricity will help in improving the environment.
Another example is the electric car. Provided that, with research and
development, the industry will be able to develop them, they would be
a great help for the environment in our cities. So putting any limit on the
use of electricity can give us problems on the environmental side. That
is the message that is quite new, and I think even the environmentalists
will have to recognize that.
The labor unions in Sweden are now taking a very strong stand. I have
been sitting on a committee after the Chemobyl accident. I represent
industry and there were representatives from the labor unions. Together
we wrote a motion. We feel that not having enough electricity is a threat
to us as an industry and to the labor unions about their jobs. And what I
am trying to say is that it is also a threat to the environment.
Please get me right: I am not talking about unlimited growth. But by
stopping ali options on the electricity supply, we will not be able to reach
those goals on the environment that the public at large request from us.
Fowler: There really is a strong connection between electricity and the
environment. Our French delegate, Dr. Remy Carle, who had to cancel
his travel at the last minute, wrote to us that as a result of their total energy
policy, they contribute positively toward global environmental protec-
tion. In the U. S., for every thousand dollars of GNP we produce, we send
two tons of CO-2 into the air. For the same amount of GNP in France, the
emissions are only half that amount.




More than a year after the Seminar, we continue to be struck by the
timeliness of the Findings and Conclusions of the First 1990 Group on
Electricity. Much has happened during 1990 and 1991 to heighten our
concerns about the energy future. The most momentous was the Persian Gulf
War. At the same time, there has been evidence of continuing relaxation of
tensions between East and West in Europe, which gives hope for reaching
understandings in other areas. Both superpowers have moved toward cuts in
their nuclear arms arsenals.
During the same time, much has come to light about the deterioration of
infrastructure in the East Bloc nations, about insufficient electric generating
capacity, and about serious environmental problems that will require
massive investments for solutions.
Other voices have echoed our warning of the risks of future electricity
shortages. In the U. S., the Department of Energy completed two years of
studies and hearings, and issued a National Energy Strategy (NES) that calls
for a wide variety of supply-side and demand-side measures. Critics were
quick to point out that a number of demand-side proposals were dropped in
the final negotiations. Some, such as increased mileage requirements for
motor vehicles, will be debated on the floor of Congress. But at the same
time, governments, utilities, industries and citizen organizations are devel-
oping environmentally sou,id energy conservation initiatives. These are
vital, because improvements in efficiency and real energy-saving programs
are going to be an essential part of the future. This will be true not only in
the industrial and emerging economies, but in the developing nations as
weil.
The future of most developing nations is clouded by imrne,lse issues, among
others: difficulty in raising capital to build infrastructure, which impacts
both energy supply and demand management progress, and the continued
pressure of population growth.
Of most importance to the United States' electricity picture, the NES calls
for removal of road-blocks to progress on the first repository for high-level
radioactive waste, and for key reforms in the nuclear licensing process. Both
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of these require actions by Congress that have been difficult to achieve in
recent years. But if me licensing reform proposal is enacted into law, that
would remove one of the most important barriers to new orders for nuclear
power plants in the U.S. The other nations are watching carefully, because
what the U.S. does or fails to do has impact on political processes on every
continent.
The U.S. nuclear industry announced a program that should lead to licensing
of standardized designs, followed by new orders by utilities. Groups
opposed to any revival of nuclear power argue that new capacity will not be
needed, that conservation and alternative sources will be sufficient, and
raising public concerns with claims that not only high-level waste, but low-
level waste represent technical problems which should be solved before new
orders are allowed, rather than political problems tha! can be solved by
responsible leadership and public understanding. They are also opposing the
renewal of operating licenses for the earliest plants, whose 40-year licenses
will end in the next decade, and even calling for shutdowns. Opposition has
emerged in Japan and Taiwan, where support had been solid.
Our updates do reveal some positive developments fear nuclear power.
French nuclear plants continue to operate weil, and contrary to publicity,
they are proving their economics, saving money for French ratepayers, and
reducing Electricite ae France's long-term debt (as noted in Sec. 7). China's
nuclear program is moving slowly, but the seriousness of their heavy
dependence on a single fuel (coal) and its implications for both local and
global environmental concerns is recognized by the government. In Swe-
den, the shutdown deadline for the first two reactors has been set aside, as
a new, hard look at its implications reveals po'ential limitations on the
nation's future well-being. And an important research milestone was
reached when the decision was made to proceed into the 5-year Engineering
Design Activity (EDA) of the ITER fusion program (Section 4). The
international headquarters for the EDA will be at a site hear the campus of
the University of California at San Diego.
Yet, after a year of momentous developments, our bottom lime remains the
same. Where is the leadership at the highest levels of government and
industry who will recognize and tell their people that plans for new electric
power plants must be started now? Every budget, governmental and indus-
trial, is under pressure. But short-term thinking is driving decisions. It will
take courage for leaders to lace their citizens and tell them that new thinking
is required now. A climate must be created that once again makes ii possible
to attract investment for the long term, for large, efficient and environmen-
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tally sound electric power plants to ensure electricity for the future that our
children and grandchildren are counting on.
Our Findings have not lost their urgency during the passage of a year. If
anything, time has passed without very many critical decisions being
reached. Our hope is that the actions they call for will not still be just
recommendations two or five, or even ten years from now.
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APPENDIX 1
LONG-TERM ENERGY DEMAND AND THE CO s PROBLEM
IN THE PEOPLES REPUBLIC OF CHINA
Prof. Lu Yingzhong
Institute for Techno-Economics and Energy Systems Analysis, Beijing
The global carbon dioxide issue and the probable climate change that could
take piace have already attracted the attention of not only the global academic
community but also people and governments ali over the world. Numerous
studies have been carried out in many countries and regions, as well as in the
whole world. However, the situations in the developing countries have not yet
been studied extensively, in particular in the biggest onemthe People's
Republic of China in which over one fifth of the world population now lives
and less than one eleventh of the total energy is consumed.
A preliminary survey of the CO2issue in the PRC was made by the author
in early 1987, in which the increasing Chinese share of the global CO_
emission was forecast and relevant policy issues addressed.( 1) Since then a
more elaborate long-term energy demand forecast has been carried out by
ITEESA (2) and a number of studies on global COt issue have been
published ali over the world (3), a more in-depth investigation of the Chinese
role in global scope can be made and relevant policy suggestions re-
evaluated. These up-dated results will be summarized in this article.
Economic and Energy Development in the PRC
Economy and energy production have grown very fast in past years,
particularly since the recent economic reform. In Table A. 1 the growth of
aggregated and per capita national income (no GNP statistics are available
before 1978), as well as the relevant growth rate are listed, which could be
compared with the annual increases in both energy production and con-
sumption shown in Table A.2. It is seen that the energy consumption
elasticity amounts to 1.2178 during the past 35 years which drops to 0.537
after 1980. This reduction in elasticity implies the adequacy and achieve-
ments of the Chinese energy policy in this period which has been discussed
in another recent paper of the author.(4) One conclusion is the possibility of
maintaining such a low elasticity throughout a rather long period extending
into the next century. More detailed analysis of the future energy demand in
China confirms this trend, which will be summarized in the following
sections.
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A.l Growth of National Income in PRC
(Incomes in current prices;
percentages in constant prices)
Year Aqq_eqatod National Per capita Natlonal
Intone Incole
109 ¥uan % Yuan
1952 58.9 I00 0 104 100.0
1957 90.8 153 0 142 135.5
1962 92.4 130 9 139 111.5
1965 138.7 197 4 194 156.7
1970 192.6 294 6 235 203.6
1975 250.3 384 7 273 237.6
1980 368.8 516.3 376 298.1
1985 703.1 826.6 673 448.1
1987 932.1 985.9 868 520.0
A.2 6rmCch of Inert/ Production and Consumptioa
Year tnart/y producCion Enerqr/ Consumption
106 ice % 106 tca %
1952 48.71 I00.0 54.11 i00.0
1957 98.61 202.4 96.44 178.2
1962 171.85 352.8 165.40 305.7
1965 188.24 386.5 189.01 349.3
1970 309.90 636.2 292.91 541.3
1975 487.54 1000.9 454.25 839.5
1980 637.35 1308.5 602.75 1113.9
1985 855.46 1756.2 770.20 1423.4
1987 912.65 1873.6 859.43 1588.3
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Table A.3 8consrios of the Population Growth in the PJtC
(in li111_s)
Year Scenario 1 Scenario 2 Scenario 3 Scenario 4
1983 1022.07 1022.07 1022.07 1022.07
1989 1095.56 1095.56 1100.10 1101.63
1995 1147.99 1147.99 1179.35 1207.88
2001 1191.21 1191.21 1254.04 1307.73
2007 1218.68 1247.35 1309.60 1385.78
2013 1233.57 1288.35 1353.35 1454.25
2019 1234.37 1312.92 1392.14 1530.74
2025 1221.10 1323.77 1424.52 1609.14
2031 1192.55 1328.81 1441.57 1672.32
2037 1148.47 1324.11 1441.58 1718.55
2043 1091.68 1306.09 1431.36 1761.73
2049 1026.19 1278.07 1416.53 1809.33
2055 956.37 1248.54 1397.58 1855.70
2061 887.64 1223.79 1376.16 1898.15
2067 823.27 1203.22 1355.48 1942.48
2073 763.88 1184.50 1337.29 1993.67
2079 _09.39 1167.92 1_20.55 2048.59
Population Growth
The current population of China has already exceeded on billion which is the
highest in the world. Although rather effective population control has been
implemented since the late seventies, Chinese population will continue to
increase steadily through the mid-21st century. Four scenarios have been
suggested by researchers in the PRC which have been adopted as the basis
the government's population policy.(5)The assumptions of these sce-
narios are as follows:
Scenario 1: The average fertility of Chinese females will decrease steadily
from 2.63c_ of 1982 to 1.70% by 1990 and 1.5% by 1995 and then it will be
kept at 1.5c,_ afterward;
Scenario 2: The same as above before 2001, but after 2001 the fertility will
return to and be kept at 2.0_,i.e., adopt the pc,licy of "two children each
family" next century;
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Scenario 3: The average femility will decrease slowly from the 1982 value
of 2.63c/_ to 2.0% by 1990 which is kept afterward: and
Scenario 4: The average fertility will be kept at its 1984 level of 2.40%
indefinitely. The results of these scenarios are shown ill Table A.3.
Scenarios 1and 2 had been preferred by the authors and recommended to the
government as two ideal scenarios, in which the total population is seen
attaining its maximum by 2019 at 1,234,370,000 orby 2031 at 1,238,810,000
respectively, and then declining. However, later development of events
denotes that these scenarios are unrealistic, and the third scenario is more
likely. Thus the present forecast is based on this third scenario which gives
the peak population of 1,441,580,000 by 2037, which varies very slowly in
the next century, always staying above 1.3 billion. It is noted in particular
that during the next four decades the Chinese population will have a net
increase of more th,',,n400 million, which presents a formidable challenge to
all the planners, as well as the decision-makers.
Economic Growth
The target of economic growth of the PRC has been set as the quadrupling
of the gross national product by the year 2000 as compared with this figure
in 1980. However, no official target has been declared beyond that point,
except a more or less vague suggestion that the per capita income of Chinese
people will match that of the low limit of the developed countries after
another 50 years or so.
Based on the analysis of the possible developments of various newly
industrialized and lower developed countries, e.g., Brazil, South Korea,
Greece. Spain and Italy, three scenarios have been proposed, and the
estimated economic growth as well as the relevant per capita GNP up to 2050
are listed in Table A.4 and A.5 respectively.
In Table A.4 the assumptions made in these three scenarios and the average
growth rate are estimated. It is believed that the second scenario will be more
probable.
The high growth scenario is considered possible when comparing the
relevant factors with those of Japan and South Korea during their take-off
period in 1960-1975. However, taking into consideration the probable
influences of some non-economic factors, the scenario of medium growth
may be more feasible. In the following, therefore, the medium growth
scenario is taken as a most probable case for analysis.
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Structure of National Economy
In order to estimate the possible change of the structure of the future national
economy during a period as long as 60 years, a comparison with typical
countries of"different developing levels has been made, and the trends of
structural change identified, lt is concluded therefrom that:
( 1) the share of the agricultural sector will decrease steadily to 3-5%
from its present value of 36%;
(2) the share of the service sector will increase steadily to around 6()_.
from its present value of 20%; and
(3) the share of industrial sector will not vary much, though the share
of manufacturing industries will decrease somewhat to about 26%.
A forecast of the change of the economic structure in China based on the
above analysis is given in Table A.6.
Energy Demand Forecast
Sectoral analysis is carried out in forecasting the future energy demand of
the Chinese economy. The final energy demand of each sector is determined
first, and then the primary energy demand is calculated by allowing the
losses in exploitation, conversion and distribution.
Industrial Energy Demand
The energy intensity of Chinese industry is compared with different devel-
oped countries and the cause of the great discrepancy is identified:
First, the large share of energy-inefficient small and medium industries
which contributed about 70c,_of the total value products, among which the
small industries make up over 50c;,"
Second, coal is extensively used in the industrial sector and in power
generation, which caused low efficiency as well as pollution.
Third, the share of obsolete equipment and processes which resulted in
additional waste of energy.
With more detailed analysis of various energy-intensive industries and the
estimations of the relevant potentials of energy conservation within these
industries, a conservative assumption has been made that the energy
intensity of Chinese industry in 2050 will approach those that the developed
countries had in 1985, or a 65 year lag. However, this requires an annual
energy conservation rate of 3.5% from 1980-2020, 3.0c_ from 2020-2030,
and 2.3% from 2030-2050. The relevant energy demand under such an
assumption is shown in Table A.7.
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TabJc A.4 scenarios of Chlneme |concalc Growth
(in percent)
Scenario Growth Rate Elamticlty Elasticity Average
S_nn. Factors of Capital of Labor Growth Rate
High 3.5 0.4 0.6 5.5
Medium 3.4 0.4 0.6 4.7
Low 2.5 0.4 0.6 3.9
Table A.5 Forecast of Per Capita GIIP
(in 1984 U.S. Dollars)
Scenario 2000 2030 2050
High 800-i000 5,000 14,500
Medium 800-1000 4,000 i0,000
Low 800-1000 3,100 6,700
Table A.6 Forecast of the |tructural Change
of Chinese Econmwf
Average GNP Sectoral Share, %
per capita Agriculture Industry Service
(1984 US$) Total Mrg. Total Trans.
2000-3000 I0 45 29 45 6
4000-5000 8 40 27 52 6
10000-15000 4 36 26 60 6
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Agricultural Energy Demand
The share of tile future agricullural sector in tile total GDP will decrease
substantially as see n above. However, since tile present mechanization and
electrification levt,l of the Chinese agricultural economy is very low, the
modernization of ,his sector will require more input of commercial energy
than ii did before. As a result, the absolute increase of commercial energy
supply will be high, its shown inTable A.8. The elasticities of both electricity
and petroleum products are foreseen lo be much higher as compared with the
industrial sector.
Transportation Energy Demand
Since the transportation sector is an oil gobbler in most developed countries,
the future energy consumption in this sector deserves particular attention in
this forecast. However, the transportation modes and intensity depend on
many factors, such as the structure of the economy, the size and natural
conditions of the territory, the life-style and the development oithe technol-
ogy. Very careful analysis is therefore indispensable in the determination of
the future traffic level as well as the intensities of various modes of
transportation. The final results of such an analysis are summarized inTable
A.9.
Energy Demand of the Service Sector
The present level and energy consumption of the Chinese service sector
(excluding the transportation services) are very low. And besides, this sector
has been disregarded in national statistics since it is considered to be st) low.
Also, this sector has been long disregarded in national statistics since it is
considered non-productive and hence a parasite to the productive sectors.
The situation Ims been changed very much since the recent economic
reform: i-nore and more attention has been paid to the development of this
sector. As ztresult, the development of this sector will be the fastest among
ali the sectors in the coming decades, st) the relevant energy demand will
skyrocket as weil. The forecast of the energy demand in this sector is shown
in Table A. 10.
Residential Energy Demand
The rise of living level in both urban and rural regions of China will require
a substantial increase of energy supply. In the urban region, the increased
share of house heating and hot water supply in total households and the
popularization of electric appliances will result in a rapid increase in the
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Y_[c A.7 Forecast of Chinese Industrial Energy Demand
It_a Unit 2020 2030 2050
GPD per capita 1980 U$$ R,000- 3,000- 5,000-
2,500 4,000 i0,000
Population Million 1,393 1,441 1,416
Share of Value
Added in GDP _ 45.0 40.0 36.0
Value Added 1012 US$ 1.25-1.57 1.73-2.31 4.08-5.09
Energy IntenJity kgoe/US$ 0.43 0.32 0.20
Energy Demand 108 tca 7.68-9.64 7.91-10.65 11.66-14.54
T_blc A._ Porecast of Energy Demand of k_ricultural Sector
Item Unit 2000 2015 2030 2050
Growth Rate of
Value Added % 4.0 3.0 2.0 2.0
Elamtlcity of
Electricity % 1.0 0.9 0.8 0.8
Elasticity of
PetroleuJa % 1.0 0.8 0.65 0.5
Growth Rate of
Elec. Consul. % 4.0 2.7 1.6 1.6
Growth Rate of
Parr. Conmum. % 4.0 2.4 1.3 1.0
Elec. Demand TWh 51.0 76.0 96.4 132.4
Parr. Demand 106 ton 12.78 18.24 22.14 27.02
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Table A.9 Forecast of Transportation ilnor_ Demand
Item 2020 2030 2050
Population 13.9 14.4 14.2
GNP per capita US$ High 2500 4000 9000
Low 2000 3000 8000
Freight Traffic:
Total 109ton-kl High 10700 17800 39600
Low 8600 13400 35000
Energy Intensity High 12.4 12.0 11.3
kgoe/103ton-ka LOw 10.3 9.7 9.3
Energy Deland 106toe High 132.68 213.60 447.48
LOw 88.58 129.98 325.50
Passenger Traffic:
Total 1091an-kl High 2970 4944 ii000
Low 2370 3698 9790
Energy Intensity High 20.0 19.4 18.3
kgoe/1031an-kl Low 16.7 15.9 14 •4
Energy Deaand 106toe High 59.40 95.80 201.30
Low 39.60 58.80 141.00
Total En. Deaand 106toe Hiqh 192.08 310.40 648.78
Low 128.18 188.78 466.50
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demand of electricity and fossil fuels. Since the oil supply will decline ill the
next century and the prospect of natural gas in China is still uncertain, coal
gasification seems indispensable for the clean energy requirement. The
results of the study are summarized in Table A. 11.
Residential energy demand in the Chinese rural region is quite different
from that in the urban region. In the year 1985, about 76% of the total
residential energy came from non-commercial sources, mainly from straw
and stalks. Only 72.64 million tce (tons of coal equivalent) of commercial
fuels was supplied to the rural region, less than 100 kg per capita per year.
However, due to the declining availability of biomass fuels and the ecologi-
cal equilibrium consideration, the consumption of non-commercial fuels in
the rural region will decrease and the supply of commercial energy must
increase substantially in the next century. On the other hand, since the
population in the rural region will decrease substantially due to rapid
urbanization, the total energy demand will eventually decrease, although the
per capita consumption increases. The results of our forecast are shown in
"Fable A. 12.
The total residential energy demand is sunmmrized in Table A. 13, in which
the demand of commercial energy is seen almost to double from 2020 to
2050, while the consumption of electricity would triple. However, when
compared with most developed countries, the per capita electricity con-
sumption in China will still be low, even by 2050. The predominant role of
coal in the urban residential energy structure will give rise to serious
environmental pollution if no tectmical solution is found in the near future.
Total Energy Demand Forecast
A sum of ali the above sectoral forecasts is listed in Table A. 14, in which the
losses of conversion and distribution tire added to obtain the total energy
demand. A cornparison of Chinese sectoral energy structure by 2020 and
2050 with the 1985 figures of OECD countries is also shown in this table.
lt is noted that the 2050 structure of China is quite similar to the OECD
structure while the 2030 one is obviously different. The coincidence of the
2050 value demonstrates the suitability of this approach and the validity of
the results.
Energy Supply Forecast
The Availability of Energy Resources
Most of the conventional energy resources tire abundant in the PRC. In Table
A.15 the proven reserves and the potential resources of these fuels are
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Table A. I() rorecaat of Zn*r97 Da_nd in the Service Sector
Item Unit 2020 2030 2050
GDP 109 US$ 2780-3480 4320-5670 11300-14100
Share of Service
Sector in GDP % 39.0 46.0 54.0
Value Added 109 US$ 1080-1350 19%0-2650 6100-7610
Energy Intensity kgoe/US$ 0.087 0,067 0.050
Energy Demand 106 ice 134-168 190-254 436-543
T_J_ i. _[ forecast of urban Residential Znorg? Demand
Ira 2020 2030 2050
I. total Energy demand, 106ice 226 357 584
2. Shareo by Use: (%)
- House Heating 36 36 37
- Cooking 16 14 Ii
- Hot Water 40 39 36
- Lighting and elec. 8 11 16
Appliances
3. Shares by Kind8: (%)
- Coal 55 49 42
- Gas 32 32 31
- Electricity 8 11 16
- Heat 5 8 ii
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Table A.12 rorocaet of lural Roeidoatial Energy Do_tnd
Ira Unit 2020 2030 2050
Per Capita Useful
Energy Consum. kcal/man-day 1600 2400 3800
Rural Population million 890 720 430
Energy Efficiency % 25 28 30
Share of Biomam8 % 45 40 30
Electrification % 85 90 95
Non-colmercial
Energy Deland 106 tca 134 129 85
In which:
- Fualvood 106 ton 90 20 90
- Aqr. Waetae 106 ton 173 153 67
- Others 106 tca 1.4 1.2 1.0
Colmercial
Ener_ry Demand 106 tca 163 193 199
In which:
- Coal 106 ton 215 257 268
- Petroleum 106 ton 2 2 2
- Elec'cricit¥ TWh 53 52 41
Total Enerqy
Deaand 106 tca 297 322 284
237
Table A.13 forecast of Residential Energy Demand
Itu Unit 2020 2030 2050
Total Rea. En. Deland 106tca 523 679 868
In which: Conercial 106tca 389 550 783
Non-co_marcial 106tca 134 129 85
Per Capita En. Demand kgca/nan-yr 375 471 613
Per Capita Co-m. En. kgca/uan-yr 279 382 553
Per Capita Eloc. Cone. kW/man-yr 146 261 553
Energy Structure:
Share of Colut. En. % 74 81 90
Share of Non-coum. En. % 26 19 i0
Table A. 14 Forecast of Total and kctoral tnar_r Deatnde
Itu 2020 2050 OECD
En. Demand t En. Demand t 1985
108tca 108tca t
Final En. Demand
- Industry 7.68-9.64 36.3 11.66-14.54 26.7 26.3
- Agriculture 0.30-0.40 1.5 0.50- 0.60 i.i 1.1
- Transportation 1.83-2.74 9.6 6.67- 9.27 16.2 20.9
- Set"vice 1.34-1.68 6.3 4.36- 5.43 i0.0 8.4
- Residence 3.70-4.08 16.3 7.43- 8.22 16.0 13.5
Sum Total 14.85-18.54 70.0 30.62-38.06 70.0 70.5
Conversion and
Distrib. Losses 6.37-7.95 30.0 13.12-18.31 30.0 29.5
Total Demand 21.21-26.49 43.74-54.37
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Table A.15 [nercj? =.sources of the P_c
Resource Proven Reserve Potential Resource
Total Per Capita* Total Per Capita*
Coal 769.2 Gton 719 ton >3200 Gton 2994 ton
Oil 5.5 Gton 5.2 ton 60 Gton 56 ton
N. Gas i000 Gm 3 936 m 3 33000 Ga 3 30882 13
Hydro .... 19 TWh/yr 1778kWh/yr
Uranium** 10 kton 0.01 kg ....
* Based on 1987 population value.
** Based on official published figure of uranium supply
available for 15 GWe nuclear power plants.
Table A.16 Forecast of Petrolems Production
Scenario 1 2 3 4
Production in 2000 Mt 175 185 180 200
Peak P|_oduction Mt 200 225 240 300
Peak TiBe 2010/20 2010/20 2020/30 2020/30
Resource Requiruent:
Final Proven Reserve Mt 46450 50340 60130 70820
Ratio of FPR/Potential .59-.76 .64-.82 .76-.98 .90-1.15
Decilion Evaluation:
Coeff. of Confidence 0.94 0.72 0.39 0.ii
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summarized, in which it is noted that the per capita values of some resources
is rather low. Only the coal resource is really abundant on a per capita basis,
while ali the others are small as compared with the future huge demand. In
particular, the most important petroleum resource seems too low for future
development.
The petroleum supply will be the most critical issue in a long-term forecast.
The rapid depletion of this resource will result in the declining of production
soon after the rum of this century as predicated by the author in 1984.(6)
More recent work gives the peak production and the timing of various
scenarios as shown in Table A.16. lt is seen in this table that the peak
production is a function of the coefficients of confidence, i.e., the lowest
production (200 Mt. annually) is most likely to be realized, but the highest
one (300 Mt.) is the least likely. However, under any conditions, the
maximum production will not exceed 300 million metric tons per year and
the peak time will be around 2020/2030.
Hydroelectric power resources are seen as rather abundant -- amounting to
1800 kw-hr per capita, or 3.8 times the consumption today. However, as
compared with the tremendous increase of electricity demand by 2050,
hydropower will only occupy some 20% of the total power generated, thus
its share will be almost the same as it is today. Other energy sources are
therefore needed to produce power on a mammoth scale.
The resource of Chinese coal seems to be unlimited but there are other
restrictions for its utilization. The geographical distributions of coal re-
sources are highly uneven, so the production sources are always far from the
consuming centers. A description of such a situation is summarized in Table
A. 17, in which the distribution of coal reserves is listed against that of the
GDP. The mismatch of these two distributions is easily seen, and this fact
results in a tremendous burden on all modes of transportation.
It is noted in this table that the gaps between the relative shares of coal
reserves and energy demand are the highest in four most important devel-
oped regions, i.e., North-East China--11.4%, East China--17%, Beijing/
Tianjing/Hebei region--8.6% and Middle-South China--18.8%, while the
surpluses are seen in Shanxi/Shaanxi/Inner Mongolia region--50.5% and
North-West China--3.9%. Taking into account the volume of coal to be
transported in 2050 in case no other alternatives could be deployed, it is
estimated that about 3 billion tons of raw coal will be transported from
Shanxi/Shaanxi/Inner Mongolia and Xingjiang region ali the way to the far
East coast region of China -- a task in which even the technical feasibility
will be subjected to suspicion, not to speak of economic rationality.
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Table A. 17 Uneven Distribution of Coal Hoaourcoa
and aogional 8hares of Znorg7 Consumption
Region Proven Coal Remervem En. Con. Share, %
109ton t Condition 2020 2050
Shanxi/Shaanxi/
Inner Moqolia 479.8 62.4 Plenty II. 0 Ii. 9
NortJa-eaat 64.1 8.3 65% utilized 19.1 19.7
East 46.9 6.1 Deep/depleted 24.0 23.1
BelJ ing/TianJ ing/
Hebel 17.8 2.3 65% utilized II. 9 I0.9
Middle-moutJ1 23.4 3.0 Small mcala 20.6 21.8
Sou_ Wear 74.3 9.7 Tranmpo_c.
Difficult 9.0 $.3
NorTh Wemt 63.0 •. 2 Plenty 4.7 • • 3
Sum Total 769.2 I00.0
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The second and more knotty problem of tile burning of such a huge amount
of coal is the environmental impacts encountered. A detailed discussion has
been the subject of other papers of the author, hence it will be mentioned only
briefly here.(7) The air pollution and the associated acid rain has already
been considered one of the most impending problems in many Chinese
cities, and some positive measures have been suggested to alleviate the
situation. The best option is to develop alternative energy sources to replace
coal as much as possible, and among those are both nuclear and solar energy.
The Structure of Primary Energy Supply
Taking into account ali these resources, constraints, and possible techno-
logical advances in the early part of the next century, a rational primary
energy mix for the future Chinese energy system is suggested, as shown in
Table A. 18. lt is noted that nuclear energy is assigned an outstanding role,
since a sizable amount of coal should be substituted due to the above-
mentioned reasons. However, other new energies are also assigned an
important role, in which solar energy will occupy a prominent piace. The
share of new energy is seen larger than that ofoil by 2050, i.e., 4.8% vs. 3.2%
or 250 tce vs. 166 tce in absolute volume, lt is therefore a very challenging
task.
However, much more challenging is the development of nuclear power. In
order to replace coal by 10.7%, 20.7% or 30.7% from the primary total
energy supply, nuclear power will have to increase annually at 4.82%,
7.16%, or 8.58c_ respectively from 2020 to 2050. The installed capacity of
future Chinese nuclear power will then correspond to 150%, 280%, or 418%
of the total world total capacity of 1987! No doubt some new, sate and
economical reactor design will have to be pursued in order to implement
such an ambitious program if there is no other choice in the Chinese energy
future.
The Chinese Share in Global CO,_ Emission
The share of CO_ emission in the future Chinese energy system is out of
proportion to its energy share because of the high percentage of coal
consumed. On the same energy output basis, coal will emit about 120% more
CO_ than natural gas and 50% more than oil. By comparing with the forecast=
of global carbon emission made by Edmonds, et al (8), the share of Chinese
CO, emission is summarized in Table A. 19. lt is noted that the share will
obviously be out of proportion to the population share in 2050, except in the
ultra-high nuclear case C. The three nuclear options will reduce the share by
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Tables A. 18 and A. 19
Tsbte &.lilt ll=enarioa of the Iltructure of PrismrT Enez_JT
Itu Unit 2000 2020 2050
Total Mtcs 1500 2400 5200
Oil Mt 200 250 116
Htce 286 358 166
t 19.1 14.9 3.2
Nat. Gas GI3 e 40 100 200
Mtcs 53 133 266
t 3.5 5.5 5.1
Hydro GWa 83 174 263
TWh 291 609 921
Mtca 100 210 320
t 6.7 8.8 6.2
New Energy Mica 0 I0 250
% 0.0 0.4 4.8
Case A Case B Case C
Coal ME 1470 2260 5100 4370 3640
MEc@ 1051 1626 3640 3120 2600
t 70.1 67.8 70.0 60.0 50.0
NUclear GWo 5 30 291 563 835
TWh 30 180 1750 3378 5008
MEc@ 10 63 558 1078 1596
% 0.7 2.6 10.7 20.7 30.7
Table &.lg: C_J.aese Ilbares £n Global CO, Em:Lssioa
Itea Unit 2000 2025 2050
Global:
Carbon 109tan 7.2 10.3 14.5
China:
Population t 19.17 20.91 19.92
Case0 CaaeA CaeeB CaaaC
Carbon lu9ton 1.131 1.717 3.952 3.455 2.991 2.627
Share t 15.71 16.67 27.26 23.83 20.63 17.43
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3.43%, 6.63%, or even 9.83% (Case C) respectively in the above table. Thus
this fact will eloquently justify the decision and the effort of an ambitious
Chinese nuclear power prograin.
Energy Policy Issues in the PRC
The above long-term energy demand forecast and the relevant analysis of
the supply strategies suggests a series of policy considerations oil the future
of the Chinese energy system. Detailed analysis has been carried out in a
separate paper (4) but some conclusions will be briefly noted as tk)llows:
(1) Control the population growth, in particular in the rural region.
According to optimistic estimates, China will breed roughly one Malaysia,
or one GDR, or one Czechoslovakia, or one Australia per year within this
decade, or create more than one United States plus one Japan from nov,, to
2050. The pressure of population growth and the peoples' thirst for a better
life will always drive the anxious Chinese decision-makers to venture into
every possibility for the rapid development of this huge country.
(2) Rationalize the country's economic policies, in particular to carry
on the economic retorms more thoroughly.
Only successful economic reform could give the energy industry new
impetus for such large scale energy development and get rid of the chronic
energy shortage in the PRC.
(3) Emphasize energy conservation.
The forecast denotes a long-term elasticity around 0.50-0.55 which de-
mands a very hard effort on energy conservation. Not only energy-saving
equipment and processes should be utilized in the future economy, but also
a less energy-intensive structure of economy and life-style should be
pursued.
(4) Better utilize energy resources and develop alternative energies.
The rational and clean use of coal, of course, will be one of the most
important policy issues in the PRC. On the other hand, the depletion of
domestic petroleum resources and the substitution of oil has attracted more
and more attention. The important role of nuclear energy in the future
Chinese energy system has been repeatedly discussed by many authors, and,
as a result, the Chinese decision-makers in the Ministry of Energy have also
emphasized this policy. There are still serious obstacles in both the safety
and the economy of this nuclear option.
(5) Pursue long-term integrated planning.
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Long-tem1 integrated planning considering the interaction of energy,
economy, environment and social developments is indispensable for a fast
growing economy and energy system. The study of a number of issues is still
needed in the long-term energy fk_recasl oithe PRC, e.g., capital inveslmenl,
technology options, manpower and other resources requirements, etc. The
global issue of climate change presents a new and challenging problem to
Chinese decision-makers, which requires also an inlegrated approach in a
global context.
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Tables A.20 and A.21
1_ble &.20s _ Growth o_ Illeat=i_£ty Cons_lFt£on :Lm the NrC
(ian, t_s_t_tt-&_sre _ ]res:)
Year Electricity Cons. Year Electricity Cons,
1949 4.3 1969 94.0
1950 4.6 1970 115.9
195l 5,8 1971 138.4
1952 7.3 1972 150.0
1953 9.2 /973 164.0
L954 il.O 1974 165.9
L955 L2 3 1975 192.2
1956 16 6 L976 199.6
1957 19 3 1977 218.8
1958 27 5 1978 251.1
1959 44 3 1979 275.0
1960 59 4 1980 300.6
1961 48 1 1981 309.3
1962 45 8 1982 327.7
1963 49.0 1983 351.4
1964 56.0 _984 377.0
1965 67.6 1985 410.7
1966 82.5 k986 449.6
1967 77.4 1987 496.0
1968 71.6
%_ble A.lXt roz_asst of lib:tr/city Pr_luot/m
in the I_C (nmr. 10)
Year 2000 2020 2050
Item Unit Cue I Case 2 Ome 3
Total gne rg._¢ L09tca 1.50 2.40 5.20 5.20 5.20
Shire of Electricity % 29.0 40.0 50.0 50.0 50.0
ElectrtciW Product. _ 1200 3008 8150 8150 8150
In_ tailed Capacity GNe 240 600 1630 1630 1630
Ammon8 which :
Hydropover Gl_ 83 174 263 263 263
Coal ONe 152 396 lO76 804 532
Nuclear Gge 5 30 291 563 835
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APPENDIX 2
UPDATE: ENERGY RESOURCE DEVELOPMENT IN CHINA IN
THE 1990'S
A Ten-year Plan
Abstracted l'rom a paper written by tile staff of tile Division of Planning,
Ministry of Energy Resources, PRC. "Energy Resources in China," Vol. 2,
No. 3, March 25, 1991. Translated anti furnished by Prof. Chi Wang, Oregon
State Univ.
In China, the last decade of the 20lh Century, encompassing the seventh and
the eighth "'five-year plim", is of great importance to China's goal to raise
the standard of living of the Chinese people to a decent level. To this end,
the objective of the energy, industry is therefore to ensure that the demand
of energy' is adequately met during this crucial period. The basic policy in
future energy development will be centered around electric power, with
emphasis placed on: coal production: hydroelectric power: nuclear t)ower:
petroleum and natural gas production: energy conservation measures aimed
at sltving electric energy, petroleum and coal" cogeneration; utilization of
v,,'aste heat: continued effort to replace petroleum with coal: improvement of
energy' use-efficiency; and reduction of environmental contamination.
Basic objectives for the next ten years are:
(1) Ensure that the growth rate of the energy industry is keeping pace with
the growtll rate of the Gross National Product (GNP). lt is estimated the GNP
will go up about ('_q yearly during the next decade. Production of once-
through energy resources should grow about 3_7_a year and electric power
generation should increase by 7+,4 a year.
This would meim that production of once-through energy resources should
reach the level of l.2 billion tons standard-coal-equivalent (SCE)by 1995
imd 1.4 billion tons SCE by, the end of the decade. Coal production should
be increased 0.4 billion tons SCE a year by, the year 2000; petroleum
production should be increased 4.7 million tons standard oil equiw.tlent
(SOE) a year -- i.e., 2.7 million tons SOE of petroleum and 1.50 billion
cubic meters of natural gas" generation of hydroelectric power should be
increased 1().0 billion kW-hr a year to the level of 21.0 billion kW-hr a year
by' the year 2()()(Jand generation of nuclear power should be increased to the
level of 1().0 billion kW-hr a year.
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-The rate oi'energy conservation of the society as a whole ,should reach
3_/_.
By 1995, coal ccmsumption in thermal power plants should drop to
the level of 350 g/kw-hr. Coal consumption in new thermal power
phmts should he about 33() g/kw-hr. Replacement of old coal-fired
power plants with generation capacity estimated t¢_be 5()()() MWe.
- Reduction of power consumption within power plants.
- Gradually increase the role oi'coal in electric pow'er generation to the
level of 335/, by the year 20()0.
(3) Accelerate construction of hydroelectric facilities, aiming at a level of
13,200 MWe genenttion capacity by the year 2()()(), of which 2700 MWe will
be medium to large-size facilities.
(4) Accelerate mining of coal, aimed al production of 1.4 billion Ions of coal
a year by the year 20{)(}. Facilities for improvement of coal quality will also
be expanded.
(5) Accelerate development of nuclear power, thereby placing nuclear
power as one oi'the important resources of energy. By the year 2()()(), nuclear
power plants with a total generation capacity of 5,3(}() MWe shotlld be in
operation, and plants with generation capacity of 5,7OO MWe should be
under construction. Manufacturing technology for nuclear power plants
having a generation capacity of 6()() MWe should be mastered for domestic
manufacturing of nuclear power plants by the end of the century.
(61 Strengthen petrolcum industry development, aiming at the goal of
producing ! 7()million metric Ions of petroleum and 3() billion cubit meters
of natural gas by the year 2()()(). Redoubled efforts should be made in
exploration tasks aiming at an addition of 4.3 billion tons to the present level
of confirmed reserve. New efforts should be focused on the regions in
western China.
(7_ Development of power generation facilities in the rural area should be
enhanced, including construction of mediunl size and sinai! hydroelectric
facilities having a total generation capacity of 3,500 MWe, and small solar-
power, wind-power and geothermal plants.
(8) Making use of technological advancements, improvement should be
made in management, efficiency, productivity, and environment protection.
Several giant-sized projects will be undertaken making use of sophisticated
technology. The development plan for the next decade includes:
(a.) Hydroelectric facilities at Three Gorges (Yangtze River) wilh a
generation capacity of 16,789 MWe, al Lung Tan with a generation
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(a.) Hydroelectric fitcilities at Three Gorges (Yanglze River) with a
generation capacity of 16,789 MWe, at Lung Tan with a generation
capacity of 4,000 MWe, at Er Tan with a generation capacily of 3,000
MWe and a number of large pumped storage stations,
(b.) Thirteen thermal power plants, each having a generation capacity oi"
3,00() MWe:
(c.) Two nuclear power stations, each having four 600 MWe power
reactors and two nuclear power stations, each having two 1,000 MWe
power reactors, a total of 6,800 MWe;
(d.) Establishment of a nation-wide transmission grid with 500 kV lines;
(e.) New coal mines to produce 80 million tons of coal and manufacture
of mining facilities having a capacity of 10,00()tons per day;
(f.) Development of sophisticated techniques tbr exploration of oil and
natural gas at desert and ocean shore sites, and technology for long-
distance pipeline and ocean-to-shore transportation of oil and natural gas.
(9) Making use of modern technology and scientific management skills to
improve efficiency and productivity. Planned items include:
(a.) Improve coal mine productivity by 5% a year, aimed at 2 metric tons
per worker by the year 2000:
(b.) Raise the ratio of mechanized coal mining from 61% in 1989 to 84%
by the year 2000:
(c.) Raise productivity of power plant workers by 5% a year;
(d.) Reduce coal consumption in power plants by improved thermal
efficiency:
(e.) Condense construction time lk)r power plants (600 MWe or higher
coal-fired) to 24-30 months. Condense construction time for medium and
large sized hydroelectric facilities lo 2-4 years. Condense construction
time for coal mines ( 1 million tons/year or larger) to 4 years.
Comment by Prof. Chi Wang, Oregon State Univ., July 5, 1991:
At this point, China is doing better in her economic development program.
Thus, China's foreign currency reserve has increased from a low of $8
billion U.S. in 1988 lo the current level of over $36 billion. China's first
nuclear power plant, the Qinshan- I plant, is scheduled to be on line by the
end of 1991. The official policy in nuclear power development has been
declared by Chinese leaders as "'basically self-reliance, but seeking foreign
advanced technology when needed."
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Presently, China's Liaoning province is trying to purchase 2 VVER-lO()()s
lmm the USSR by means ol'comperlsation trade, and the Shangluti nuclear
power group is inl'om+ially seeking loreign contractors to participate in the
design and construction tasks of 2,6(10 MWe PWRs at the Qinshan situ. In
1090, Cllina's National Nuclear Industry Corp. (CCNIC, formerly the
Ministry of Nuclear Industry) began discussions with Westinghouse Corp.
to pursue cooperative development in some areas of the AP-6()() program.
However, the LI.S.- China Nuclear Cooperation Agreernent has not yet been
forwarded by the White House to the Congress for ratification. Early in 1991
CNNIC negotiated with a foreign rnanufacturer for cooperative tasks in
mantlfacturing fuel elerrlents for the proposed 6_)() MWe nuclear power
plants to be built at the Qinshan site.
However, there is no doubt that shortage of allocated funds from the central
govemrnent is slowing down progress of China's nuclear power develop-
ment. lt is possible that the severe power shortage currently prevailing in
Guangdong and the noticeable effect of "acid rain" in several coastal




SOCIAL MOVEMENTS AND ENERGY ISSUES
Prof. Aaron Wildavsky
Political Science Dept., Graduate School of Public Policy
Director, Survey Research Center
University of California, Berkeley, CA
The two questions I find most often asked are: What criterion of choice
should we adopt and defend? and, Why is it that people opposed to various
aspects of modem technology keep denying this criterion of choice?
In order to explain this I'm going to range very far afield and to talk to you
about things you've never heard of and will sound even stranger. The only
assurance that I will give you is that they are true, which is even stranger.
Consider the case of the rational potato. When mother told us that we should eat
the jacket because the vitamins are there, she was right. But mother doesn't
know everything: and she did not know that every living creature and every-
thing that grows, in order to defend itself, has to be able to ward off predators.
This is also true of the homely potato, which has a fair amount of poison in it.
Indeed, on some very rare occasions, when potatoes decompose and concen-
trate their decomposition, the unfortunates who have drunk that little brew have
died. Now if you were to go with this image of a parlor game, a rational potato,
and you had to decide where to put your poisons, would you put them in the
white, soft, pulpy center or in the harsh, rough, abrasive bark? Being a rational
potato, you would put your poisons where the vitamins are. And this gives the
first, and one of the most important, clues about understanding risk, namely that
the good and bad consequences of every product, element and process are
inextricably intertwined in the same objects.
Risk is spoken about as if there were not one tree of life but two. There's the
healthy apples, and there are the sick apples. Choose healthy apples, not sick
apples. What kind of statement is that? The reason we have any questions
at all is that apples have both good and bad things inextricably intertwined
for us. An Alar-tainted apple, for example, has one third of the carcinoge-
nicity of a glass of Berkeley tap water: chlorine is transformed to chloro-
form, which is a weak carcinogen. So if we then ask, how are we to get more
of the good that is in things rather than the bad, we have to come face to face
with an anomaly, an apparent anomaly, that easily dissolves upon thought.
i
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Let us stipulate to critics that many things come into the world that are bad
for somebody, and many existing things are bad for somebody. Human
variability is very great. And let's say that new things are always coming in
that are going to hurt someone. If that was all there is, as the scare stories in
the newspapers suggest, why aren't the stretcher bearers carrying the youth
of America away? Have you visited our campuses? Do you notice students
falling down, one after the other? On the contrary, we see that our country,
in common with other advanced industrial countries, is not only among the
richest but the safest and healthiest countries in the world. Indeed, we get a
clue from this. In every country of the world, richer countries, with high per
capita GNP, have people who are healthier than poorer ones. Within every
country richer people are healthier than poorer people. Within every ethnic
and regional group that I've been able to study, richer people are healthier
than poorer ones. The many campaigns to denigrate American institutions,
especially capitalism, tell you that the United States is eighteenth in int'ant
mortality. That's true, but of course saying that doesn't tell you whether
we're doing better or worse. Answer: we're doing better, except for those
that feed crack to their children.
But, more than that, people in most of the countries are infinitely better off
than people used to be, and moreover, me ,t of them are bunched at a certain
level. If, however, you took the Caucasian population, the U.S. is right up
there with the leaders. But more than that, the leader in the world in good
infant mortality is the Japanese. They have 6 per thousand, which is just out
of this world, by historical references. But I don't want our Japanese
representative go get a swelled head, because accor, ling to my theory (I've
started looking for the data) the Japanese in America should be doing as well
or better than the Japanese in Japan.
The American rate for Japanese-Americans is 4 per thousand which is just
incredible. And indeed, when I run up against data for American Swedes and
Norwegians and Danes, l believe we will find the same thing. From this
example I mean to ask: What is it that's responsible for the enormous
improvements in health and safety that have occurred in the last 100 years,
in the last 50 years, in the last 20 years, in the last 10 years and last year? So
far as I know, nobody has asked this question. For years I went around asking
economists where their economic theory of health and safety was. You mean
in the business schools you're going to teach people to make their children's
fingers fall off and make their wives' stomachs fall out in order to make
money? Surely you must think that corporate capitalism is better for
people's health than if it didn't exist and, if you don't think so, why are you
doing it'? Why are you destroying life instead of enhancing it'?
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The basic answer to this question is that health and safety, as Chauncey Starr
told you, is almost a direct function of our standard of living. You already
know that your neighbors are a very important part of your standard of
living. If you've ever lived in a place where they back out real fast and
they're accident prone, you understand this very weil. But more than that,
health and safety, in a very general way, depend on the accumulation of
fungible resources, like knowledge, information, energy, wealth and orga-
nizational capacity. I mention organizational capacity because that's often
neglected. I realize I wrote a book on this theme called, "Searching for
Safety", and that I neglected it also. But it is very important, and an aspect
of know-how is knowing how to organize, as the entire life of Prof. Glenn
Seaborg testifies. I don't know if he lists on his vita"organizational genius",
but that is a very important part of the reason America has done as well as
it has in the last decades.
When you have large amounts of generalizable and fungible resources,
fungible meaning convertible into other things, you can then meet the axiom
of uncertainty, because then you know that the idea being currently pushed
w that there are going to be inherently sate reactors -- is a no-no. Why
would any one speak up for something thai his whole life testifies to is
wrong? To err is human. There is nothing associated with human beings in
which there are not errors. Why should we do something so that the first time
it goes wrong (and what doesn't) -- didn't the great Dr. Samuel Johnson
speak of second marriage as a triumph of hope over experience- why, we
know that's not realistic. So what we need are systems that are going to do
several things:
* Take advantage of our mistakes so we will do better in the future,
* Decentralize research, so that we can figure out what are the better things
to do without investing too much in any one of them.
* And we need systems that will enable us to deal with bad things after they
occur, because of the impossibility of predicting them.
In a wide-ranging search, I have concluded tliat nothing of importance has
been predicted in our time. Not the computer revolution, not Naziism, not
Bolshevism, not feminism. You name it and, if its important, we haven't
predicted it.
Mv favorite is the 1903 Patent Office in this country, whose Chief said ii
could close down now' because everything that could be discovered, had
been. If it is true that the accumulation of generalizable resources is good for
your health, that explains one thing: Why, in the presence of natural
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disasters, people in rich countries do so much better than poor ones. You see
what happens to poor countries. They have one of everything and it"s usually
missing. They don't have the facilities for early warning, and if they did, they
don't have the transportation to get out of the way. They're sicker to begin
with. They don't have proper clothes and shelter. Everything is more fragile,
and the result is that people who live in countries thai are more technologi-
cally advanced are richer, and do better under virtually every circumstance
you can imagine. Why, then, do we listen and give in to people who tell us
that poorer is safer? I believe in the adage of the great Yiddish red hot
momma of my youth in Brooklyn, Sophie Tucker, who was very clear in her
views that "I've been rich and I've been poor, and believe me, rich is better".
But ali the mechanisms that we are offered to make us safer, do make us
poorer. Ralph Keeney is about to come out with a paper to tell us how much
we lose when we spend money on regulations and other things that are not
productive. We already know that a 1% increase in the employment rate
does better for peoples" health than every damn safety measure you could
imagine, except maybe for two: plumbing and public health.
Out of this consideration comes a very important criterion of choice, lt is
very well known. I don't accept credit for it. It is only that an eternal verity
is being denied. The criterion is called "net benefit". And it just tells you to
weigh up, as best you can, as fallible as you are, the good and the bad health
effects of things. I never talk about money because then they say, "It's only
money". Money is life, money is babysitters, money is vacations, money is
hospitals, money is health. Now if bad things are coming into the world at
a tremendous rate, which they are, and they're harmful to somebody, what
is happening so that our health rates are better every year'? What is happening
is that indeed these things are bad for somebody, but they're good for more
people that they're bad for. So they take more good out of the intertwined
good and bad in objects. The result is that, over time, unlike Greece and
Rome where you died at age 30, our life expectancy and our health at
different ages keeps growing.
Why, then, do we hear from environmental and so-called safety groups that
net benefit is anathema? It's not wrong, its anathema. They say that if any
substance does some harm to somebody, it has to be stopped. I call this "trial
without error". No trials without prior guarantees against error! If we follow
that rule, our wealth will decline, and then our health will decline. It's wrong
to promise health and bring sickness. You should not let your opponents take
the moral upper hand. On the contrary, why then do we have this enormous
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opposition, not only to nuclear power, but to tile release of genetically
engineered organisms, one of the best things ever to come our way, whose
benefits are immense and growing, and whose dangers are so remote, they
can't be seen by even the most advanced microscopes? Why'?
Take your clue from a basic aspect of human life. Life is with people.
Whatever else people care about -- they may care about dogs and cats --
but always they care about their relations with other people. And what you
want to do is to translate your position and that of other people's positions,
into social relations. What matters most to people is other people and how
they relate to each other. So let's start, as in any good scientific endeavor,
a little obliquely, with a five minute exercise in conceptions of human and
physical nature. And then I will show you how you can use this analysis to
explain what's happening.
If you are a competitive individualist, a la Milton Friedman or our local
biologists whose pride and optimism shines through every paper they write,
they're going to re-create the world from micro-origins for breakfast, and
everything left over they're going to have for lunch. Why, a competitive
individualist's view of nature is that nature is a cornucopia. There are no
resources that are natural. Human beings give whatever creativity there is.
If you want to read a book that breathes the spirit, Julian Simon's "The
Ultimate Resource" tells you man is the ultimate resource. So they believe
in a life of incessant bidding and bargaining, Individuals believe that in order
to justify incessant bidding and bargaining, they argue that whatever bad
things you create from it. you'll be able to pick up afterwards by creating
more resources.
Now take radical egalitarians, people who believe in greater equality of
conditions. Like what'? Like reducing the power differences between men
and women, parents and children, animals and people, gays and straights,
blacks and whites, and all the rest. Their views of nature, which you can get
several times a week in your mail, from environmental groups: NOTICE:
NATURE IS FRAGILE. Why, the least little upset to Mother Nature and she
will wreak such havoc upon you as you will not believe! They say nature is
fragile in order to emphasize that corporate capitalism, big people, people
with too much money, people with too much power, exploit nature just like
they do human beings. I've discovered that the comparison does much better
when you reverse it.
Suppose you're a competitive individualist and want to say nature is fragile.
How would you justify bidding and bargaining? How would you justify
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capitalism? You would have to have immense regulation. No, you can't do
this. Supposing you're an egalitarian and you said nature is cornucopian,
why then should you share it? What is the need tbr equalizing measures ii"
there is always enough'? If you have a hierarchical disposition, then you say
that nature, the physical world, is "'perverse tolerant": perverse ii you don't
follow the rules and abide by the decisions oithe great experts, tolerant if you
do follow the rules and the experts.
Now there are also fatalists: people who believe thai life is like a lottery, to
use the words of Mrs. Gaskell's great nineteenth century novel about class
warfare in Britain. Nature is random, and therefore there's no point in
intervening in it because you can never figure it out. You could get rich. You
could run into a great legacy or a bag of gold could fall from the sky, but from
your own effort, never.
What we are living with is the externalization upon the contemporary scene
of different visions of the natural world, designed to support different types
of social relations. In order to understand this we have to go from inodels of
physical nature as they are attached to a desire for different social relations
to models of human nature. And that's ali- no more variables.
If you are individualistic, your rnodel of human nature is that human beings
are plastic. They respond to incentives. If you are hierarchical, your model
of human nature is that human beings are born bad. This is where original
sin comes from. There's a lovely book by Elaine Pagels on St. Augustine in
the fourth century and why his theory dominated the Catholic Church.
Before Augustine, the church did not say that human beings were bom bad;
they had more optimistic views. But imagine that I've appointed you all, not
scientists, but Roman legates! You're going out into the field and you walk
down to someplace conquered by Rome and they tap you on the shoulder and
they say, "'In Rome, what is your conception of human nature'?" And you say,
"Human beings are born good but corrupted by evil institutions, like Rome".
No - it is the egalitarians that keep telling you that human beings are born
good but corrupted by evil institutions. Why'? Because the coerciveness oi"
the hierarchies and the structured inequalities produced by competitive
individualism are terrible. If your norm of life is that everybody should have
equal power, then you lash out against those who you think stand tbr
inequality.
Thirty years ago, we didn't hear this cacophony of opposition in the history
we were given, lt only came in the last 20 ),ears. When the AEC was founded
it did not exist the way it does now. There was trouble aplenty, but not the
256
incessant hostility, the visceral contempt that we see now. Ii was unimagin-
able then that you could throw away billions upon billions of dollars on
facilities like it was nothing: as if some ancient tribe met up with a curse anG
decided they had to do something quite different. Well, if you were fatalistic
you would not object. What would ii matter? What was the point of
objecting'? If you're an individualist you believe risk is an opportunity and
man's creativity overcomes obstacles. If you're hierarchical you believe the
experts like Seaborg are correct. Didn't President Kennedy appoint him'?
Doesn't he have the right credentials'? Isn't he in tune with the other nuclear
experts'? Ali of which is true. So you see right away, the opposition can't
come from there.
Let me give you a little different vocabulary. You have noticed, haven't you,
that the critics are ali on the left: that you almost never find a conservative
among them. So who's doing this'? It's the radical egalitarians who are doing
this. Why? Because they first saw nuclear power as an example of the
inequalities they despise and abhor. If you want to understand them, think
not of the big C for Cancer, think of the four Cs: Corporate Capitalism
Causes Cancer.
What you are hearing, what you are getting every day, is that your
abominable behavior is part of a larger system that oppresses, represses and
suppresses people. It has to be put down, and what better way to do it than
to make people fearful oi'their waste products! What better way to do it than
to say that you have to have total purity, no errors, be completely spotless,
the perfect everything. Weil, of course nobody can meet those criteria, and
that's exactly the point.
Let me put it another way, perhaps more understandable. We are in the midst
oi struggle over the validity of our institutions. Don't think for a minute that
because democratic capitalism has been victorious in Eastern Europe thai its
victory is assured here. On the contrary, you have only to know the hostility,
the contempt, the rage, the anger that is expressed toward our institutions
among egalitarian elites. Like whom'7 Like a majority of the Democratic
party outside the South. Like almost all the public interest groups who,
survey after survey shows, prefer the government of Nicaragua to their own.
Is thai crazy'?
I heard from Dr. Starr that being a member of a great committee, the EPA
Committee on Acid Rain, you discover it's not a wonderful phenomenon
and basically it's not beneficial, but ii we spent 40, S0, 100 billion dollars
in a decade, we'll get a slight alleviation in about 40 years. This sort oi'thing
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could never happen unless you had a strong and powerful movement. Again,
what are the major movements of our time'? Civil rights, feminism, children's
rights, animal rights, and so on. They're ali egalitarian movements. In other
words, the anti-science part is not separated from the rest of our lives, lt is
an integral part of everything we experience. When's the last time you saw
a TV thing or a movie that showed a businessman leading a good life'?
The basic theory is in the book that I've been telling you about, thal Idid with
a great anthropologist named Mary Douglas, called "'Risk and Culture". Its
thesis sounds strange: People choose what to fear to support their own way
of life. For that you have to understand that objects do not come with brands
on them telling you what they are. They do not come with neon lights
blinking on and off saying, "'Sate" or "Dangerous". These identifiers are
socially constructed, lt is human beings that have to agree on the meaning
of things. You can't go through us or around us. Even science ultimately
requires consent.
I wits looking for some survey, being too poor to produce it myself, that
would enable me to compare peoples' perceptions of different dangers. And
along came Carl Dake from the Psychology Department with just the right
thing. Now our psychologists are wonderful, though they have their limita-
tions. Their limitation is they don't ask enough people. Their advantage is
they ask hundreds of questions -- they must chain their subjects to tables.
As a result, I was able to do something I've been trying to do for years and
craft not one dependent variable -- one question -- like perceptions of
dangers from technology, but perceptions of dangers from war, social
deviance, economic decline and technology.
Not to make too fine a point on it, I will give you the results very quickly.
If you are a radical egalitarian who belk,.ves in greater equality of conditions,
and who thinks our institutions are gravely lacking in producing this result,
you are bombed sick out of your mind with worry about the consequences
of technology. They're a great danger. Their consequences cannot be
limited. No good they could ever do could compensate for this. These are ali
answers to questions I'm reciting back to you. But how about social
deviants'? There's no problem there. How about war'? That's something the
establishment tells you in order to perpetuate inequality. Now, if you are of
a hierarchical bent, and ask, "ts technology a great danger'?", they say, "Our
experts say it's ali right: it's not a danger." But social deviance, that is a
terrible danger. They are sick with worry about the consequences. Though
this question was not a:;ked, I imagine they are very much like those you read
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about and may talk tc) that think that AIDS is retribution for sin, for social
deviance.
Risk'? Risk is opportunity. Deviants? If they don't bother me -- they won't
make me sick-- I won't bother them. Their habits are their business, as long
as they don't bother me. Is it true then, that individualists are not worried
about anything'? Wrong, they're worried about war. And since I have an
older boy who is just like this. I called him up and I gotjust the right answer.
Why are you worried about war'? Because it stops business! And the bastards
conscript you!
What you see here is that these people are choosing what to Iear. The
evidence is tlm same for ali of us, wherever we are, but peoples' perceptions
of what is and is not dangerous vary enormously. The latest thing that I have
seen is a monograph of the Russell Sage Foundation, called "The Risk
Professionals" in which they interviewed 240 people who are risk assessors
in government and industry, from environmental groups and the colleges
and universities. A finding which is uniform across ali studies, is that
knowledge doesn't matter. Except there is a tendency for those who know
more: whatever they know more about is both safer than other people think
and won't perform as many wonders.
Now what about the other studies that are ali relevant to this'? What they
show is ttlat variables like trust in institutions or left/right splits explain a
great deal. Knowledge doesn't explain anything. What you see is any
variable that allows you to put your sense of how the world ought to work
to so as to impose it on objects, that discriminates right away. Isn't it true
with your own experience, that if you can find a strong supporter of nuclear
power, it's rare to find a liberal'? There are liberals among them, but they're
very few. If you find people who are terribly worried about recombinant
DNA or something, and they're terribly worried about nuclear, they're
almost ali perfect-type liberals, are they not'?
In my book, "'Searching for Safety", I have chapter on the law of torts. The
law of torts is the law of personal injuries, lt had a reasonable rationale which
was that ifa product or a person hamled another, the person who was harmed
could sue and therefore there would be an incentive not to create hann. But
the original idea was based on fault. That is. you had to show that the
business or the person was in some way culpable, that they knew something
abou! what could go wrong, that they could have prevented it, but did not
take reasonable care. That way, it's terrific. One good thing about the ton
law is thal il's resilient and spontaneous, that is, you can't sue unless you got
hurt.
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But in recent decades, the tort law has become a means of redistributing
income. And its had terrible effects. The Rand Corporation did a study of
thousands of cases and this is what it shows: Supposing two people are in a
ten'ible accident, God tk_rbid, and one gets terribly hurt, so you sue the
insurance company of the other and you collect X thousands, X tens of
thousands. If one of you is a city it's 4X, if one of you is a corporation it's
anybody's guess.
And now a final point. You can conceive of the world as an egalitarian or an
individualist, or any way you want, but nature does not need to comply.
Nothing that I have said implies relativism of any kind. 1can imagine the
world to be any way I want, but I can't make it come out that way. We saw
in Eastern Europe promises of a better life through central command
economies. They can promise ali they want, but they are not able to make
that good. In the same way, those who say that net benefits should be
rejected, who are opponents of almost every technology that you ever heard
of, who think that poorer is healthier and safer, may be able to get away with
what they are doing. They are dominant in our country.
I know for a fact that I am losing. I hear it everywhere I go. I am not under
any illusions that there's any majority in support of the views that I have
expressed here. But I also believe, from my knowledge, that if the opponents
ultimately prevail, our country and other countries will eventually end up
both poorer and sicker. And to the best of our ability we should try not to
allow that to happen.
Supposing there is in the Santa Cruz hills a grizzly axe murder. Somebody
has been slashed into many pieces and you instantly turn on the radio to your
local sociologist-cure-anthropologist: "Who is to blame':" And you will
hear, "'The system done did it!" The system has replaced the butler as the
ubiquitous evil person here.
In my whole life I memorized one table which I will give you because it tells
you what a serious situation we are in here. It comes from Sidney Verba and
Gary Orrin's book, "'Equality in America". First of all, the respondents are
ali elites. These are not general citizens. Here is the question: Who is to
blame for poverty: the system or the individual': I'm going to give you those
who argued the system/blame side. Blacks - 84c,4 for system blame,
feminists 74%, Democratic activists 64%, media elites 5()_)_,businessmen
14c,_,Republicans 12c_. What you see here is as clear a picture of ideological
polarization as you could ever find.
What is happening to nuclear power and other aspects of technology is not
something strange, it's not out there on Mars, it's not apart from other things
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that happen in our lives. It's part and parcel of u'emendous ideological
division. And those who are on the feannongering side, they have public
opinion on their side, wtaich is why the politicians cater to them so much.
To sumnmrize then: if we want, based both on theory and observation, to
improve the health of the citizens of the world, tlm way to do so is to continue
with at least moderate economic growth, to extend science and technology.
I'm now doing a book on Poland, to exemplify it as a case of why these
regimes -- Conmaunist political economies -- decline so rapidly. The
whole poinl there is that their use of materials and energy is two to three
times at least more intct_._;ivethan ours, and that's one basic reason they are
so polluted. Adopting a completely di fferent system is only going to increase
pollution, not decrease it.
The best criterion of choice is net benefit. The best social and economic
systems are democratic, decentralized, private property oriented. The rea-
sons for the differences among people have virtually nothing to do with
knowledge: they have everything to do with preferences for a different way
of life.
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